Narrative:

I was working R80/R81 combined without an RA controller; traffic was routine with some complexity because of significant weather deviations around bermuda. An A319 was approximately 10 miles northwest of txkf (bermuda airport). The A319 had just finished deviating and was cleared for the visual approach to runway 30 for txkf. The tower called for release on a B737-800; I released the flight climbing to FL250 runway heading. Another A319 was on a significant deviation approximately 50 miles northwest of txkf; looking to find a break in the line of weather to get to txkf. A B767-300 was on a deviation between lazey and antig at FL340. The B767-300 was an over flight from lfpg to kmia. An A330 was on their flight plan route from numbr to gecal at FL400. The A330 was an over flight from egkk to muhg. I was expecting the B737-800 to check on my frequency and auto-acquire since he was the departure; I saw the initial hit from the radar; but he had not checked on. The next sweep; there was no radar return which was unusual; I called the flight there was no response. On the next sweep I realized my aircraft; on the visual; was also in coast track. At that point I realized that I had lost my radar. I attempted to call the first A319 and the second A319; neither answered and I could tell that there was something wrong with the frequencies as well. I attempted to switch to the buec; but it was not available and had also failed. The emergency frequencies have been out of service for several days. I immediately notified the supervisor and advised him to call txkf and advise them to attempt contact with the first A319; the second A319 and the B737-800. The B737-800 and second A319 were in conflict and I did not know exactly where these flights were and I did not have a rule in place to ensure they would remain separated. I called aeronautical radio (arinc) and advised them that this was the txkf sector and we had a catastrophic equipment failure and I needed an immediate phone patch with the second A319 and the B737-800. Arinc used the second A319 SELCAL and got a phone patch established between me and the flight. I advised the A319 of the situation; I had the flight say altitude. That A319 was leaving 14;000 feet for 5;000 feet. I stopped the A319 at 13;000 feet; I advised the A319 to return to the txkf frequency 128.5 that the B737-800 should have been on. I advised the A319 to stop the B737-800's climb at 12;000 feet and to bring the B737-800 up on the arinc phone patch so that I could attempt to apply a non-radar rule to allow the A319 to land and to get the B737-800 to a cruising altitude. The B737-800 checked on the phone patch level at 12;000 feet; I explained the situation to the B737-800 and was able to get the B737-800 established on an outbound txkf radial and get his DME. However the A319 was still on a significant deviation and was unable to turn towards txkf to get established on a radial. After approximately 10 minutes from the start of the failure the radar and frequencies retuned. I reestablished radar and communications with all my flights and returned to normal operations. The first A319 contacted txkf and landed without further incident. The B767-300 had completed their deviation and turned back on course; the A330 was normal ops with no issues. Recommendation; it appears txkf technicians were working on the back-up channel and may have inadvertently turned off the primary channel. I feel that we need to have procedures in place for when txkf-af are working on the equipment that we know so that we can apply a more proactive control environment so that we would be prepared for a catastrophic event like this. I lost both my primary radar feed; the secondary radar feed; all frequencies and all buec's during this outage. If I had known that I was potentially operating with no safety net I would have run my operation very differently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZNY Controller described an unsafe condition; working aircraft operating to and from Bermuda when both RADAR and radio links failed simultaneously.

Narrative: I was working R80/R81 combined without an RA controller; traffic was routine with some complexity because of significant weather deviations around Bermuda. An A319 was approximately 10 miles NW of TXKF (Bermuda Airport). The A319 had just finished deviating and was cleared for the visual approach to Runway 30 for TXKF. The Tower called for release on a B737-800; I released the flight climbing to FL250 runway heading. Another A319 was on a significant deviation approximately 50 miles NW of TXKF; looking to find a break in the line of weather to get to TXKF. A B767-300 was on a deviation between LAZEY and ANTIG at FL340. The B767-300 was an over flight from LFPG to KMIA. An A330 was on their flight plan route from NUMBR to GECAL at FL400. The A330 was an over flight from EGKK to MUHG. I was expecting the B737-800 to check on my frequency and auto-acquire since he was the departure; I saw the initial hit from the RADAR; but he had not checked on. The next sweep; there was no RADAR return which was unusual; I called the flight there was no response. On the next sweep I realized my aircraft; on the visual; was also in coast track. At that point I realized that I had lost my RADAR. I attempted to call the first A319 and the second A319; neither answered and I could tell that there was something wrong with the frequencies as well. I attempted to switch to the BUEC; but it was not available and had also failed. The Emergency Frequencies have been out of service for several days. I immediately notified the Supervisor and advised him to call TXKF and advise them to attempt contact with the first A319; the second A319 and the B737-800. The B737-800 and second A319 were in conflict and I did not know exactly where these flights were and I did not have a rule in place to ensure they would remain separated. I called Aeronautical Radio (ARINC) and advised them that this was the TXKF Sector and we had a catastrophic equipment failure and I needed an immediate phone patch with the second A319 and the B737-800. ARINC used the second A319 SELCAL and got a phone patch established between me and the flight. I advised the A319 of the situation; I had the flight say altitude. That A319 was leaving 14;000 feet for 5;000 feet. I stopped the A319 at 13;000 feet; I advised the A319 to return to the TXKF frequency 128.5 that the B737-800 should have been on. I advised the A319 to stop the B737-800's climb at 12;000 feet and to bring the B737-800 up on the ARINC phone patch so that I could attempt to apply a non-RADAR rule to allow the A319 to land and to get the B737-800 to a cruising altitude. The B737-800 checked on the phone patch level at 12;000 feet; I explained the situation to the B737-800 and was able to get the B737-800 established on an outbound TXKF radial and get his DME. However the A319 was still on a significant deviation and was unable to turn towards TXKF to get established on a radial. After approximately 10 minutes from the start of the failure the RADAR and Frequencies retuned. I reestablished RADAR and Communications with all my flights and returned to normal operations. The first A319 contacted TXKF and landed without further incident. The B767-300 had completed their deviation and turned back on course; the A330 was normal ops with no issues. Recommendation; it appears TXKF technicians were working on the back-up channel and may have inadvertently turned off the primary channel. I feel that we need to have procedures in place for when TXKF-AF are working on the equipment that we know so that we can apply a more proactive control environment so that we would be prepared for a catastrophic event like this. I lost both my primary RADAR feed; the secondary RADAR feed; all frequencies and all BUEC's during this outage. If I had known that I was potentially operating with no safety net I would have run my operation very differently.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.