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An A319 flight crew; cleared for a visual approach from a base leg vector to runway 24R at day; descended too low and was informed by a low altitude alert from the tower. The captain's decision to reset the MCP altitude alert from the FAF crossing altitude to tdze; apparently uncommunicated to the PF first officer; may have contributed to the loss of situational awareness.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1138517 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201312 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | DAY.Airport |
| State Reference | OH |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | A319 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Autoflight System |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT |
Narrative:
I was the PF and we were on base leg vectors for the visual 24R with ILS back up. Base turn to final with the runway in sight; cleared for the visual; 2;600 ft set for FAF crossing altitude; the aircraft was above glideslope. On turn to final the conditions were hazy with sunlight limiting our visibility. During the descent the captain set the MCP altitude to the lower alt of 1;000 ft [~TDZ elevation] to avoid alt capture above glideslope and a possible 'thrust excursion.' I turned off the autopilot and subsequently descended below 1;000 ft [AGL] on base leg with the runway still in sight. I leveled off as tower called 'low altitude alert' and captured glideslope from below at roughly 1;000 ft AGL. Uneventful landing and rollout. Captain subsequently called tower for back-brief.better crew coordination between pilots could have avoided any confusion about automation settings. 'Verbalize and read back' is easy at altitude; but we must ensure it at low altitude as well.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A319 flight crew; cleared for a visual approach from a base leg vector to Runway 24R at DAY; descended too low and was informed by a low altitude alert from the Tower. The Captain's decision to reset the MCP altitude alert from the FAF crossing altitude to TDZE; apparently uncommunicated to the PF First Officer; may have contributed to the loss of situational awareness.
Narrative: I was the PF and we were on base leg vectors for the visual 24R with ILS back up. Base turn to final with the runway in sight; cleared for the visual; 2;600 FT set for FAF crossing altitude; the aircraft was above glideslope. On turn to final the conditions were hazy with sunlight limiting our visibility. During the descent the Captain set the MCP altitude to the lower alt of 1;000 FT [~TDZ elevation] to avoid alt capture above glideslope and a possible 'thrust excursion.' I turned off the autopilot and subsequently descended below 1;000 FT [AGL] on base leg with the runway still in sight. I leveled off as Tower called 'low altitude alert' and captured glideslope from below at roughly 1;000 FT AGL. Uneventful landing and rollout. Captain subsequently called Tower for back-brief.Better crew coordination between pilots could have avoided any confusion about automation settings. 'Verbalize and read back' is easy at altitude; but we must ensure it at low altitude as well.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.