Narrative:

I want to make it clear I understand and recognize the challenges all parties face while operating in winter weather. With that said however; what we experienced for the second time at this airport is going to get someone killed. As the snow began to fall the operation went with it. As always operations' was holding airplanes at the gate allowing the long line that had developed for de-ice to dwindle. We coordinated our time with the operations tower in an attempt to time it perfectly to allow passengers to wait in relative comfort in the terminal and not in a stuffy airplane eating into our long onboard delay. After coordinating this time and boarding accordingly we boarded up but unfortunately sat at the gate for a lengthy amount of time waiting for our slot in the de-ice pad. During our delay at the gate we were monitoring the de-ice frequency much like we did the last time we found ourselves here during a snow event. And like last time there is no other way to describe what we were listening to than utter chaos. All communications were being conducted over one frequency. Whether it was the ground crews talking with each; flight crews talking to flight crews advising there was still snow somewhere on their aircraft or other airplanes trying to talk to 'iceman' it was all happening over one frequency. You can quickly see that this set up does not work well while airplanes are attempting to receive critical de-ice information and ground crews are attempting to coordinate the operation. It didn't work last time and it certainly was not working this time. We knew we were in for an interesting time on the pad once again. Once we were off the gate we made our way over to the de-ice pad and were cleared in almost immediately. The four bays they were using all had aircraft in them. Some being actively worked on while some were waiting on trucks to start the process. As we sat their observing the operation we witnessed the following: an operator who had their bucket as high as it would go attempting to spray type iv on a wing of an aircraft. One of the two trucks in a two-truck operation running out of fluid halfway through the process; the second a truck or a completely different truck comes over and attempts to pick up where the previous truck left off but misses half of wing with type iv. We did not see one tactile test completed while waiting. De-ice crews were asking about their trucks producing massive amounts of smoke from the heaters. There was confusion on how a truck could exit the operation to either fill up or use the facilities for personal reasons. There was also confusion on how and where trucks that were just topped off can get back into the rotation. The last few I feel highlight a process that is not refined and because of that mistakes are constantly happening. And this is all before it's our turn. While we were being de-iced we were hearing from other crews in different bays that they were being sprayed with unheated type I. One air crew advised another air crew that the de-ice team which was later announced on the radio and being a training team had only sprayed type iv on the aircraft before spraying type I. If this ice team is in training where are the trainers or the managers to ensure this is being done properly? We pulled into bay 4 and the process started rather quickly which is great. We requested type I and iv as it was actively snowing. Upon completing type I we both noticed what we thought to be contamination on our both of our wings. We inquired with 'iceman' and requested a tactile check. The response we received was a tactile check is automatic. Which we found interesting since we had not seen the tactile test done once during the time we were waiting for an open bay. While we are waiting for the automatic tactile check to be complete; the two trucks felt it appropriate to spray a portion of our fuselage; wings and tail with type iv. No tactile check had been completed before the application of type iv began. Shortly after the trucks were done spraying type iv a manager showed up and walked around the aircraft inspecting both wings. She then came on the radio and gave us our information. Time; fluid mixture and also stated tactile check complete. We immediately asked for clarification stating 'it's our understanding the tactile check needs to be accomplished after the application of type I and before the application of the type iv' the response was we are aware of that sir. I then asked if that is the case; and that clearly did not happen here; how can this process possibly be considered complete. The response was we can spray you again if you want. At that point we lost all confidence in the process and felt that the only place to take this airplane was back to the gate. We immediately picked up the phone and told our dispatcher of the problems we were having and witnessing. He stated we were not the only ones and other aircraft returned to the gate citing the same problems. That phone call was made and we were back in the gate 25 minutes later. I immediately got off the airplane and took pictures and video. In my estimation we ran 30 minutes into a holdover time that was calculated for 1:10-2:20 and the leading edge of the wing had ice adhering to it. And who knows what the upper surface of the tail looked like. Much like in my last report; if we would have been on the ground for our calculated