Narrative:

I was pilot not flying with a lesser total time captain; but who has more time in type; as I just recently was typed and this was only my sixth time in the aircraft. We were given a crossing restriction prior to swfft to meet at FL240; 25 NM south of swfft. Upon crossing swfft we [were] given [clearance to] descend via the swfft one RNAV arrival. Our FMS was already programmed for this arrival. The pilot flying requested that the bottom altitude on the arrival be set in the altitude preselect and I complied and set 5;000 ft MSL. The pilot flying then selected VNAV as LNAV was already our lateral mode. Then the controller called us back and said 'nxxxx plan on the south landing transition'. The pilot flying then decided to pull up on the chart page of the pilot's du to confirm that the landing south arrival was indeed loaded in the FMS correctly; (first mistake as this is the pilot not flying's job to confirm and the pilot flying's job is to monitor the descent; as stated in our companies ops specs); this took some time as a second page must be navigated to and selected to read the arrival procedure text. By the time it was confirmed by the pilot flying to his satisfaction that the FMS was indeed loaded correctly; we were only 10 miles southeast of swfft; with the autopilot and FMS not having begun the descent to cross swfft below FL200 and above 13;000. The controller at memphis prompted us by asking 'if we were descending via the swfft arrival?' which we had not begun to do. The pilot flying immediately began the descent; and I informed the controller that we would not make the restriction; he said not to worry about it; as he had already coordinated our late descent. We crossed swfft at approximately FL220 descending rapidly to get back on the path.the biggest contributor to this issue is that the pilot flying PIC was not following company procedures and monitoring the autopilot and vertical navigation; and took it upon himself to confirm what was in the FMS was indeed correct. I should have taken the aircraft and confirmed the descent path was captured. (But I was wrapped up in trying to assist him in confirming that the FMS had been set up correctly; my fault; no one 'flying the airplane') secondary is that this arrival is a very complicated one with multiple arrival paths after adaay and a second page that must be read to confirm the correct arrival gate is programmed. This arrival should be broken down into several independent arrivals; instead of multiple gates all jumbled together to suit either a north landing; south landing; or 13/31 runway landing. I have seen this on other arrivals and have voiced my opinion of this to friends that are controllers [at] atl center and they are in agreement with my opinion these should be separated into individual arrivals.finally; the controller should have given us the expect to descend via the swfft one sooner as well as given us the south transition final fix to confirm to all parties that we were using the correct transition. This would have eliminated this situation all together as we did in fact have the correct transition loaded to begin with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Gulfstream 280 flight crew failed to comply with the crossing altitude at SWFFT on the SWFFT RNAV STAR to BNA due to distractions associated with insuring the complex arrival was properly programmed.

Narrative: I was pilot not flying with a lesser total time Captain; but who has more time in type; as I just recently was typed and this was only my sixth time in the aircraft. We were given a crossing restriction prior to SWFFT to meet at FL240; 25 NM south of SWFFT. Upon crossing SWFFT we [were] given [clearance to] descend via the SWFFT one RNAV arrival. Our FMS was already programmed for this arrival. The pilot flying requested that the bottom altitude on the arrival be set in the altitude preselect and I complied and set 5;000 FT MSL. The pilot flying then selected VNAV as LNAV was already our lateral mode. Then the Controller called us back and said 'Nxxxx plan on the south landing transition'. The pilot flying then decided to pull up on the chart page of the pilot's DU to confirm that the landing south arrival was indeed loaded in the FMS correctly; (first mistake as this is the pilot not flying's job to confirm and the pilot flying's job is to monitor the descent; as stated in our companies ops specs); This took some time as a second page must be navigated to and selected to read the arrival procedure text. By the time it was confirmed by the pilot flying to his satisfaction that the FMS was indeed loaded correctly; we were only 10 miles southeast of SWFFT; with the autopilot and FMS not having begun the descent to cross SWFFT below FL200 and above 13;000. The Controller at Memphis prompted us by asking 'if we were descending via the SWFFT arrival?' which we had not begun to do. The pilot flying immediately began the descent; and I informed the Controller that we would not make the restriction; he said not to worry about it; as he had already coordinated our late descent. We crossed SWFFT at approximately FL220 descending rapidly to get back on the path.The biggest contributor to this issue is that the pilot flying PIC was not following company procedures and monitoring the autopilot and vertical navigation; and took it upon himself to confirm what was in the FMS was indeed correct. I should have taken the aircraft and confirmed the descent path was captured. (But I was wrapped up in trying to assist him in confirming that the FMS had been set up correctly; my fault; no one 'flying the airplane') Secondary is that this Arrival is a very complicated one with multiple arrival paths after ADAAY and a second page that must be read to confirm the correct arrival gate is programmed. This arrival should be broken down into several independent arrivals; instead of multiple gates all jumbled together to suit either a north landing; south landing; or 13/31 runway landing. I have seen this on other arrivals and have voiced my opinion of this to friends that are controllers [at] ATL Center and they are in agreement with my opinion these should be separated into individual arrivals.Finally; the Controller should have given us the expect to descend via the SWFFT one sooner as well as given us the south transition final fix to confirm to all parties that we were using the correct transition. This would have eliminated this situation all together as we did in fact have the correct transition loaded to begin with.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.