Narrative:

The problem arose because my preflight planning was minimal, I had very little recent flight experience, and was spending too much time in the cockpit monitoring the new-engine's instruments. The preflight was inadequate. It consisted of looking at a sectional chart and deciding which VOR radials to follow home and marking the appropriate af/D pages for dayton cox approach and toledo approach. I departed lunken on a VFR flight to grosse ile. The above factors all contributed to my getting off course and somewhat confused as to my position. I dialed in the cvg VOR and took up a heading to intercept the chosen radial (022). I realized that my course would take me into the dayton arsa and dialed in the correct approach frequency (or so I thought). It is important that I had not written down these frequencys prior to flight, because now I had to spend time in the cockpit finding them. After 2 unsuccessful attempts to contact dayton approach I went back to the af/D to double-check the frequency. The one I had in the communication was the same one listed. At this point I began looking for dayton airport. I spotted the airport up ahead and tried to contact approach again. I had the map up and was checking my position and monitoring the engine instruments when I realized that dayton had still not called me back. I began a descending, right turn to avoid the dayton arsa. I glanced at the map and became nervous as to my actual position in respect to the dayton arsa and wright patterson AFB. I made another right turn to complete a course reversal. At this time I was rather distracted and upset with myself for getting into such a stupid situation. I was looking at the af/D to see if there was another frequency to call on and monitoring the engine instruments, spending way too much time in the cockpit. I looked at the flight instruments and realized that my heading had drifted over to 250 and that I was unsure of my actual position. I turned back to the east and went back to the map, after a few minutes I took a deep breath, called myself a few dumb names and then started thinking again. I crosschecked my position by VOR, continued heading east and located myself over wilmington, oh. At this point I decided to climb up over the arsa and continue home to grosse ile. The rest of the flight was completed without incident. The reason for my confession is that due mostly to poor preflight planning I may have violated the dayton arsa and/or the wright patterson control zone. An additional factor that I believed may have contributed is that on the flight down to cincinnati I developed a splitting headache. I thought it would not cause any hazard. Taken by itself it would not have, but in conjunction with the other factors ir made things worse. The lesson in this incident is that I should have followed the same rules I insist my flight students follow.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOW LEVEL EXPERIENCE PLT OF SMA BECAME DISORIENTED MAY HAVE PENETRATED DAY ARSA.

Narrative: THE PROBLEM AROSE BECAUSE MY PREFLT PLANNING WAS MINIMAL, I HAD VERY LITTLE RECENT FLT EXPERIENCE, AND WAS SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME IN THE COCKPIT MONITORING THE NEW-ENGINE'S INSTRUMENTS. THE PREFLT WAS INADEQUATE. IT CONSISTED OF LOOKING AT A SECTIONAL CHART AND DECIDING WHICH VOR RADIALS TO FOLLOW HOME AND MARKING THE APPROPRIATE AF/D PAGES FOR DAYTON COX APCH AND TOLEDO APCH. I DEPARTED LUNKEN ON A VFR FLT TO GROSSE ILE. THE ABOVE FACTORS ALL CONTRIBUTED TO MY GETTING OFF COURSE AND SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AS TO MY POSITION. I DIALED IN THE CVG VOR AND TOOK UP A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE CHOSEN RADIAL (022). I REALIZED THAT MY COURSE WOULD TAKE ME INTO THE DAYTON ARSA AND DIALED IN THE CORRECT APCH FREQ (OR SO I THOUGHT). IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I HAD NOT WRITTEN DOWN THESE FREQS PRIOR TO FLT, BECAUSE NOW I HAD TO SPEND TIME IN THE COCKPIT FINDING THEM. AFTER 2 UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT DAYTON APCH I WENT BACK TO THE AF/D TO DOUBLE-CHECK THE FREQ. THE ONE I HAD IN THE COM WAS THE SAME ONE LISTED. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN LOOKING FOR DAYTON ARPT. I SPOTTED THE ARPT UP AHEAD AND TRIED TO CONTACT APCH AGAIN. I HAD THE MAP UP AND WAS CHECKING MY POSITION AND MONITORING THE ENGINE INSTRUMENTS WHEN I REALIZED THAT DAYTON HAD STILL NOT CALLED ME BACK. I BEGAN A DESCENDING, RIGHT TURN TO AVOID THE DAYTON ARSA. I GLANCED AT THE MAP AND BECAME NERVOUS AS TO MY ACTUAL POSITION IN RESPECT TO THE DAYTON ARSA AND WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB. I MADE ANOTHER RIGHT TURN TO COMPLETE A COURSE REVERSAL. AT THIS TIME I WAS RATHER DISTRACTED AND UPSET WITH MYSELF FOR GETTING INTO SUCH A STUPID SITUATION. I WAS LOOKING AT THE AF/D TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANOTHER FREQ TO CALL ON AND MONITORING THE ENGINE INSTRUMENTS, SPENDING WAY TOO MUCH TIME IN THE COCKPIT. I LOOKED AT THE FLT INSTRUMENTS AND REALIZED THAT MY HEADING HAD DRIFTED OVER TO 250 AND THAT I WAS UNSURE OF MY ACTUAL POSITION. I TURNED BACK TO THE EAST AND WENT BACK TO THE MAP, AFTER A FEW MINUTES I TOOK A DEEP BREATH, CALLED MYSELF A FEW DUMB NAMES AND THEN STARTED THINKING AGAIN. I XCHKED MY POSITION BY VOR, CONTINUED HDG E AND LOCATED MYSELF OVER WILMINGTON, OH. AT THIS POINT I DECIDED TO CLIMB UP OVER THE ARSA AND CONTINUE HOME TO GROSSE ILE. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE REASON FOR MY CONFESSION IS THAT DUE MOSTLY TO POOR PREFLT PLANNING I MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DAYTON ARSA AND/OR THE WRIGHT PATTERSON CTL ZONE. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR THAT I BELIEVED MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED IS THAT ON THE FLT DOWN TO CINCINNATI I DEVELOPED A SPLITTING HEADACHE. I THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE ANY HAZARD. TAKEN BY ITSELF IT WOULD NOT HAVE, BUT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER FACTORS IR MADE THINGS WORSE. THE LESSON IN THIS INCIDENT IS THAT I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE SAME RULES I INSIST MY FLT STUDENTS FOLLOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.