Narrative:

During descent for approach I was assigned 6000'. At 7000' the altitude alerter sounded and both the first officer and I acknowledged it. During the next 1000' the first officer tuned up the ILS frequency to identify it. I was watching my altimeter, but as I approached 6000' it didn't register in my mind to stop the descent. When the altitude alerter bell rang again I finally realized I was 400' low. During the recovery the lowest altitude I saw was 5500' and the highest was 6400'. There are 3 factors which I feel helped lead up to this situation. First: my assigned route and duties. We fly all night. I have 8 legs, which ends up being 7.0-7.5 hours of flying within 12-13 hours of duty time. On 7 of the 8 stops we load and unload the aircraft, which can be up to 2000 pounds of work a stop. Our longest stop is approximately 1 hour 45 min. All of these things added together add to fatigue. This incident happened on the 7TH leg. Second: the position of the altitude alerter. The altitude alerter is located high on the instrument panel. It is blocked from direct view by either pilot. Out of sight, out of mind. It would be much easier to xchk with it lower on the panel. Third: atlanta approach control procedures. I have been flying into atl for 3 yrs now and the procedure is the same. Keep the planes high and close in. It is not unusual to be expected to lose 2000' just before turning final. And then make a 90 degree - 110 degree turn to intercept the localizer a half mile from the outer marker. It is almost impossible not to overshoot and end up close to the approach path of the other runway. If approach let us down earlier and turned us on farther out and at a smaller angle, we would not have to rush to get down. I am trying to get the company to ease up on my route to make it less fatiguing. I am also stressing to the first officer the need to focus on important things during critical phases of flight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states that his petitioning of the company to lower the on duty time has been successful. The on duty is now 11 hours maximum with no more than 6 flight legs. He stated that this has helped a great deal in lowering the fatigue factor. The flight crews do indeed do the unloading and loading of the aircraft cargo which averages about 20 minutes. It is not conducive to proper preflight planning. The company has about 100 pilots and 80 aircraft. The aircraft utilization is high. When asked about atl approach control procedure on vectors and keeping high he stated that this was in conjunction with a noise abatement procedure. Pilot said that approach control is not too receptive to requests for a longer turn on. Reporter was advised to state that a coupled approach was to be made and that a longer turn on to final would be appreciated. This would be more in keeping with approved ATC procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A 2-MAN FLT CREW EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN COMPLYING WITH APCH CTL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE APCH. CREW ON 12 TO 13 HOUR DUTY TIME, MULTIPLE LEGS OVER 7 AND AT NIGHT. EXTRA DUTIES WHILE ON GND LAYOVER COMPLICATE PLT CAPABILITIES.

Narrative: DURING DSCNT FOR APCH I WAS ASSIGNED 6000'. AT 7000' THE ALT ALERTER SOUNDED AND BOTH THE F/O AND I ACKNOWLEDGED IT. DURING THE NEXT 1000' THE F/O TUNED UP THE ILS FREQ TO IDENTIFY IT. I WAS WATCHING MY ALTIMETER, BUT AS I APCHED 6000' IT DIDN'T REGISTER IN MY MIND TO STOP THE DSCNT. WHEN THE ALT ALERTER BELL RANG AGAIN I FINALLY REALIZED I WAS 400' LOW. DURING THE RECOVERY THE LOWEST ALT I SAW WAS 5500' AND THE HIGHEST WAS 6400'. THERE ARE 3 FACTORS WHICH I FEEL HELPED LEAD UP TO THIS SITUATION. FIRST: MY ASSIGNED ROUTE AND DUTIES. WE FLY ALL NIGHT. I HAVE 8 LEGS, WHICH ENDS UP BEING 7.0-7.5 HRS OF FLYING WITHIN 12-13 HRS OF DUTY TIME. ON 7 OF THE 8 STOPS WE LOAD AND UNLOAD THE ACFT, WHICH CAN BE UP TO 2000 LBS OF WORK A STOP. OUR LONGEST STOP IS APPROX 1 HR 45 MIN. ALL OF THESE THINGS ADDED TOGETHER ADD TO FATIGUE. THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED ON THE 7TH LEG. SECOND: THE POSITION OF THE ALT ALERTER. THE ALT ALERTER IS LOCATED HIGH ON THE INSTRUMENT PANEL. IT IS BLOCKED FROM DIRECT VIEW BY EITHER PLT. OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO XCHK WITH IT LOWER ON THE PANEL. THIRD: ATLANTA APCH CTL PROCS. I HAVE BEEN FLYING INTO ATL FOR 3 YRS NOW AND THE PROC IS THE SAME. KEEP THE PLANES HIGH AND CLOSE IN. IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO BE EXPECTED TO LOSE 2000' JUST BEFORE TURNING FINAL. AND THEN MAKE A 90 DEG - 110 DEG TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC A HALF MILE FROM THE OUTER MARKER. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO OVERSHOOT AND END UP CLOSE TO THE APCH PATH OF THE OTHER RWY. IF APCH LET US DOWN EARLIER AND TURNED US ON FARTHER OUT AND AT A SMALLER ANGLE, WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO RUSH TO GET DOWN. I AM TRYING TO GET THE COMPANY TO EASE UP ON MY ROUTE TO MAKE IT LESS FATIGUING. I AM ALSO STRESSING TO THE F/O THE NEED TO FOCUS ON IMPORTANT THINGS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REPORTER STATES THAT HIS PETITIONING OF THE COMPANY TO LOWER THE ON DUTY TIME HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE ON DUTY IS NOW 11 HRS MAX WITH NO MORE THAN 6 FLT LEGS. HE STATED THAT THIS HAS HELPED A GREAT DEAL IN LOWERING THE FATIGUE FACTOR. THE FLT CREWS DO INDEED DO THE UNLOADING AND LOADING OF THE ACFT CARGO WHICH AVERAGES ABOUT 20 MINUTES. IT IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO PROPER PREFLT PLANNING. THE COMPANY HAS ABOUT 100 PLTS AND 80 ACFT. THE ACFT UTILIZATION IS HIGH. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ATL APCH CTL PROC ON VECTORS AND KEEPING HIGH HE STATED THAT THIS WAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NOISE ABATEMENT PROC. PLT SAID THAT APCH CTL IS NOT TOO RECEPTIVE TO REQUESTS FOR A LONGER TURN ON. REPORTER WAS ADVISED TO STATE THAT A COUPLED APCH WAS TO BE MADE AND THAT A LONGER TURN ON TO FINAL WOULD BE APPRECIATED. THIS WOULD BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH APPROVED ATC PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.