Narrative:

[The aircraft] had maintenance log history of left pack issues. After cruise at FL310 while I was on first break; a flight attendant told me the captain requested my presence back in the cockpit. Upon return I noticed EICAS for left pack off and right generator off. The APU was running. The captain explained that they already ran the flight manual (FM) procedures for these two events that occurred within 5 minutes of each other. He then got a satcom phone patch to dispatch and maintenance control. The maintenance controller stated that these events would have precluded dispatch if prior to dispatch point (but of course MEL doesn't apply until next leg). Maintenance control then asked the captain to look up some maintenance readings in the maintenance ACARS menu pages. He then asked the captain to further troubleshoot at which point the captain had a discussion with the rest of us. We fully agreed that if the FM non-normal checklists did not correct the issues that we should not deviate from the FM checklists even if under maintenance control direction after the point of dispatch. I felt to do so would be paramount to deviating from the FM and use of emergency authority. In this case; maintenance control was referencing maintenance manuals that we do not have in an attempt not to correct an unsafe condition; but to return the aircraft to normal operations to continue the polar flight. We were forecast to land with 20.0 but would have needed to run the APU for about 12 more hours (5.5k). In the middle of our satcom discussion we lost satcom and data link and were not able to regain. We attempted VHF through commercial radio and it turned out to be a jumbled mess of communications (poor connection). Satcom inoperative EICAS continued as we flew further north. We agreed that it was pointless continuing flight northward and were discussing a turn back to the south when we got an ACARS from dispatch advocating a return. Also got an ACARS advocating dumping down to maximum landing weight. The captain divided duties up and we talked to ATC; the flight attendants; and the passengers. We discussed the fuel dumping procedure and when we wanted to start that. We sent a quick note to the crew desk and told them the situation. We finished up all checklists and performed a maximum weight return. Overall; captain did great and had excellent CRM skills. My only complaint was with maintenance control and dispatch who seemed to advocate taking actions not in the flight manual in an effort to continue the flight. We absolutely did not want to return and dump 140k in gas but we also did not want to be at 80N with a repeat problem and/or land with 14k in gas.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 First Officer on break; is summoned to the cockpit after failure of the left pack and the right generator. After discussions with Maintenance Control the crew elects to dump fuel and return to the departure airport.

Narrative: [The aircraft] had maintenance log history of left pack issues. After cruise at FL310 while I was on first break; a Flight Attendant told me the Captain requested my presence back in the cockpit. Upon return I noticed EICAS for left pack off and right generator off. The APU was running. The Captain explained that they already ran the Flight Manual (FM) procedures for these two events that occurred within 5 minutes of each other. He then got a SATCOM phone patch to Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The Maintenance Controller stated that these events would have precluded dispatch if prior to dispatch point (but of course MEL doesn't apply until next leg). Maintenance Control then asked the Captain to look up some maintenance readings in the maintenance ACARS menu pages. He then asked the Captain to further troubleshoot at which point the Captain had a discussion with the rest of us. We fully agreed that if the FM Non-Normal Checklists did not correct the issues that we should not deviate from the FM Checklists even if under Maintenance Control direction after the point of dispatch. I felt to do so would be paramount to deviating from the FM and use of emergency authority. In this case; Maintenance Control was referencing Maintenance Manuals that we do not have in an attempt not to correct an unsafe condition; but to return the aircraft to normal operations to continue the polar flight. We were forecast to land with 20.0 but would have needed to run the APU for about 12 more hours (5.5k). In the middle of our SATCOM discussion we lost SATCOM and data link and were not able to regain. We attempted VHF through Commercial Radio and it turned out to be a jumbled mess of communications (poor connection). SATCOM inoperative EICAS continued as we flew further north. We agreed that it was pointless continuing flight northward and were discussing a turn back to the south when we got an ACARS from Dispatch advocating a return. Also got an ACARS advocating dumping down to maximum landing weight. The Captain divided duties up and we talked to ATC; the flight attendants; and the passengers. We discussed the fuel dumping procedure and when we wanted to start that. We sent a quick note to the crew desk and told them the situation. We finished up all checklists and performed a maximum weight return. Overall; Captain did great and had excellent CRM skills. My only complaint was with Maintenance Control and Dispatch who seemed to advocate taking actions not in the flight manual in an effort to continue the flight. We absolutely did not want to return and dump 140k in gas but we also did not want to be at 80N with a repeat problem and/or land with 14k in gas.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.