37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1123819 |
Time | |
Date | 201310 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | MCO.Airport |
State Reference | FL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Approaching mco runway 18L we were cleared for the visual with the restriction to pass the orl VOR at 2;500 ft. As the pilot not flying I turned my attention to the checklist and performing pilot not flying duties such as configuration changes when I made a situation check I observed that we where descending through 2;200 ft about 1.5 NM north. Of the orl VOR the autopilot had been disconnected and the altitude alerter was reset explaining why there was no altitude alert. I pointed out the altitude to the first officer along with the restriction; after two calls he began to correct the altitude. We did however enter orl's airspace.I believe multiple factors contributed to this: first an operating technique that seems endemic to the industry of charging up to the airport as fast as possible and then making rapid speed and configuration changes at the last minute; effectively taking the pilot not flying out of the loop for some time as the pilot not flying makes those changes and clears the checklist items that cannot be done before the aircraft is configured. Second the recent change to the operating manual that has the pilot flying resetting the altitude himself. Due to the change being recent how we do this in the case of step down fixes where there is no ATC call is unclear; creating an unsafe situation when coupled with the next factor. Finally and most importantly an attitude among our first officers (encouraged by our human factors department) that they may operate autonomously making important operational decisions without getting the captain's approval. This is compounded by a disregard for far's; company procedures and ATC instructions. Ultimately I am responsible for this and must take steps to prevent this sort of thing. I am going to insist that all altitude changes be coordinated between the pilot flying; pilot not flying before they are made including resetting the altitude on arrivals and approaches.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An Air Carrier First Officer flying a night visual to MCO Runway 18R descended below the ORL 2;500 FT crossing restricting but corrected after the Captain's alert. The Captain reported new Company procedures take one pilot out of the loop during this period of the arrival.
Narrative: Approaching MCO Runway 18L we were cleared for the visual with the restriction to pass the ORL VOR at 2;500 FT. As the Pilot Not Flying I turned my attention to the checklist and performing pilot not flying duties such as configuration changes when I made a situation check I observed that we where descending through 2;200 FT about 1.5 NM north. of the ORL VOR the autopilot had been disconnected and the altitude alerter was reset explaining why there was no altitude alert. I pointed out the altitude to the First Officer along with the restriction; after two calls he began to correct the altitude. We did however enter ORL's airspace.I believe multiple factors contributed to this: First an operating technique that seems endemic to the industry of charging up to the airport as fast as possible and then making rapid speed and configuration changes at the last minute; effectively taking the pilot not flying out of the loop for some time as the pilot not flying makes those changes and clears the checklist items that cannot be done before the aircraft is configured. Second the recent change to the operating manual that has the pilot flying resetting the altitude himself. Due to the change being recent how we do this in the case of step down fixes where there is no ATC call is unclear; creating an unsafe situation when coupled with the next factor. Finally and most importantly an attitude among our first officers (encouraged by our Human Factors Department) that they may operate autonomously making important operational decisions without getting the captain's approval. This is compounded by a disregard for FAR's; company procedures and ATC instructions. Ultimately I am responsible for this and must take steps to prevent this sort of thing. I am going to insist that all altitude changes be coordinated between the pilot flying; pilot not flying before they are made including resetting the altitude on arrivals and approaches.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.