Narrative:

Aircraft X was assigned a 135 heading off of runway 17R. Aircraft X acquired on the radar on what appeared to be the assigned heading so I instructed them to contact departure. I immediately realized that aircraft X did not have their mode C on so I got on the line to the appropriate departure controller (DR3) and at the same time DR3 called me for a point out. As DR3 was requesting the point out I realized that aircraft X was continuing on the RNAV departure; which is not what they were instructed; and I advised DR3. Luckily at this time there were no aircraft in the arrival dump; and the pilot deviation was of no significance.this has been a reoccurring problem with the RNAV procedures here at den. It happens regularly; but it seems that the facility and the RNAV team have so much invested that data is being skewed to keep this thing running. We have added verbiage to our ATIS that pilots are required to read back departure instructions; and have decided that we are not going to converge as often to try and mitigate the problem; but the problem is still occurring. Now by adding the national climb via phraseology there is even more uncertainty between controllers and pilots. I would say that about twice an hour a pilot will get into an argument about climb via with clearance delivery and honestly it is becoming a distraction in the workplace. If you pull the clearance tapes since this was implemented; I think you will hear all kinds of questioning and arguing; when the goal of the climb via phraseology was to eliminate questions. With all of the agencies goals to reduce distractions in the workplace; ie: turn off; tune in; it is a point of discussion every time and a distraction. How many times would you allow something to hurt yourself and continue to do the same activity. For some reason RNAV procedures seem exempt form that logic. I think realistically there are two options for den to fix this. Assign radar vectors out of the class B surface area; every time no exceptions; or never converge; no exceptions; and start metering and implementing flow procedures. Which ever the airlines want more of is fine; but this is unsafe. We have had a near midair collision with these procedures and it is just a matter of time until we have another one or worse. Controllers at den are loosing what little faith we have left in these procedures; and more importantly we are loosing faith in our leadership; and quite honestly faith in this program. We have procedures in place that instruct two airplanes to converge at the same point and we keep trying to band aid the problem reference the beginning of the recommendations section of this report. How bad of a violation do we need to change these procedures?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Reporter describes situation where aircraft is assigned a heading; but then assumes the RNAV departure which it shouldn't have taken.

Narrative: Aircraft X was assigned a 135 heading off of Runway 17R. Aircraft X acquired on the radar on what appeared to be the assigned heading so I instructed them to contact Departure. I immediately realized that Aircraft X did not have their mode C on so I got on the line to the appropriate Departure Controller (DR3) and at the same time DR3 called me for a point out. As DR3 was requesting the point out I realized that Aircraft X was continuing on the RNAV departure; which is not what they were instructed; and I advised DR3. Luckily at this time there were no aircraft in the arrival dump; and the pilot deviation was of no significance.This has been a reoccurring problem with the RNAV procedures here at DEN. It happens regularly; but it seems that the facility and the RNAV team have so much invested that data is being skewed to keep this thing running. We have added verbiage to our ATIS that pilots are required to read back departure instructions; and have decided that we are not going to converge as often to try and mitigate the problem; but the problem is still occurring. Now by adding the national climb via phraseology there is even more uncertainty between controllers and pilots. I would say that about twice an hour a pilot will get into an argument about climb via with Clearance Delivery and honestly it is becoming a distraction in the workplace. If you pull the clearance tapes since this was implemented; I think you will hear all kinds of questioning and arguing; when the goal of the climb via phraseology was to eliminate questions. With all of the agencies goals to reduce distractions in the workplace; IE: Turn Off; Tune In; It is a point of discussion every time and a distraction. How many times would you allow something to hurt yourself and continue to do the same activity. For some reason RNAV procedures seem exempt form that logic. I think realistically there are two options for DEN to fix this. Assign radar vectors out of the Class B surface area; every time no exceptions; or never converge; no exceptions; and start metering and implementing flow procedures. Which ever the airlines want more of is fine; but this is unsafe. We have had a NMAC with these procedures and it is just a matter of time until we have another one or worse. Controllers at DEN are loosing what little faith we have left in these procedures; and more importantly we are loosing faith in our leadership; and quite honestly faith in this program. We have procedures in place that instruct two airplanes to converge at the same point and we keep trying to band aid the problem reference the beginning of the recommendations section of this report. How bad of a violation do we need to change these procedures?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.