Narrative:

On preflight planning [we] noticed weight restriction. Considered weather at destination; alternate and fuel planning. Decided to lower fuel load by about 150 pounds (9;450 pounds instead of 9;600 pounds) to take all payload under a worse-case scenario. This was still 350 pounds above minimum fuel on the release and would allow for 45 minutes of single engine taxi time. I included fuel awareness in our crew briefing and let the first officer know that we would need to be aware of our fuel supply as the weather was poor at [our destination] and that I had intentionally left 150 pounds of fuel off to take payload. I also had doubts about the suitability of our alternate as I had never operated there before. The destination and alternate were legal on paper but in the back of my mind I wondered if the poor weather affecting [our destination] would also be impacting [our alternate] as storm systems generally move from west to east in the midwest.taxi out was quick and we took off with about 9;300 pounds of fuel on board. This was about 200 pounds above our minimum fuel that I recall as 9;092 pounds. We climbed and operated the entire flight on profile. The flight had to deviate around a line of thunderstorms shortly after reaching cruise. We made three major course deviations to circumnavigate thunderstorms but were in the clear about 50 miles south of tulsa. We climbed to FL370 from FL350 for fuel conservation; weather avoidance; and turbulence avoidance. Throughout cruise we monitored the weather at our destination and alternate. Both remained suitable in our opinion. The fuel supply; though right at the minimum levels after the climbout and deviations; remained adequate. We showed landing in [our destination] between 2;700 and 3;000 pounds for most of the flight. The burn to [our alternate] was planned at 1;200 pounds showing landing approximately 1;700-2;000 pounds throughout the cruising portion of the flight. I knew we had no fuel for holds or contingencies enroute. If anything out of the ordinary happened to delay us we knew we would need to take positive action as a crew to ensure a safe flight outcome. Due to extended vectoring we arrived on final approach showing landing with about 2;700 pounds. On a 3 mile final the aircraft ahead of us reported braking action nil. The weather had also degraded to 3;000 RVR winds from 360 gusting up to 30 KTS. The controller advised us that all the runways were closing due to nil braking and to discontinue our approach. We executed a go-around. I asked the first officer if he knew how to contact dispatch on commercial radio. He said no. At that point I asked him to fly the aircraft and talk to ATC on communication 1 and declare an emergency due to low fuel. I contacted dispatch on communication 2 telling him we needed a good alternate now and that we had 2;500 pounds of fuel on board and had just went missed approach at [our destination]. Dispatch said that [our first alternate and second alternate] were the closest airports but they didn't look much better than [our destination]. He suggested ZZZ as an alternate and said the burn would be 1;500 pounds. Doing some quick math I figured we would arrive at ZZZ with around 1;000 pounds of fuel. No margin but possible. Being that myself and the dispatcher both doubted the suitability of [our alternate] I immediately directed the first officer to tell ATC we needed to go to ZZZ. I programmed the FMS for ZZZ and ATC cleared us directly there. The FMS showed us landing in ZZZ with 700 pounds of fuel which seemed reasonable to me given the current fob and the burn of 1;500 pounds stated by the dispatcher. We climbed to FL190 and flew at M .60 attempting to conserve fuel as much as possible. We had about a 40 knot tailwind most of the way to ZZZ. I asked dispatch for optimum altitudes and airspeed to fly but didn't receive the information. Along the way the first officer continued to fly and I coordinated with ATC stating to every controller along the way that we were declaring an emergency due to fuel exhaustion. Approach and center advised the airport was reopening at [our destination] and wondered if we wanted to return. The first officer and I both agreed that it would be better to continue to ZZZ as the weather was much better there and we didn't want to risk another missed approach or nil braking action report at [our destination] with our critical fuel supply. After briefing the arrival and approach to ZZZ I took control of the aircraft and the first officer resumed the pilot not flying duties. ZZZ approach asked us on checking in to say fuel supply in minutes and souls on board. I reported 20-25 minutes of fuel supply and 53 souls. ZZZ offered an ILS to 21 circle to 31 rather than the ILS to 31 trying to get us on the ground faster; with ceilings of 1;100 and visibility 9 SM too. We declined the circling approach feeling it was riskier than 5 more minutes in the air getting vectored to a normal straight in ILS. The first officer and I discussed the fact that a go-around or missed approach would lead to fuel