Narrative:

Things were pretty much normal except for an ECAM message that displayed landing gear lgciu 1 fault. We did a reset in accordance with the qrc and it went away. After a timely departure; we taxied out to the runway. We were cleared for takeoff when the ECAM reappeared. We taxied clear of the runway and got hold of maintenance control. We did another reset and again the ECAM disappeared. However before we could get a takeoff slot for our destination the ECAM reappeared. We taxied back to the gate and had local maintenance look at it. We learned that maintenance had done an update to the # 1 lgciu the night before. Out of any lgciu unites/parts etc. The solution was to take lgciu 2 and switch it with lgicu 1 and then defer lgicu 2. Since it is an approved procedure; we accepted the airplane with lgciu 2 meled. After takeoff and after gear retraction; we heard a somewhat loud thump accompanied by a vibration. It felt like the nose gear had dropped on the gear up locks and then was being raised again. Like the last part of the gear retraction cycle after takeoff. This was after the gear was already up. After approximately a minute; [we experienced] another similar thump again accompanied by a vibration. A third thump and vibration was felt approximately 2 minutes after that. I noticed a faint odor; pretty much right after gear retraction. An odor that is hard to describe; but maybe of an electric motor that was working very hard or like someone had dripped a material on a hotplate. The first officer did not smell it; but after the double ding; (10;000 ft) the a flight attendant called and complained about the same smell and the thumping noise and vibration. It seemed the odor was dissipating as we climbed and the thumping noise and vibration had stopped. After consulting with dispatch and maintenance control I/we decide to continue. After approximately 4 hours of flight; we got an ECAM with lgciu 1 fault. Having lgciu 2 deferred and lgciu 1 inoperative; meant we would (possibly) have a host of inoperative equipment; including normal gear extension; reversers (both engines); autopilot (though # 2 autopilot kept working); nose wheel steering; autothrottles (it kept working) etc. We read through landing gear lgciu 1+2 fault QRH followed by landing gear gravity extension and landing with abnormal landing gear. After a discussion with maintenance control; dispatch; the first officer and I; I/we decided to declare an emergency. The first officer and I had discussed various outcomes of the situation. We also decided extending the gear early. Having consulted with maintenance control; we tried to extend it 10-15 miles out; by using the normal gear down procedure. It did not work. A manual landing gear gravity extension was executed and the gear came down. We landed normally; but without reverse thrust and nose wheel steering. I was able to steer the airplane of the runway by using a high-speed turn off. We had already requested that a tow truck be standing by; by the runway. They hooked us up and as we started towards the terminal; the nose wheel unlocked light came on. We decided to stop and ask maintenance to insert gear pins. Somewhat surprised they do not have them in the tow trucks; we occupied a taxiway for what seemed to be 20-30 minutes before gear pins were found. We continued to the gate without further incident. The cabin was not prepared for an evacuation. My/our intention was to see if we could get the landing gear down early. If that was not the case; we would have had to burn some of the fuel and that would have given the flight attendants; the time they needed to prepare that cabin. However; I/we did ask them to reference their in-flight handbook should the situation arise. In hindsight; I would like to make a comment that I always have been wondering about. How can we take a standby system and make it our primary system? Swapping a secondary system to replace an inoperative primary system seems to me to be defeating the purpose of having a secondary/backup system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reports being dispatched with LGCIU 2 inoperative and having LGCIU 1 fail enroute. This results in a gravity landing gear extension during approach and no nose wheel steering after landing.

Narrative: Things were pretty much normal except for an ECAM message that displayed Landing Gear LGCIU 1 fault. We did a reset in accordance with the QRC and it went away. After a timely departure; we taxied out to the runway. We were cleared for takeoff when the ECAM reappeared. We taxied clear of the runway and got hold of Maintenance Control. We did another reset and again the ECAM disappeared. However before we could get a takeoff slot for our destination the ECAM reappeared. We taxied back to the gate and had Local Maintenance look at it. We learned that Maintenance had done an update to the # 1 LGCIU the night before. Out of any LGCIU unites/parts etc. the solution was to take LGCIU 2 and switch it with LGICU 1 and then defer LGICU 2. Since it is an approved procedure; we accepted the airplane with LGCIU 2 MELed. After takeoff and after gear retraction; we heard a somewhat loud thump accompanied by a vibration. It felt like the nose gear had dropped on the gear up locks and then was being raised again. Like the last part of the gear retraction cycle after takeoff. This was after the gear was already up. After approximately a minute; [we experienced] another similar thump again accompanied by a vibration. A third thump and vibration was felt approximately 2 minutes after that. I noticed a faint odor; pretty much right after gear retraction. An odor that is hard to describe; but maybe of an electric motor that was working very hard or like someone had dripped a material on a hotplate. The First officer did not smell it; but after the double ding; (10;000 FT) the A Flight Attendant called and complained about the same smell and the thumping noise and vibration. It seemed the odor was dissipating as we climbed and the thumping noise and vibration had stopped. After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance Control I/we decide to continue. After approximately 4 hours of flight; we got an ECAM with LGCIU 1 fault. Having LGCIU 2 deferred and LGCIU 1 inoperative; meant we would (possibly) have a host of inoperative equipment; including normal gear extension; reversers (both engines); autopilot (though # 2 autopilot kept working); nose wheel steering; autothrottles (it kept working) etc. We read through Landing Gear LGCIU 1+2 FAULT QRH followed by Landing Gear Gravity Extension and Landing with Abnormal Landing Gear. After a discussion with Maintenance Control; Dispatch; the First Officer and I; I/we decided to declare an emergency. The First Officer and I had discussed various outcomes of the situation. We also decided extending the gear early. Having consulted with Maintenance Control; we tried to extend it 10-15 miles out; by using the normal gear down procedure. It did not work. A manual Landing Gear Gravity Extension was executed and the gear came down. We landed normally; but without reverse thrust and nose wheel steering. I was able to steer the airplane of the runway by using a high-speed turn off. We had already requested that a tow truck be standing by; by the runway. They hooked us up and as we started towards the terminal; the nose wheel unlocked light came on. We decided to stop and ask Maintenance to insert gear pins. Somewhat surprised they do not have them in the tow trucks; we occupied a taxiway for what seemed to be 20-30 minutes before gear pins were found. We continued to the gate without further incident. The cabin was not prepared for an evacuation. My/our intention was to see if we could get the landing gear down early. If that was not the case; we would have had to burn some of the fuel and that would have given the flight attendants; the time they needed to prepare that cabin. However; I/we did ask them to reference their in-flight handbook should the situation arise. In hindsight; I would like to make a comment that I always have been wondering about. How can we take a standby system and make it our primary system? Swapping a secondary system to replace an inoperative primary system seems to me to be defeating the purpose of having a secondary/backup system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.