Narrative:

While operating in accordance with the airport rules for gliders and the FAA's specific direction for the glider club to follow the local rules; a near midair collision (near mid-air collision) occurred between the tow plane and a single engine aircraft. The tow aircraft was taking off in the grass next to runway 21 (dry/fresh cut grass) while towing a glider. An aircraft was taking off on runway 31 (dry asphalt). [This was at] an uncontrolled airport with crossing runway operations routinely conducted by both powered and glider aircraft. In addition; runway 13/31 has routine opposite direction conflicting [with] instrument training traffic (ILS 31 and VOR 13). It is not uncommon for 3 runways to be used at one time with blocked communications due to radio saturation. Approximately 10 minutes prior to glider operations; the tow pilot (ATP MEL/commercial sel;ses; mes/CFI/cfii/cfig) informed everyone on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF); or unicom frequency (122.975); that glider operations were going to be taking place in approximately 10 minutes. In addition; a call in the blind was made by the tow pilot on the unicom frequency that glider tow operations were going to be taking place on runway 21 from the grass in approximately 10 minutes. The FBO acknowledged the informative radio call. The spotter also made a call on the unicom frequency that glider operations would be beginning soon. The tow pilot also confirmed that a spotter (private pilot with glider rating) was in position at the intersection of runway 13/31 and runway 03/21. A radio check was performed between the tow pilot; the spotter and the K-7 glider on the unicom frequency. All communications throughout the day; to include the near midair collision; were conducted on the unicom frequency. The tow plane was then taxied into position for takeoff in the grass for runway 21. The tow pilot shut down momentarily and exited the aircraft to personally brief the glider pilots (student glider pilot in front and commercial sel/cfig in the rear cockpit) in the glider. He also informed the glider pilots that he had heard two aircraft with student pilots in the area and there were planes in the pattern using runway 31. After starting the tow plane; the tow pilot made a blind radio call that glider staging was taking place on runway 21 at the airport. At the same time; an aircraft was taking the active to takeoff on runway 31 and the spotter confirmed this with the tow pilot. The departing aircraft made a radio call that he was departing on runway 31. The tow plane and glider remained in position for takeoff waiting for the diamond aircraft to takeoff on runway 31 and clear the area. After the cross traffic aircraft was clear; another radio call was made by the tow pilot informing airport traffic that the tow plane with glider in tow were departing runway 21 in the grass with a left turnout. This radio call was heard loud and clear by the spotter. The glider club spotter confirmed via radio that the departure path was clear and there had been no other radio calls by any other aircraft that would be a conflict. The tow pilot then added full power for takeoff. Towing a low performance glider takes approximately 20% more runway than a high performance glider and the initial takeoff roll with full power in the grass is very slow for such a takeoff. However; the glider is typically airborne well before the tow plane is able to break ground. On the incident takeoff; the glider was airborne normally after an approximate 1;000 ft takeoff roll and the tow plane was airborne approximately 500 ft prior to taxiway a. Shortly after the tow plane was airborne and at approximately 25 ft above the ground; the glider club spotter made a traffic call on the unicom frequency informing the tow pilot that an aircraft was taking off on runway 31. The spotter; the tow plane and the glider did not hear any radio calls by this aircraft. The spotter's call was based on visually acquiring the traffic that had not been previously visible from the spotter's position most likely because the conflicting aircraft was not yet on the runway or positioned at an angle not easily visible. The tow pilot confirmed the conflict visually and watched a single engine aircraft rotate and continue taking off on runway 31 with a flight path that would most likely cause a mid-air collision at midfield. With the diamond aircraft not taking evasive action or aborting to give way to the tow plane and glider in tow; the tow pilot had to make an immediate split-second decision to either abort the takeoff and land straight ahead crossing runway 31 and the path of the diamond; continue with the tow and try to de-conflict flight paths; or release the glider and execute an emergency low altitude steep turn to avoid the diamond aircraft. The conflicting aircraft was approximately at the point where the taxiway crosses runway 31 at an angle (taxiway that connects both runways 03 and 13/31 to the t-hangar ramp) when this was occurring. The