exhaustion and was therefore not a viable option. We needed the approach and landing to work the first time. We agreed that I would fly the approach and landing as the first officer only had approximately 125 hours of airline and jet experience. The approach and landing was normal. When we arrived at the gate in ZZZ we had 470 pounds of fuel remaining. Many threats were previously described in the above narrative. The largest threat I see other than described in the narrative were the lack of a plan to fly to a truly suitable alternate. I had in the back of my mind the entire flight that [our planned alternate] was not a good alternate even if it was legal. That what we truly needed for a viable plan B was an alternate to the west of [our destination] and enough fuel to fly there. I knew that if it really came down to it I needed to go most likely to ZZZ for an alternate and that we could but with very low fuel margins. This is exactly what happened although I really thought that we would be able to land at [our destination] just fine. After all they are a large 'hub' airport with many runways and lots of snow removal equipment and experience with winter conditions. I don't feel at any point that we were using poor judgment; not following applicable company guidance; or violating crash fire rescue equipment's. We both were very conscientious of our total situation for the entire flight. We were constantly monitoring our plans and planning for contingencies. I'm not saying we did everything perfect or made perfect judgments. Overall; though; I feel we managed the risk to the best of our ability with the tools we had and worked very well together. I think this is ultimately why we ended the flight safely although with essentially zero fuel margin. I left about 150 pounds of fuel off the aircraft intentionally; and; I believe legally; but the severity of the situation would not have been any less with an additional 150 pounds of fuel. We would have landed with 620 pounds instead of 470 pounds; (less any 'cost to carry') but that is still a critically low fuel supply and would not have given us any other options. Even so I will think very critically; remembering this flight on this day; in the future before lowering fuel; even when legal to do so; to maximize payload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-145 flight crew found themselves unable to land at either their destination or planned alternate because of nil braking action and weather. Having reduced their dispatch fuel slightly to maximize payload they had to think; plan and initiate action quickly to develop a workable plan B. They did so and landed at an alternate to the west of and behind the weather that made their initial plan unworkable. They landed with 670 LBS of fuel after working smoothly with cooperative air traffic controllers.

Narrative: On preflight planning [we] noticed weight restriction. considered weather at destination; alternate and fuel planning. Decided to lower fuel load by about 150 LBS (9;450 LBS instead of 9;600 LBS) to take all payload under a worse-case scenario. This was still 350 LBS above minimum fuel on the release and would allow for 45 minutes of single engine taxi time. I included fuel awareness in our crew briefing and let the First Officer know that we would need to be aware of our fuel supply as the weather was poor at [our destination] and that I had intentionally left 150 LBS of fuel off to take payload. I also had doubts about the suitability of our alternate as I had never operated there before. The destination and alternate were legal on paper but in the back of my mind I wondered if the poor weather affecting [our destination] would also be impacting [our alternate] as storm systems generally move from west to east in the Midwest.Taxi out was quick and we took off with about 9;300 LBS of fuel on board. This was about 200 LBS above our minimum fuel that I recall as 9;092 LBS. We climbed and operated the entire flight on profile. The flight had to deviate around a line of thunderstorms shortly after reaching cruise. We made three major course deviations to circumnavigate thunderstorms but were in the clear about 50 miles south of Tulsa. We climbed to FL370 from FL350 for fuel conservation; weather avoidance; and turbulence avoidance. Throughout cruise we monitored the weather at our destination and alternate. Both remained suitable in our opinion. The fuel supply; though right at the minimum levels after the climbout and deviations; remained adequate. We showed landing in [our destination] between 2;700 and 3;000 LBS for most of the flight. The burn to [our alternate] was planned at 1;200 LBS showing landing approximately 1;700-2;000 LBS throughout the cruising portion of the flight. I knew we had no fuel for holds or contingencies enroute. If anything out of the ordinary happened to delay us we knew we would need to take positive action as a crew to ensure a safe flight outcome. Due to extended vectoring we arrived on final approach showing landing with about 2;700 LBS. On a 3 mile final the aircraft