holdover time; not caught the contamination or worse not be able to see the contamination on the tail; and taken off my fear is we would have had serious degradation of lift leading to a fatal crash. I want to once again state I understand the challenges operating in winter weather. Whether its ground crews; flight crews; in-flight; dispatch or crew scheduling it is a challenge. But that kind of weather can be operated in as long as precautions are taken and the proper training is adhered to. In the three weeks from my last experience things have not improved. They have actually gotten worse. These problems are nothing new to the de-ice programs. Each year there are horror stories of crews taxing off the de-ice pad with contamination still present of their aircraft. The most disturbing thing is we see the same problems year after year with no improvement. Meeting after internal meeting will not fix anything. On paper the procedures may appear to be in order but unless you witness the operation you truly can't get a true picture of what is going on every time that de-ice pad is operating. One day there is going to be a mistake that is not caught by a flight crew and someone is going to get killed. [We need] proper training; proper oversight/leadership on the de-ice pad; [and] go to a one truck operation in each bay instead of two. Two truck operations in each bay seem to be too complicated for them to manage. Have one truck actively spraying while another stands by and observes. Limit the trucks to a certain number of aircraft so they never run out of fluid mid process. As that truck leaves to fill up the standby truck goes active. Radio frequency needs to be split up. The only radio traffic should be 'iceman' talking with the aircraft. Everyone else should either have hand held radio's much like the ramp managers or a dedicated frequency. A line pilot [should be] on the pad observing the operation and the job being done; maybe even two. More than one manager running around trying to coordinate the filling of trucks; tactile checks; shift changes; break downs; refilling fuel in trucks and so on. Designate one pickup truck to two bays. That allows more oversight and an opportunity to manage the situation as it changes. Right now its one manager running around in one pickup trying to meet the needs of all 4 bays; [this] doesn't work. Again I am more than willing to have a conversation with whomever about these problems and the solutions. It needs to be fixed before the next snow event. We have been lucky so far.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain does not believe that his company's de-ice crews are properly trained or following their training. After completing de-icing and anti-icing he returns to the gate to find snow and ice adhering to his wings.

Narrative: I want to make it clear I understand and recognize the challenges all parties face while operating in winter weather. With that said however; what we experienced for the second time at this airport is going to get someone killed. As the snow began to fall the operation went with it. As always Operations' was holding airplanes at the gate allowing the long line that had developed for de-ice to dwindle. We coordinated our time with the Operations Tower in an attempt to time it perfectly to allow passengers to wait in relative comfort in the terminal and not in a stuffy airplane eating into our long onboard delay. After coordinating this time and boarding accordingly we boarded up but unfortunately sat at the gate for a lengthy amount of time waiting for our slot in the de-ice pad. During our delay at the gate we were monitoring the de-ice frequency much like we did the last time we found ourselves here during a snow event. And like last time there is no other way to describe what we were listening to than utter chaos. All communications were being conducted over one frequency. Whether it was the ground crews talking with each; flight crews talking to flight crews advising there was still snow somewhere on their aircraft or other airplanes trying to talk to 'Iceman' it was all happening over one frequency. You can quickly see that this set up does not work well while airplanes are attempting to receive critical de-ice information and ground crews are attempting to coordinate the operation. It didn't work last time and it certainly was not working this time. We knew we were in for an interesting time on the pad once again. Once we were off the gate we made our way over to the de-ice pad and were cleared in almost immediately. The four bays they were using all had aircraft in them. Some being actively worked on while some were waiting on trucks to start the process. As we sat their observing the operation we witnessed the following: An operator who had their bucket as high as it would go attempting to spray type IV on a wing of an aircraft. One of the two trucks in a two-truck operation running out of fluid halfway through the process; the second a truck or a completely different truck comes over and attempts to pick up where the previous truck left off but misses half of wing with type IV. We did not see one tactile test completed while waiting. De-ice crews were asking about their trucks producing massive amounts of smoke from the heaters. There was confusion on how a truck could exit the operation to either fill up or use the facilities for personal