Narrative:

As usual; staffing in the north area was minimal. There was weather impacting the area for the second night in a row. I was working bae radar with training on the manual side most of the night. During this particular episode; I was climbing aircraft X off ord; on course over bae northbound. I was stepping up an aircraft Y off msn on course over bae eastbound. As aircraft X left FL250; I climbed aircraft Y to FL250. I became aware that aircraft Y was climbing at a high rate; so I took a second look at aircraft X's rate of climb. When I determined that aircraft X was climbing particularly slowly; I told aircraft Y to stop his climb. Technically; of course; this is acceptable separation.due to the aircraft proximity however; I felt the clearance was unnecessary as aircraft Y was going to be level below aircraft X for another couple of miles; there was simply no reason to run aircraft Y up a few hundred feet below aircraft X. Immediately after instructing aircraft Y to stop his climb; he told me that he had an RA. I acknowledged. Aircraft X said he had an RA as well. I asked aircraft X his climb rate and he said 1;000 FPM. I moved on to other duties. Once the aircraft were clear I gave aircraft Y an unrestricted climb. He asked twice about the RA; once asking what altitude aircraft X was out of when I climbed him (aircraft Y). I could tell he was concerned about the situation that had occurred. I only wish I had had time to talk to him a little about it; but it was simply too busy and complex to do so. I informed the supervisor about the incident at the end of my shift. That is all I have to say about the RA.as a side note; I would add this: at various times during this shift; I had to deal with sectors adjacent to mine either not taking hand offs; not descending aircraft on initial contact; or not properly coordinating aircraft movement. I blame this on poor training; which has plagued my area and my facility for years; and on poor staffing. I am not aware of any tmu restrictions that were put in place last night for ord departures northbound. During one session; no aircraft were flying near bae VOR due to weather; yet I had a steady stream of these aircraft flashing at me; all level at FL230; all off course; deviating. Due to the poor design of the system and the heavy reliance on 4th line coordination; I couldn't see and aircraft destination or requested altitude without computer input. Every aircraft was 'devr/bae' or 'devr' or 'dev' or '20R/wx'. Every aircraft needed route amendments as they were all routed bae..odi or bae.J89 or bae.J34 and none of them wanted to go that way. Why are aircraft permitted to depart ord en mass with inaccurate flight plans? At one point; during an extremely busy time; my d-side was taken away. The d-side reached over and un-forwarded my calls and forwarded the manual calls to me. I asked what he was doing. He said he was leaving. I said no you are not! I need you; so sit down! He said he was directed elsewhere; and left. A minute later the trainee sits down and calls me for a briefing. I told him to hang up and start coordinating. I didn't have time to give a briefing. I had airplanes deviating all over and things needed to be done! These sorts of things happen every day in the north area now. 10 years ago they would have been considered major lapses in safety. I have been forced to become a trainer again. When I train during weather the 4th line covers the destination. The only way to see the aircraft details is to look at the uret which is refreshing and constantly re-ordering and it takes too long to find one aircraft on the list of 40 airplanes. Needless to say; when it gets busy; it is very uncomfortable not having information that you needed to safely evaluate the actions of the trainee. Typically the sector switches into react mode; and the focus becomes keeping airplanes apart; as opposed to efficiently moving traffic. It is dangerous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Controller uses vacated altitude rule and climbs lower air aircraft as soon as he notices higher aircraft vacate altitude. Controller sees difference in climb rate and stops lower aircrafts climb.

Narrative: As usual; staffing in the north area was minimal. There was weather impacting the area for the second night in a row. I was working BAE radar with training on the manual side most of the night. During this particular episode; I was climbing Aircraft X off ORD; on course over BAE northbound. I was stepping up an Aircraft Y off MSN on course over BAE eastbound. As Aircraft X left FL250; I climbed Aircraft Y to FL250. I became aware that Aircraft Y was climbing at a high rate; so I took a second look at Aircraft X's rate of climb. When I determined that Aircraft X was climbing particularly slowly; I told Aircraft Y to stop his climb. Technically; of course; this is acceptable separation.Due to the aircraft proximity however; I felt the clearance was unnecessary as Aircraft Y was going to be level below Aircraft X for another couple of miles; there was simply no reason to run Aircraft Y up a few hundred feet below Aircraft X. Immediately after instructing Aircraft Y to stop his climb; he told me that he had an RA. I acknowledged. Aircraft X said he had an RA as well. I asked Aircraft X his climb rate and he said 1;000 FPM. I moved on to other duties. Once the aircraft were clear I gave Aircraft Y an unrestricted climb. He asked twice about the RA; once asking what altitude Aircraft X was out of when I climbed him (Aircraft Y). I could tell he was concerned about the situation that had occurred. I only wish I had had time to talk to him a little about it; but it was simply too busy and complex to do so. I informed the Supervisor about the incident at the end of my shift. That is all I have to say about the RA.As a side note; I would add this: At various times during this shift; I had to deal with sectors adjacent to mine either not taking hand offs; not descending aircraft on initial contact; or not properly coordinating aircraft movement. I blame this on poor training; which has plagued my area and my facility for years; and on poor staffing. I am not aware of any TMU restrictions that were put in place last night for ORD departures northbound. During one session; no aircraft were flying near BAE VOR due to weather; yet I had a steady stream of these aircraft flashing at me; all level at FL230; all off course; deviating. Due to the poor design of the system and the heavy reliance on 4th line coordination; I couldn't see and aircraft destination or requested altitude without computer input. Every aircraft was 'devr/bae' or 'devr' or 'dev' or '20R/wx'. Every aircraft needed route amendments as they were all routed BAE..ODI or BAE.J89 or BAE.J34 and none of them wanted to go that way. Why are aircraft permitted to depart ORD en mass with inaccurate flight plans? At one point; during an extremely busy time; my D-side was taken away. The D-Side reached over and un-forwarded my calls and forwarded the manual calls to me. I asked what he was doing. He said he was leaving. I said no you are not! I need you; so sit down! He said he was directed elsewhere; and left. A minute later the trainee sits down and calls me for a briefing. I told him to hang up and start coordinating. I didn't have time to give a briefing. I had airplanes deviating all over and things needed to be done! These sorts of things happen every day in the north area now. 10 years ago they would have been considered major lapses in safety. I have been forced to become a trainer again. When I train during weather the 4th line covers the destination. The only way to see the aircraft details is to look at the URET which is refreshing and constantly re-ordering and it takes too long to find one aircraft on the list of 40 airplanes. Needless to say; when it gets busy; it is very uncomfortable not having information that you needed to safely evaluate the actions of the trainee. Typically the sector switches into react mode; and the focus becomes keeping airplanes apart; as opposed to efficiently moving traffic. It is dangerous.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.