ahead of us reported braking action nil. The weather had also degraded to 3;000 RVR winds from 360 gusting up to 30 KTS. The Controller advised us that all the runways were closing due to nil braking and to discontinue our approach. We executed a go-around. I asked the First Officer if he knew how to contact Dispatch on Commercial Radio. He said no. At that point I asked him to fly the aircraft and talk to ATC on COM 1 and declare an emergency due to low fuel. I contacted Dispatch on COM 2 telling him we needed a good alternate now and that we had 2;500 LBS of fuel on board and had just went missed approach at [our destination]. Dispatch said that [our first alternate and second alternate] were the closest airports but they didn't look much better than [our destination]. He suggested ZZZ as an alternate and said the burn would be 1;500 LBS. Doing some quick math I figured we would arrive at ZZZ with around 1;000 LBS of fuel. No margin but possible. Being that myself and the Dispatcher both doubted the suitability of [our alternate] I immediately directed the First Officer to tell ATC we needed to go to ZZZ. I programmed the FMS for ZZZ and ATC cleared us directly there. The FMS showed us landing in ZZZ with 700 LBS of fuel which seemed reasonable to me given the current FOB and the burn of 1;500 LBS stated by the Dispatcher. We climbed to FL190 and flew at M .60 attempting to conserve fuel as much as possible. We had about a 40 knot tailwind most of the way to ZZZ. I asked Dispatch for optimum altitudes and airspeed to fly but didn't receive the information. Along the way the First Officer continued to fly and I coordinated with ATC stating to every Controller along the way that we were declaring an emergency due to fuel exhaustion. Approach and Center advised the airport was reopening at [our destination] and wondered if we wanted to return. The First Officer and I both agreed that it would be better to continue to ZZZ as the weather was much better there and we didn't want to risk another missed approach or nil braking action report at [our destination] with our critical fuel supply. After briefing the arrival and approach to ZZZ I took control of the aircraft and the First Officer resumed the pilot not flying duties. ZZZ Approach asked us on checking in to say fuel supply in minutes and souls on board. I reported 20-25 minutes of fuel supply and 53 souls. ZZZ offered an ILS to 21 circle to 31 rather than the ILS to 31 trying to get us on the ground faster; with ceilings of 1;100 and visibility 9 SM too. We declined the circling approach feeling it was riskier than 5 more minutes in the air getting vectored to a normal straight in ILS. The First Officer and I discussed the fact that a go-around or missed approach would lead to fuel exhaustion and was therefore not a viable option. We needed the approach and landing to work the first time. We agreed that I would fly the approach and landing as the First Officer only had approximately 125 hours of airline and jet experience. The approach and landing was normal. When we arrived at the gate in ZZZ we had 470 LBS of fuel remaining. Many threats were previously described in the above narrative. The largest threat I see other than described in the narrative were the lack of a plan to fly to a truly suitable alternate. I had in the back of my mind the entire flight that [our planned alternate] was not a good alternate even if it was legal. That what we truly needed for a viable plan B was an alternate to the west of [our destination] and enough fuel to fly there. I knew that if it really came down to it I needed to go most likely to ZZZ for an alternate and that we could but with very low fuel margins. This is exactly what happened although I really thought that we would be able to land at [our destination] just fine. After all they are a large 'hub' airport with many runways and lots of snow removal equipment and experience with winter conditions. I don't feel at any point that we were using poor judgment; not following applicable company guidance; or violating CFR's. We both were very conscientious of our total situation for the entire flight. We were constantly monitoring our plans and planning for contingencies. I'm not saying we did everything perfect or made perfect judgments. Overall; though; I feel we managed the risk to the best of our ability with the tools we had and worked very well together. I think this is ultimately why we ended the flight safely although with essentially zero fuel margin. I left about 150 LBS of fuel off the aircraft intentionally; and; I believe legally; but the severity of the situation would not have been any less with an additional 150 LBS of fuel. We would have landed with 620 LBS instead of 470 LBS; (less any 'cost to carry') but that is still a critically low fuel supply and would not have given us any other options. Even so I will think very critically; remembering this flight on this day; in the future before lowering fuel; even when legal to do so; to maximize payload.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.