Narrative:

Shortly after passing through 10;000 MSL; the onboard leader called me and notified me that all the circuit breakers in the galleys had popped and there was smoke coming from the number two coffee maker. He told me his intention was to fire the halon fire bottle and I concurred with his decision. We declared an emergency and requested to return. We then switched flying duties; the first officer became the pilot flying and I became the pilot monitoring. We then divided duties; the first officer took over communications with ATC and I informed the passengers of our situation and told them we would be returning. I then sent the dispatcher an ACARS divert message. I then called the flight attendants and briefed them on our progress; informed them that we would be landing in about seven minutes and told them I did not intend to perform an evacuation. They acknowledge the instructions and I told them to consider our conversation as our company policy of final notice prior to landing. I reengaged with the first officer for landing. We completed the descent and approach checks while ATC vectored us onto the final approach course. I made one more call back to the flight attendants to ensure they were ready for landing and I then made an announcement to the passengers informing them that after landing; we planned to taxi into to the gate; so they could disembark. The aircraft landing weight was 130;000 pounds; well below max landing weight; and the first officer completed an uneventful; 40 flap landing; using medium auto-brakes. We taxied clear of the runway were met by the airport fire and rescue team and after a short discussion with them concerning the possibility of them coming up the aft airstairs to ascertain whether or not the fire was out; they decided that it would be permissible for us to proceed to the gate and let the passengers off. We proceeded to the gate. I considered referencing the smoke and fumes checklist; but we had no indications of smoke or fumes in the cockpit and the smoke from the coffee maker had ceased. Our priority was to land safely and I didn't want to delay that by running the checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-88 Captain is informed by the Purser during climb that all of the galley circuit breakers have tripped and smoke is coming from the number two coffee maker. Flight returns to the departure airport for a normal landing without employing the electrical smoke checklist.

Narrative: Shortly after passing through 10;000 MSL; the Onboard Leader called me and notified me that all the circuit breakers in the galleys had popped and there was smoke coming from the number two coffee maker. He told me his intention was to fire the halon fire bottle and I concurred with his decision. We declared an emergency and requested to return. We then switched flying duties; the First Officer became the Pilot Flying and I became the Pilot Monitoring. We then divided duties; the First Officer took over communications with ATC and I informed the passengers of our situation and told them we would be returning. I then sent the Dispatcher an ACARS divert message. I then called the flight attendants and briefed them on our progress; informed them that we would be landing in about seven minutes and told them I did not intend to perform an evacuation. They acknowledge the instructions and I told them to consider our conversation as our company policy of final notice prior to landing. I reengaged with the First Officer for landing. We completed the descent and approach checks while ATC vectored us onto the final approach course. I made one more call back to the flight attendants to ensure they were ready for landing and I then made an announcement to the passengers informing them that after landing; we planned to taxi into to the gate; so they could disembark. The aircraft landing weight was 130;000 pounds; well below max landing weight; and the First Officer completed an uneventful; 40 flap landing; using medium auto-brakes. We taxied clear of the runway were met by the airport fire and rescue team and after a short discussion with them concerning the possibility of them coming up the aft airstairs to ascertain whether or not the fire was out; they decided that it would be permissible for us to proceed to the gate and let the passengers off. We proceeded to the gate. I considered referencing the Smoke and Fumes Checklist; but we had no indications of smoke or fumes in the cockpit and the smoke from the coffee maker had ceased. Our priority was to land safely and I didn't want to delay that by running the checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.