Narrative:

Aircraft had a deferral for hydraulic 2B. This item required the dispatcher to perform landing and takeoff considerations for the flight. He did so and made arrangements for runway 28C in ord and if this was unavailable; a diversion airport of fwa. I contacted dispatch prior to departure and gave my concerns with this deferral related to single engine operations related to engine 2 failure. He informed me it would be fine; and not a concern just land on a long runway. I also contacted [the duty manager]; and voiced my concerns of the issue with a failure of the right engine and the aircraft's operation on landing with no operational system 2 hydraulic. He noted and said it was a consideration and not to worry about it; engineers had considered this. We departed with no issue and landed in ord with no issues. Enroute I consulted the QRH on several situations; being that the MEL provided no real guidance. I chose the item low pressure on system 2 hydraulics; being that with a failure of the number 2 engine; we would have no outboard braking. It lead me to the runway requirements of 140% increase with no reversers (with a failure of number 2 engine; and deferral of 2b pump). This failure on takeoff (V1 or greater) would have required a minimum runway of 12;250 ft at 50;000 pounds. Not available at [our departure]. At the very least I should have gotten a takeoff alternate. Our departure data is based on single engine failure with obstacle clearance; etc. But we dispatched with maintenance issues not in consideration of these deferrals and performance. Looking back on this flight; at the very least I should have gotten a takeoff alternate in excess of our landing minimums at 50;000 requiring 140% more runway. Had that not been available refused the flight with this deferral as a revenue flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reports being dispatched with the 2B hydraulic pump MEL'd and questioning the runway length required for landing should the Number Two Engine fail; rendering the Number Two Hydraulic System inoperative.

Narrative: Aircraft had a deferral for Hydraulic 2B. This item required the Dispatcher to perform landing and takeoff considerations for the flight. He did so and made arrangements for Runway 28C in ORD and if this was unavailable; a diversion airport of FWA. I contacted Dispatch prior to departure and gave my concerns with this deferral related to single engine operations related to Engine 2 failure. He informed me it would be fine; and not a concern just land on a long runway. I also contacted [the Duty Manager]; and voiced my concerns of the issue with a failure of the right engine and the aircraft's operation on landing with no operational System 2 Hydraulic. He noted and said it was a consideration and not to worry about it; engineers had considered this. We departed with no issue and landed in ORD with no issues. Enroute I consulted the QRH on several situations; being that the MEL provided no real guidance. I chose the item low pressure on System 2 hydraulics; being that with a failure of the Number 2 Engine; we would have no outboard braking. It lead me to the runway requirements of 140% increase with no reversers (with a failure of Number 2 Engine; and deferral of 2b pump). This failure on takeoff (V1 or greater) would have required a minimum runway of 12;250 FT at 50;000 LBS. Not available at [our departure]. At the very least I should have gotten a takeoff alternate. Our departure data is based on single engine failure with obstacle clearance; etc. But we dispatched with maintenance issues not in consideration of these deferrals and performance. Looking back on this flight; at the very least I should have gotten a takeoff alternate in excess of our landing minimums at 50;000 requiring 140% more runway. Had that not been available refused the flight with this deferral as a revenue flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.