Narrative:

A B737 on a visual approach to runway 1R; after a go-around due to traffic on runway; came less than 1;000 ft 3 miles from E145; on a visual approach to runway 1C. At the time this loss occurred; iad had been IMC for 10 minutes with the prevailing visibility of 1 SM. Rmks showed tower visibility to be 7 miles. The tower advertised ILS and visual approaches being conducted simultaneously to [runway] 1R/C/left; departing runway 30. Controllers could see the runway and aircrews could see the lights; however; there was a shallow fog layer that was thickening. Controllers were issuing RVR and briefing the low visibility during position relief briefings. After landing; one crew advised of a fog layer at about 30 ft and said that the runway won't be in sight much longer. Local briefed his relief that the field was IFR. Local 1 briefed his relief that RVR was being issued and visual approaches were being conducted. It is potomac TRACON's (pct) responsibility to call the approach in use yet pct did not tell tower which approaches to advertise nor did tower advise pct to stop issuing visual approaches. In fact; a pct supervisor called the tower to talk about the visibility. Incredulously; they seemed to talk each other into not believing that the official weather sequence showed the prevailing visibility; whereupon visual approaches were continued. Scratchpad on about 7 arrivals showed they were on visual approaches when they should have been on ILS approaches. This situation occurred because of the breakdown in communications among the tower and TRACON teams and a lack of leadership by the respective flms.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IAD Controller described a separation loss during an attempt to conduct visual approaches when reported weather indicated that conditions were such that no visual approaches should be attempted.

Narrative: A B737 on a visual approach to Runway 1R; after a go-around due to traffic on Runway; came less than 1;000 FT 3 miles from E145; on a visual approach to Runway 1C. At the time this loss occurred; IAD had been IMC for 10 minutes with the prevailing visibility of 1 SM. RMKS showed Tower visibility to be 7 miles. The Tower advertised ILS and visual approaches being conducted simultaneously to [Runway] 1R/C/L; departing Runway 30. Controllers could see the runway and aircrews could see the lights; however; there was a shallow fog layer that was thickening. Controllers were issuing RVR and briefing the low visibility during position relief briefings. After landing; one crew advised of a fog layer at about 30 FT and said that the runway won't be in sight much longer. Local briefed his relief that the field was IFR. Local 1 briefed his relief that RVR was being issued and visual approaches were being conducted. It is Potomac TRACON's (PCT) responsibility to call the approach in use yet PCT did not tell Tower which approaches to advertise nor did Tower advise PCT to stop issuing visual approaches. In fact; a PCT Supervisor called the Tower to talk about the visibility. Incredulously; they seemed to talk each other into NOT believing that the official weather sequence showed the prevailing visibility; whereupon visual approaches were continued. Scratchpad on about 7 arrivals showed they were on visual approaches when they should have been on ILS approaches. This situation occurred because of the breakdown in communications among the Tower and TRACON teams and a lack of leadership by the respective FLMs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.