Narrative:

Clt ATIS states landing north; ILS 36R glideslope inoperative; VFR night conditions; light winds. Ivane 2 RNAV STAR was briefed and verified. ILS 36R was briefed with glideslope inoperative. VNAV procedures were briefed. We planned for a visual with VNAV back up for runway 36R. Passing abeam clt airport; clt approach descended us to 4;000 ft. We expected a short turn on to final. But; instead; they kept us down wind passed 20 miles. A right turn was issued; followed by another right turn; maintain 4;000 until passing hekam; cleared ILS approach 36R. The extended approach course was called for and drawn. But; it only extended to cikdu; the facf. Airplane is on autopilot and captain pushed localizer to arm approach. Hekam was not present on either FMS or HSI. I typed it into the fix page to identify the fix to maintain 4;000; and told the captain verbally. Airport was in sight; VASI was in sight. Airplane did not capture the localizer 36R. Captain clicked off autopilot to hand fly the approach; turning right to capture the localizer. We overshot the localizer and were correcting. We passed hekam at 4;000. 3;000 was set into the altitude window for cikdu. We both became task saturated; because all fixes were not present; and captain now hand flying. Captain started a descent passing hekam with airport in sight. Clt approach called; maintain 3;500; and asked if we had traffic on left parallel runway. Captain called both traffic and airport in sight to ATC. It is not certain why the localizer did not capture by autopilot. The extended fixes did not load due to hekam transition not selected on FMS. Only the ILS 36R and STAR were loaded. Suddenly; our workload became high; trying to add missing fix and no autopilot. But pilot flying had airport and traffic in clear sight and continued. As pilot not flying; my attention was divided; watching pilot hand flying; working the radio; and trying to find correct spelling of hekam and typing. A mistake was made by seeing 4;000 on the approach chart; not noticing that was lansr; and then put the next altitude at 3;000 for cikdu. We were misled by being at 4;000; 20 miles out. The proper altitude for hekam is 6;000; not 4;000 as assigned. Nor did ATC point out traffic on the parallel runway; when cleared for the approach on base; as 'heads up'. It was after the fact that ATC called out traffic. If ATC had said; maintain 4;000 to lansr; for the attitude we were at; it would have helped in terms of situational awareness. ATC should use proper altitudes for fixes on extended approaches. Not a lower altitude. We were expecting a short approach based on an early descent to 4;000. It did not happen. Second; there should be some guidance about 'transitions' for airports that have them. We normally do not choose a transition and rarely use them; because they do not apply. Typically; it is obvious; but in this case; it is not. But with ever changing approaches and RNAV stars or sids; what was meant to make our lives easier; is making it more complicated; because ATC always adds speed and altitude changes. Now the FMS can not predict what it needs to do. And; perhaps special notes should be added to the 'airport pages'; where the use of 'transitions' is covered specifically with clear instructions to add it when loading the FMS; especially when we do not always frequent the airport on a regular basis. If not; then fixes will be missing. Lastly; a FMS 'interactive aid' should be added to our distance learning resources; to practice making last minute FMS changes. Then we can see what the FMS will do or not do for various profiles and scenarios. It is not practical to use the airplane; while on actual trips; because setting up scenarios is not very forgiving or gives us time to study the options or results.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier First Officer reports that all the fixes necessary to fly the ILS36R at CLT do not load unless the HEKAM transition is selected when loading the ILS. Crew crosses HEKAM at 4;000 FT per ATC and starts descent to 3;000 FT not realising that two more fixes need to be crossed at 4;000 FT before descent is commenced. Glideslope was out of service.

Narrative: CLT ATIS states landing north; ILS 36R glideslope inoperative; VFR night conditions; light winds. IVANE 2 RNAV STAR was briefed and verified. ILS 36R was briefed with glideslope inoperative. VNAV procedures were briefed. We planned for a visual with VNAV back up for Runway 36R. Passing abeam CLT airport; CLT Approach descended us to 4;000 FT. We expected a short turn on to final. But; instead; they kept us down wind passed 20 miles. A right turn was issued; followed by another right turn; maintain 4;000 until passing HEKAM; cleared ILS approach 36R. The extended approach course was called for and drawn. But; it only extended to CIKDU; the FACF. Airplane is on autopilot and Captain pushed LOC to arm approach. HEKAM was not present on either FMS or HSI. I typed it into the FIX page to identify the fix to maintain 4;000; and told the Captain verbally. Airport was in sight; VASI was in sight. Airplane did not capture the LOC 36R. Captain clicked off autopilot to hand fly the approach; turning right to capture the LOC. We overshot the LOC and were correcting. We passed HEKAM at 4;000. 3;000 was set into the ALT window for CIKDU. We both became task saturated; because all fixes were not present; and Captain now hand flying. Captain started a descent passing HEKAM with airport in sight. CLT Approach called; maintain 3;500; and asked if we had traffic on left parallel runway. Captain called both traffic and airport in sight to ATC. It is not certain why the LOC did not capture by autopilot. The extended fixes did not load due to HEKAM transition not selected on FMS. Only the ILS 36R and STAR were loaded. Suddenly; our workload became high; trying to add missing fix and no autopilot. But Pilot Flying had airport and traffic in clear sight and continued. As Pilot Not Flying; my attention was divided; watching pilot hand flying; working the radio; and trying to find correct spelling of HEKAM and typing. A mistake was made by seeing 4;000 on the approach chart; not noticing that was LANSR; and then put the next altitude at 3;000 for CIKDU. We were misled by being at 4;000; 20 miles out. The proper altitude for HEKAM is 6;000; not 4;000 as assigned. Nor did ATC point out traffic on the parallel runway; when cleared for the approach on base; as 'heads up'. It was after the fact that ATC called out traffic. If ATC had said; maintain 4;000 to LANSR; for the attitude we were at; it would have helped in terms of situational awareness. ATC should use proper altitudes for fixes on extended approaches. Not a lower altitude. We were expecting a short approach based on an early descent to 4;000. It did not happen. Second; there should be some guidance about 'transitions' for airports that have them. We normally do not choose a transition and rarely use them; because they do not apply. Typically; it is obvious; but in this case; it is not. But with ever changing approaches and RNAV STARS or SIDS; what was meant to make our lives easier; is making it more complicated; because ATC always adds speed and altitude changes. Now the FMS can not predict what it needs to do. And; perhaps Special Notes should be added to the 'Airport pages'; where the use of 'transitions' is covered specifically with clear instructions to add it when loading the FMS; especially when we do not always frequent the airport on a regular basis. If not; then fixes will be missing. Lastly; a FMS 'interactive aid' should be added to our distance learning resources; to practice making last minute FMS changes. Then we can see what the FMS will do or not do for various profiles and scenarios. It is not practical to use the airplane; while on actual trips; because setting up scenarios is not very forgiving or gives us time to study the options or results.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.