Narrative:

During preflight preparations on a seattle-tokyo flight, I was monitoring refueling operations and reviewing the projected load. I referenced the performance manual (runway analysis) and the present winds/temperature/runway. I informed the operations people of this situation so they could work on a solution. Meanwhile I noticed that the release fuel of 299,500 pounds was being exceeded on the fuel totalizer. I crossed-checked by total of all fuel gauges. Totalizer = 311.0 gauges = 308.0. Fuel was sticked as per extended over-water and readings logged as 299.5. I questioned this discrepancy with the refueler, maintenance, and captain. They determined that the stick readings would be the indication to accept. I mentioned that I have never seen that large of a discrepancy. Cargo was off loaded to meet the performance/weight limitations. The aircraft was equipped with mixed engines, 3 pw-7F's, 1 pw-7A so the 7A power would be used. During preflight I requested that a fuel shut off valve be safetied. The captain said that we would not take a delay for that. I expressed concern of the hazard of going in this confign. He disagreed. Fortunately, the switch was safetied prior to pushback. The captain was asking me to hurry up. I was checking the weight manifest papers for accuracy. The captain got to me so I was resigned that I was ready for engine start. I had not completed my accuracy of the weight manifest, but I thought I would recheck it prior to takeoff. We taxied out and departed. The takeoff was very long. Liftoff occurred close to the departure end of the runway (less than 1000'). After level off, in cruise, I checked the weight manifest and calculated that we were too heavy for takeoff. It appeared that the load planner had used 7F power instead of 7A power. I discussed this with the captain. He said not to worry about it. I discussed my concern with getting rushed, being pressured and about submitting a NASA report, and to discuss the incident with supervisory pilots. He said it would stir up trouble. I have discussed this with my supervisor to be kept in confidence and not to be relayed to FAA. I have also discussed this with the alpa, mec, for the airline (even though this airline is not an alpa carrier). I will also inform the captain that please, do not rush me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IMPROPER TKOF DATA USED ON ACR WDB.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT PREPARATIONS ON A SEATTLE-TOKYO FLT, I WAS MONITORING REFUELING OPERATIONS AND REVIEWING THE PROJECTED LOAD. I REFERENCED THE PERFORMANCE MANUAL (RWY ANALYSIS) AND THE PRESENT WINDS/TEMP/RWY. I INFORMED THE OPERATIONS PEOPLE OF THIS SITUATION SO THEY COULD WORK ON A SOLUTION. MEANWHILE I NOTICED THAT THE RELEASE FUEL OF 299,500 LBS WAS BEING EXCEEDED ON THE FUEL TOTALIZER. I CROSSED-CHECKED BY TOTAL OF ALL FUEL GAUGES. TOTALIZER = 311.0 GAUGES = 308.0. FUEL WAS STICKED AS PER EXTENDED OVER-WATER AND READINGS LOGGED AS 299.5. I QUESTIONED THIS DISCREPANCY WITH THE REFUELER, MAINT, AND CAPT. THEY DETERMINED THAT THE STICK READINGS WOULD BE THE INDICATION TO ACCEPT. I MENTIONED THAT I HAVE NEVER SEEN THAT LARGE OF A DISCREPANCY. CARGO WAS OFF LOADED TO MEET THE PERFORMANCE/WEIGHT LIMITATIONS. THE ACFT WAS EQUIPPED WITH MIXED ENGINES, 3 PW-7F'S, 1 PW-7A SO THE 7A POWER WOULD BE USED. DURING PREFLT I REQUESTED THAT A FUEL SHUT OFF VALVE BE SAFETIED. THE CAPT SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE A DELAY FOR THAT. I EXPRESSED CONCERN OF THE HAZARD OF GOING IN THIS CONFIGN. HE DISAGREED. FORTUNATELY, THE SWITCH WAS SAFETIED PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. THE CAPT WAS ASKING ME TO HURRY UP. I WAS CHECKING THE WEIGHT MANIFEST PAPERS FOR ACCURACY. THE CAPT GOT TO ME SO I WAS RESIGNED THAT I WAS READY FOR ENGINE START. I HAD NOT COMPLETED MY ACCURACY OF THE WEIGHT MANIFEST, BUT I THOUGHT I WOULD RECHECK IT PRIOR TO TKOF. WE TAXIED OUT AND DEPARTED. THE TKOF WAS VERY LONG. LIFTOFF OCCURRED CLOSE TO THE DEP END OF THE RWY (LESS THAN 1000'). AFTER LEVEL OFF, IN CRUISE, I CHECKED THE WEIGHT MANIFEST AND CALCULATED THAT WE WERE TOO HEAVY FOR TKOF. IT APPEARED THAT THE LOAD PLANNER HAD USED 7F POWER INSTEAD OF 7A POWER. I DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE CAPT. HE SAID NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT. I DISCUSSED MY CONCERN WITH GETTING RUSHED, BEING PRESSURED AND ABOUT SUBMITTING A NASA REPORT, AND TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH SUPERVISORY PLTS. HE SAID IT WOULD STIR UP TROUBLE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MY SUPVR TO BE KEPT IN CONFIDENCE AND NOT TO BE RELAYED TO FAA. I HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE ALPA, MEC, FOR THE AIRLINE (EVEN THOUGH THIS AIRLINE IS NOT AN ALPA CARRIER). I WILL ALSO INFORM THE CAPT THAT PLEASE, DO NOT RUSH ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.