safest decision with the lowest risk was to release the glider and make a low altitude steep turn. As the tow pilot was reaching down to release the glider; the glider instructor in the rear cockpit released the glider and then landed the K-7 straight ahead in the grass stopping short of taxiway a and short of runway 31. The tow pilot; with a 180 foot tow rope connected; made a low altitude steep turn at 50 ft AGL; with a flight path that cut between the parallel taxiway for runway 31 and runway 31; safely missing the diamond aircraft; by approximately 100 ft horizontally; that had made the decision to continue their takeoff and departure despite the tow plane and glider having the right of way in accordance with far 91.113. The diamond aircraft took no evasive action and continued straight ahead on runway heading. The near midair collision was high aspect (nose to nose) at co-altitude and approximately 100 ft laterally. The tow plane continued to climb and entered a downwind for runway 21 and landed uneventfully. The airport AWOS shortly after landing was winds 260/6; 10SM; clear; 28/11 A3008. Both diamond aircraft exited the airport traffic area and did not return. It appeared that the diamond aircraft were operating together (based on subsequent radio calls between the twin departed aircraft) for student training and only one aircraft was possibly making traffic calls. Throughout the rest of the day; 9 more glider tows were conducted safely with no conflicts; however; it should be noted that the glider tow pilot witnessed 3 other pattern conflicts involving only single-engine aircraft not involved with the glider operations. These 3 conflicts involved aircraft operating off runways 31 (ILS 31 and visual traffic pattern) and 13 (VOR 13 approach) conflicting with powered aircraft landing on runway 21 (visual traffic pattern). The local rule requiring a spotter for glider operations doesn't de-conflict powered aircraft and there isn't a spotter requirement for powered aircraft written in the local airport rules. The FAA handbooks (to include such handbooks as the instrument procedures handbook; the instrument flying handbook; the airplane flying handbook and the glider handbook) do not specifically address crossing runway operations. Recommend the FAA develop standard procedures and radio calls for crossing runway operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Glider Tow Pilot taking off on the runway reported his tow released at about 50 FT; then both aircraft took evasive action because of an impending near miss with a aircraft which depart the runway and failed to make or acknowledge CTAF pre-takeoff and takeoff calls from the Tow Pilot.

Narrative: While operating in accordance with the airport rules for gliders and the FAA's specific direction for the glider club to follow the local rules; a NMAC (Near Mid-Air Collision) occurred between the tow plane and a single engine aircraft. The tow aircraft was taking off in the grass next to Runway 21 (dry/fresh cut grass) while towing a glider. An aircraft was taking off on Runway 31 (dry asphalt). [This was at] an uncontrolled airport with crossing runway operations routinely conducted by both powered and glider aircraft. In addition; Runway 13/31 has routine opposite direction conflicting [with] instrument training traffic (ILS 31 and VOR 13). It is not uncommon for 3 runways to be used at one time with blocked communications due to radio saturation. Approximately 10 minutes prior to glider operations; the tow pilot (ATP MEL/Commercial SEL;SES; MES/CFI/CFII/CFIG) informed everyone on the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF); or Unicom frequency (122.975); that glider operations were going to be taking place in approximately 10 minutes. In addition; a call in the blind was made by the tow pilot on the Unicom frequency that glider tow operations were going to be taking place on Runway 21 from the grass in approximately 10 minutes. The FBO acknowledged the informative radio call. The spotter also made a call on the Unicom frequency that glider operations would be beginning soon. The tow pilot also confirmed that a spotter (Private pilot with glider rating) was in position at the intersection of Runway 13/31 and Runway 03/21. A radio check was performed between the tow pilot; the spotter and the K-7 glider on the Unicom frequency. All communications throughout the day; to include the NMAC; were conducted on the Unicom frequency. The tow plane was then taxied into position for takeoff in the grass for Runway 21. The tow pilot shut down momentarily and exited the aircraft to personally brief the glider pilots (student glider pilot in front and Commercial SEL/CFIG in the rear cockpit) in the glider. He also informed the glider pilots that he had heard two aircraft with student pilots in the area and there were planes in the pattern using Runway 31. After starting the tow plane; the tow pilot made a blind radio call that glider staging was taking place on Runway 21 at the airport. At the same time; an