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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1167163 |
Time | |
Date | 201404 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 373 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 351 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
While doing the fire warning overheat test during preflight; we noticed an anomaly during the test. During the fire test while pressing the fire bell horn cutout; the bell silenced and immediately came back on. We silenced the bell and it immediately returned again. We tried the test again with the same results using the bell cutout in the fire handle quadrant. We called maintenance out. The mechanic came out and we showed him the test. He said that this was a normal indication for the test. When the first officer; who was a seasoned captain from another carrier; and I questioned the mechanic about this; he said he would call maintenance control. One minute later; he came back and said maintenance control agreed that nothing was wrong. We left and discussed this enroute and felt we had been misled to take this aircraft. After landing at XXX; I performed the test and could not duplicate the same test results. I personally called maintenance control and came away from that conversation that we were indeed misled by the mechanic. While we could not duplicate the same test results in [our destination]; we feel that airplane should have been looked at in [at our departure airport] instead of discarding our observation chalked up to lack of proper test indications. I firmly believe this mechanic either lacked basic knowledge of the system or misled us into making us believe we lacked system knowledge so we would take an airplane that otherwise might have been grounded. I will put everything in the book and also call the chief pilot on duty when I face a similar situation in the future.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Both pilots of a B737-300 believed the engine fire warning test had been invalid because; although the warning bell would properly cease when the cutout button was pressed; it would come back on immediately upon release of the button. The Mechanic; who felt the test was normal; advised he had contacted Maintenance Control who had agreed with him it was a normal test. The flight crew ultimately agreed to take the aircraft; but in the end; decided Maintenance Control was incorrect and submitted the report.
Narrative: While doing the Fire Warning Overheat Test during preflight; we noticed an anomaly during the test. During the fire test while pressing the fire bell horn cutout; the bell silenced and immediately came back on. We silenced the bell and it immediately returned again. We tried the test again with the same results using the bell cutout in the fire handle quadrant. We called Maintenance out. The Mechanic came out and we showed him the test. He said that this was a normal indication for the test. When the First Officer; who was a seasoned Captain from another carrier; and I questioned the Mechanic about this; he said he would call Maintenance Control. One minute later; he came back and said Maintenance Control agreed that nothing was wrong. We left and discussed this enroute and felt we had been misled to take this aircraft. After landing at XXX; I performed the test and could not duplicate the same test results. I personally called Maintenance Control and came away from that conversation that we were indeed misled by the Mechanic. While we could not duplicate the same test results in [our destination]; we feel that airplane should have been looked at in [at our departure airport] instead of discarding our observation chalked up to lack of proper test indications. I firmly believe this Mechanic either lacked basic knowledge of the system or misled us into making us believe we lacked system knowledge so we would take an airplane that otherwise might have been grounded. I will put everything in the book and also call the Chief Pilot on Duty when I face a similar situation in the future.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.