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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1122414 |
Time | |
Date | 201310 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
We were diverting. [We were] on final and were stabilized for a flaps 45 landing. The captain was jockeying the thrust levers pretty well; but it didn't seem like we were gaining or losing airspeed at an abnormal rate. At about 700 AGL we got an amber windshear caution. The captain said continue. We continued on speed and on glideslope and landed normally.we should have gone around; plain and simple. On the one hand; I think this may have been a bit of a self-induced windshear on the part of the captain; because big power changes can cause the plane to think it's in windshear a little more often. On the other hand; you never know; and that's not sufficient reason to ignore SOP and not go-around. It is definitely hard to override a captain and call for a go-around when the captain has made the decision to continue. It's also hard having been based in ZZZ in the past and seen days where you couldn't land anywhere if you didn't fly through an amber windshear. There's a tendency in this company to continue during amber windshears; despite what the cfm says; and it's a powerful cultural habit to resist. The danger; of course; is that this is the one time where amber gives way to red and you are already behind the curve. That is an unacceptable danger; which we ought not to have accepted. The failure is a double failure in this case; the captain for not immediately executing the go-around; and me for not being assertive and demanding a go-around. This is something that I'm trying to correct. The fact that we were diverting certainly was a contributing factor. We are already concerned about fuel in that case; and don't want to make the situation worse. In this case we would still have had enough fuel to come back and try the approach again. Now; when you are low on gas; then sometimes you are forced to fly through an amber; but we were not yet at that point. Just go-around. There's no fault; it doesn't cost you anything but time; and it's the prudent course of action. The culture of no go-arounds will only change when people like me speak up and start going around. It's going to take a bit; but hopefully we are moving in the right direction.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB145 First Officer describes an approach by the Captain continued after a windshear caution at 700 AGL; to a normal landing.
Narrative: We were diverting. [We were] on final and were stabilized for a flaps 45 landing. The Captain was jockeying the thrust levers pretty well; but it didn't seem like we were gaining or losing airspeed at an abnormal rate. At about 700 AGL we got an amber WINDSHEAR caution. The Captain said continue. We continued on speed and on glideslope and landed normally.We should have gone around; plain and simple. On the one hand; I think this may have been a bit of a self-induced windshear on the part of the Captain; because big power changes can cause the plane to think it's in windshear a little more often. On the other hand; you never know; and that's not sufficient reason to ignore SOP and not go-around. It is definitely hard to override a Captain and call for a go-around when the Captain has made the decision to continue. It's also hard having been based in ZZZ in the past and seen days where you couldn't land anywhere if you didn't fly through an amber windshear. There's a tendency in this company to continue during amber windshears; despite what the CFM says; and it's a powerful cultural habit to resist. The danger; of course; is that this is the one time where amber gives way to red and you are already behind the curve. That is an unacceptable danger; which we ought not to have accepted. The failure is a double failure in this case; the Captain for not immediately executing the go-around; and me for not being assertive and demanding a go-around. This is something that I'm trying to correct. The fact that we were diverting certainly was a contributing factor. We are already concerned about fuel in that case; and don't want to make the situation worse. In this case we would still have had enough fuel to come back and try the approach again. Now; when you are low on gas; then sometimes you are forced to fly through an amber; but we were not yet at that point. Just go-around. There's no fault; it doesn't cost you anything but time; and it's the prudent course of action. The culture of no go-arounds will only change when people like me speak up and start going around. It's going to take a bit; but hopefully we are moving in the right direction.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.