aircraft was taking the active to takeoff on Runway 31 and the spotter confirmed this with the tow pilot. The departing aircraft made a radio call that he was departing on Runway 31. The tow plane and glider remained in position for takeoff waiting for the Diamond aircraft to takeoff on Runway 31 and clear the area. After the cross traffic aircraft was clear; another radio call was made by the tow pilot informing airport traffic that the tow plane with glider in tow were departing Runway 21 in the grass with a left turnout. This radio call was heard loud and clear by the spotter. The glider club spotter confirmed via radio that the departure path was clear and there had been no other radio calls by any other aircraft that would be a conflict. The tow pilot then added full power for takeoff. Towing a low performance glider takes approximately 20% more runway than a high performance glider and the initial takeoff roll with full power in the grass is very slow for such a takeoff. However; the glider is typically airborne well before the tow plane is able to break ground. On the incident takeoff; the glider was airborne normally after an approximate 1;000 FT takeoff roll and the tow plane was airborne approximately 500 FT prior to Taxiway A. Shortly after the tow plane was airborne and at approximately 25 FT above the ground; the glider club spotter made a traffic call on the Unicom frequency informing the tow pilot that an aircraft was taking off on Runway 31. The spotter; the tow plane and the glider did not hear any radio calls by this aircraft. The spotter's call was based on visually acquiring the traffic that had not been previously visible from the spotter's position most likely because the conflicting aircraft was not yet on the runway or positioned at an angle not easily visible. The tow pilot confirmed the conflict visually and watched a single engine aircraft rotate and continue taking off on Runway 31 with a flight path that would most likely cause a mid-air collision at midfield. With the Diamond aircraft not taking evasive action or aborting to give way to the tow plane and glider in tow; the tow pilot had to make an immediate split-second decision to either abort the takeoff and land straight ahead crossing Runway 31 and the path of the Diamond; continue with the tow and try to de-conflict flight paths; or release the glider and execute an emergency low altitude steep turn to avoid the Diamond aircraft. The conflicting aircraft was approximately at the point where the taxiway crosses Runway 31 at an angle (taxiway that connects both Runways 03 and 13/31 to the T-hangar ramp) when this was occurring. The safest decision with the lowest risk was to release the glider and make a low altitude steep turn. As the tow pilot was reaching down to release the glider; the glider instructor in the rear cockpit released the glider and then landed the K-7 straight ahead in the grass stopping short of taxiway A and short of Runway 31. The tow pilot; with a 180 foot tow rope connected; made a low altitude steep turn at 50 FT AGL; with a flight path that cut between the parallel taxiway for runway 31 and Runway 31; safely missing the Diamond aircraft; by approximately 100 FT horizontally; that had made the decision to continue their takeoff and departure despite the tow plane and glider having the right of way in accordance with FAR 91.113. The Diamond aircraft took no evasive action and continued straight ahead on runway heading. The NMAC was high aspect (nose to nose) at co-altitude and approximately 100 FT laterally. The tow plane continued to climb and entered a downwind for Runway 21 and landed uneventfully. The airport AWOS shortly after landing was Winds 260/6; 10SM; CLR; 28/11 A3008. Both Diamond aircraft exited the airport traffic area and did not return. It appeared that the Diamond aircraft were operating together (based on subsequent radio calls between the twin departed aircraft) for student training and only one aircraft was possibly making traffic calls. Throughout the rest of the day; 9 more glider tows were conducted safely with no conflicts; however; it should be noted that the glider tow pilot witnessed 3 other pattern conflicts involving only single-engine aircraft not involved with the glider operations. These 3 conflicts involved aircraft operating off Runways 31 (ILS 31 and visual traffic pattern) and 13 (VOR 13 approach) conflicting with powered aircraft landing on Runway 21 (visual traffic pattern). The local rule requiring a spotter for glider operations doesn't de-conflict powered aircraft and there isn't a spotter requirement for powered aircraft written in the local airport rules. The FAA handbooks (to include such handbooks as the Instrument Procedures Handbook; the Instrument Flying Handbook; the Airplane Flying Handbook and the Glider Handbook) do not specifically address crossing runway operations. Recommend the FAA develop standard procedures and radio calls for crossing runway operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.