reasons. There was also confusion on how and where trucks that were just topped off can get back into the rotation. The last few I feel highlight a process that is not refined and because of that mistakes are constantly happening. And this is all before it's our turn. While we were being de-iced we were hearing from other crews in different bays that they were being sprayed with unheated type I. One air crew advised another air crew that the de-ice team which was later announced on the radio and being a training team had only sprayed type IV on the aircraft BEFORE spraying type I. If this ice team is in training where are the trainers or the managers to ensure this is being done properly? We pulled into bay 4 and the process started rather quickly which is great. We requested type I and IV as it was actively snowing. Upon completing type I we both noticed what we thought to be contamination on our both of our wings. We inquired with 'Iceman' and requested a tactile check. The response we received was a tactile check is automatic. Which we found interesting since we had not seen the tactile test done once during the time we were waiting for an open bay. While we are waiting for the automatic tactile check to be complete; the two trucks felt it appropriate to spray a portion of our fuselage; wings and tail with type IV. NO TACTILE CHECK HAD BEEN COMPLETED BEFORE THE APPLICATION OF TYPE IV BEGAN. Shortly after the trucks were done spraying type IV a Manager showed up and walked around the aircraft inspecting both wings. She then came on the radio and gave us our information. Time; fluid mixture and also stated tactile check complete. We immediately asked for clarification stating 'it's our understanding the tactile check needs to be accomplished after the application of type I and BEFORE the application of the TYPE IV' The response was we are aware of that sir. I then asked if that is the case; and that clearly did not happen here; how can this process possibly be considered complete. The response was we can spray you again if you want. At that point we lost all confidence in the process and felt that the only place to take this airplane was back to the gate. We immediately picked up the phone and told our Dispatcher of the problems we were having and witnessing. He stated we were not the only ones and other aircraft returned to the gate citing the same problems. That phone call was made and we were back in the gate 25 minutes later. I immediately got off the airplane and took pictures and video. In my estimation we ran 30 minutes into a holdover time that was calculated for 1:10-2:20 and the leading edge of the wing had ice adhering to it. And who knows what the upper surface of the tail looked like. Much like in my last report; if we would have been on the ground for our calculated holdover time; not caught the contamination or worse not be able to see the contamination on the tail; and taken off my fear is we would have had serious degradation of lift leading to a fatal crash. I want to once again state I understand the challenges operating in winter weather. Whether its ground crews; flight crews; in-flight; dispatch or crew scheduling it is a challenge. But that kind of weather CAN be operated in as long as precautions are taken and the proper training is adhered to. In the three weeks from my last experience things have not improved. They have actually gotten worse. These problems are nothing new to the de-ice programs. Each year there are horror stories of crews taxing off the de-ice pad with contamination still present of their aircraft. The most disturbing thing is we see the same problems year after year with no improvement. Meeting after internal meeting will not fix anything. On paper the procedures may appear to be in order but unless you witness the operation you truly can't get a true picture of what is going on every time that de-ice pad is operating. One day there is going to be a mistake that is not caught by a flight crew and someone is going to get killed. [We need] proper training; proper oversight/leadership on the de-ice pad; [and] go to a one truck operation in each bay instead of two. Two truck operations in each bay seem to be too complicated for them to manage. Have one truck actively spraying while another stands by and observes. Limit the trucks to a certain number of aircraft so they never run out of fluid mid process. As that truck leaves to fill up the standby truck goes active. Radio frequency needs to be split up. The only radio traffic should be 'ICEMAN' talking with the aircraft. Everyone else should either have hand held radio's much like the ramp managers or a dedicated frequency. A line pilot [should be] on the pad observing the operation and the job being done; maybe even two. More than one manager running around trying to coordinate the filling of trucks; tactile checks; shift changes; break downs; refilling fuel in trucks and so on. Designate one pickup truck to two bays. That allows more oversight and an opportunity to manage the situation as it changes. Right now its one manager running around in one pickup trying to meet the needs of all 4 bays; [this] doesn't work. Again I am more than willing to have a conversation with whomever about these problems and the solutions. It needs to be fixed before the next snow event. We have been lucky so far.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.