Narrative:

I was on tower controller in charge and flight data; and another controller was on local control/ground control. East/ap issued a point out for an IFR enroute aircraft (aircraft Z) crossing the departure corridor about 5 NM from the field (northeast to southwest at 4;000 feet MSL). Aircraft Y called about 10 NM northwest of the field inbound for a touch and go at 4;000 feet MSL descending to 3;000 feet MSL. Aircraft X called up ready to depart off runway xx. Local control coordinated with east/ap for a left turn on course to avoid a loss of separation between aircraft X; aircraft Y; and aircraft Z; which was approved. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with a left turn on course; but took a little longer than expected to start his roll. When the aircraft did not execute a turn off the departure end as we thought he might; local control asked aircraft X to start turn on course now. Aircraft X was climbing to 2;800 feet MSL when local control started issuing the traffic. In response to his TCAS; aircraft X descended on his own to 2;500 feet MSL until he had the VFR traffic in sight. Traffic was never issued to aircraft Y about the departing jet. When the traffic was in sight and no factor; airrcaft X climbed and maintained 3;000 feet MSL until the IFR cessna was in sight; who was now about 4 NM west/northwest of the field at 4;000 feet MSL. Recommendation; 1. If plan a doesn't work; recognize it as soon as possible and use/have a plan B ready. There are many things we could've done to avoid the loss of separation; but we did not act in a timely enough manner. You can tell on the tapes how quickly local control got flustered when aircraft X didn't depart; climb; and turn as fast as we thought aircraft X could. The plan a could have worked; but it didn't. We needed plan B ready much quicker than we had. 2. Issue traffic to everyone. Local control was talking non-stop which inhibited his ability to issue traffic to aircraft Y; but it could've been called much sooner. 3. Let the departing traffic know why you need a quick turn out. If local control had issued 'traffic; cessna 5 miles northwest inbound on downwind for runway 32 at 3;000 feet' aircraft X may have been able to get the turn done quicker; or they could've requested to hold. 4. East/ap should not have approved the turn on course if he didn't think it would work especially with the point out aircraft crossing the departure end. 5. As tcic; I should've been quicker to react and assist local control in handling the situation in a timely manner and make suggestions. 6. Also develop plans C; D; and E7. We need to (and will) try to imagine how a situation will develop and be ready for when something doesn't happen the way we planned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described a conflict event between an IFR and VFR aircraft; the reporter noting multiple chances were available to the controller to prevent this event but none were taken.

Narrative: I was on Tower CIC and Flight Data; and another controller was on LC/GC. E/AP issued a point out for an IFR enroute aircraft (Aircraft Z) crossing the departure corridor about 5 NM from the field (northeast to southwest at 4;000 feet MSL). Aircraft Y called about 10 NM northwest of the field inbound for a touch and go at 4;000 feet MSL descending to 3;000 feet MSL. Aircraft X called up ready to depart off Runway XX. LC coordinated with E/AP for a left turn on course to avoid a loss of separation between Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; and Aircraft Z; which was approved. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with a left turn on course; but took a little longer than expected to start his roll. When the aircraft did not execute a turn off the departure end as we thought he might; LC asked Aircraft X to start turn on course now. Aircraft X was climbing to 2;800 feet MSL when LC started issuing the traffic. In response to his TCAS; Aircraft X descended on his own to 2;500 feet MSL until he had the VFR traffic in sight. Traffic was never issued to Aircraft Y about the departing jet. When the traffic was in sight and no factor; Airrcaft X climbed and maintained 3;000 feet MSL until the IFR Cessna was in sight; who was now about 4 NM W/NW of the field at 4;000 feet MSL. Recommendation; 1. If Plan A doesn't work; recognize it ASAP and use/have a Plan B ready. There are many things we could've done to avoid the loss of separation; but we did not act in a timely enough manner. You can tell on the tapes how quickly LC got flustered when Aircraft X didn't depart; climb; and turn as fast as we thought Aircraft X could. The Plan A COULD have worked; but it didn't. We needed Plan B ready much quicker than we had. 2. Issue traffic to everyone. LC was talking non-stop which inhibited his ability to issue traffic to Aircraft Y; but it could've been called much sooner. 3. Let the departing traffic know why you need a quick turn out. If LC had issued 'Traffic; Cessna 5 miles northwest inbound on downwind for Runway 32 at 3;000 feet' Aircraft X may have been able to get the turn done quicker; or they could've requested to hold. 4. E/AP should not have approved the turn on course if he didn't think it would work especially with the point out aircraft crossing the departure end. 5. As TCIC; I should've been quicker to react and assist LC in handling the situation in a timely manner and make suggestions. 6. Also develop Plans C; D; and E7. We need to (and will) try to imagine how a situation will develop and be ready for when something doesn't happen the way we planned.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.