Narrative:

We departed with MEL 30-21-01-2 engine 1 anti-ice valve. Shortly after departure on climbout around 11;000 MSL in light precipitation and light icing conditions the anti-ice system was activated automatically with four 'open' inscriptions on the overhead. We received a bleed 2 leak message on the EICAS as well as a 'leak' inscription on the bleed 2 overhead button. Shortly after the bleed 2 leak we received an ice condition 'anti-ice inop' message as well. We ran the QRH for the bleed leak and the problem was isolated after we closed the crossbleed and closed the number 2 bleed per the checklist. The anti ice failure message went away after the bleed was closed and the appropriate anti-ice checklist was consulted. We exited the icing condition by stopping our climb at 11;000 feet and later descending lower clear of the clouds. We planned to return to [departure airport] based on the bleed leak message and also the known and forecasted airmet for icing enroute. We departed at 52;813 pounds. We slowed the airplane and began burning off extra fuel by increasing drag. We asked and received a holding pattern so we could burn fuel; talk to company; and run all appropriate checklists as well as talk to our flight attendant and passengers. We determined that we would have to hold for over 1 hour to burn enough fuel to be at our landing weight. We consulted the overweight landing checklist and discussed policy in the fom. I determined that based on the bleed leak that was now contained but the unknown of damage that could have occurred before the leak was isolated; as well as the length of time required to stay airborne in order to land below our max landing weight; the safer course of action would be to use my captain's authority and land overweight. We landed at 47;500 pounds with a very smooth landing. Maintenance was contacted on the ground and they were expecting us. The overweight landing was logged as well as the bleed leak and anti-ice failure. We were flying at night in IMC and light icing conditions. MEL 30-21-01-2 was also a threat due to the associated messages that are present on the EICAS; theses messages were briefed on the ground before we departed. We also departed at a very heavy weight well above our max landing weight. When the bleed leak occurred the anti ice failure occurred at the same time and the EICAS was filling with messages quickly. We quickly became task saturated. We had to take care of our bleed leak as well as ask ATC for alternate instructions to depart the icing. I learned how important it is to prioritize and manage the cockpit during a high workload situation. I had to make a safety related decision based on information available. I determined that it would be safer to land overweight than to stay airborne for over an hour burning fuel when there was the possibility of damage to the airplane after the bleed leak. This would be an excellent loft scenario dealing with multiple issues. I was very fortunate to be flying with an excellent crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145XR Captain reported he was dispatched with engine 1 anti-ice valve inop. Shortly after takeoff they received a #2 bleed leak warning. Flight returned to departure airport.

Narrative: We departed with MEL 30-21-01-2 Engine 1 Anti-Ice Valve. Shortly after departure on climbout around 11;000 MSL in light precipitation and light icing conditions the anti-ice system was activated automatically with four 'OPEN' inscriptions on the overhead. We received a bleed 2 leak message on the EICAS as well as a 'LEAK' inscription on the bleed 2 overhead button. Shortly after the bleed 2 leak we received an ice condition 'anti-ice inop' message as well. We ran the QRH for the bleed leak and the problem was isolated after we closed the crossbleed and closed the number 2 bleed per the checklist. The anti ice failure message went away after the bleed was closed and the appropriate anti-ice checklist was consulted. We exited the icing condition by stopping our climb at 11;000 feet and later descending lower clear of the clouds. We planned to return to [departure airport] based on the bleed leak message and also the known and forecasted AIRMET for icing enroute. We departed at 52;813 pounds. We slowed the airplane and began burning off extra fuel by increasing drag. We asked and received a holding pattern so we could burn fuel; talk to company; and run all appropriate checklists as well as talk to our Flight Attendant and passengers. We determined that we would have to hold for over 1 hour to burn enough fuel to be at our landing weight. We consulted the Overweight Landing checklist and discussed policy in the FOM. I determined that based on the bleed leak that was now contained but the unknown of damage that could have occurred before the leak was isolated; as well as the length of time required to stay airborne in order to land below our max landing weight; the safer course of action would be to use my captain's authority and land overweight. We landed at 47;500 pounds with a very smooth landing. Maintenance was contacted on the ground and they were expecting us. The overweight landing was logged as well as the bleed leak and anti-ice failure. We were flying at night in IMC and light icing conditions. MEL 30-21-01-2 was also a threat due to the associated messages that are present on the EICAS; theses messages were briefed on the ground before we departed. We also departed at a very heavy weight well above our max landing weight. When the bleed leak occurred the anti ice failure occurred at the same time and the EICAS was filling with messages quickly. We quickly became task saturated. We had to take care of our bleed leak as well as ask ATC for alternate instructions to depart the icing. I learned how important it is to prioritize and manage the cockpit during a high workload situation. I had to make a safety related decision based on information available. I determined that it would be safer to land overweight than to stay airborne for over an hour burning fuel when there was the possibility of damage to the airplane after the bleed leak. This would be an excellent LOFT scenario dealing with multiple issues. I was very fortunate to be flying with an excellent crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.