Narrative:

Captain was PF (pilot flying); first officer was pm (pilot monitoring). We were inbound to sfo; approaching boldr intersection; before our runway assignment and approach procedure was given; along with a clearance to fly a 270 heading passing boldr. We had briefed and set up for the FMS RNAV runway 28R visual approach prior to descent. We were given runway 28R for landing but told to expect the tipp toe visual runway 28R. Descent had been held up by approach control with an assigned airspeed of 290 KTS. Expediting to meet the restrictions at boldr; the captain went from VNAV; to lvl chg; to expedite to bolder for the 250 KTS/10;000 ft crossing restriction. I noted the captain had the speed brakes deployed and a 32 knot tailwind. We were still high and fast as we arrived at boldr as norcal app issued another heading change and additional speed reduction to 210 KTS as we crossed boldr. Passing boldr; we had not slowed to 250 KTS; because of being in lvl chg. There was no conflict mentioned; nor was anything mentioned about speed or altitude. The last minute approach and runway assignment; my being somewhat unfamiliar with what to build and how the captain wanted the approach built for visual arrival into the FMC distracted me from monitoring the captain; left us rushed and behind in being on speed and altitude at boldr. Whether our clearance removed the responsibility of making the restriction of 250 KTS/10;000 ft at boldr or not; we were clearly task saturated by the last minute runway and visual approach assignment. Sfo is a place that issues the runway and arrival procedure very late. The arrivals are complicated by not being a direct overlay with the existing procedures in the FMC approaches. Coinciding fixes with existing fixes or creating a selectable approach procedure would reduce these complications and distractions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-NG on the BSR 2 with a tailwind and an inexperienced First Officer; failed to make the BOLDR speed restriction and then NORCAL changed the approach from the RNAV 28L visual to the TIP TOE 28R causing complicated; distracted and hurried crew actions.

Narrative: Captain was PF (Pilot Flying); First Officer was PM (Pilot Monitoring). We were inbound to SFO; approaching BOLDR intersection; before our runway assignment and approach procedure was given; along with a clearance to fly a 270 heading passing BOLDR. We had briefed and set up for the FMS RNAV Runway 28R visual approach prior to descent. We were given Runway 28R for landing but told to expect the TIPP TOE VISUAL Runway 28R. Descent had been held up by Approach Control with an assigned airspeed of 290 KTS. Expediting to meet the restrictions at BOLDR; the Captain went from VNAV; to LVL CHG; to expedite to BOLDER for the 250 KTS/10;000 FT crossing restriction. I noted the Captain had the speed brakes deployed and a 32 knot tailwind. We were still high and fast as we arrived at BOLDR as NORCAL APP issued another heading change and additional speed reduction to 210 KTS as we crossed BOLDR. Passing BOLDR; we had not slowed to 250 KTS; because of being in LVL CHG. There was no conflict mentioned; nor was anything mentioned about speed or altitude. The last minute approach and runway assignment; my being somewhat unfamiliar with what to build and how the Captain wanted the approach built for visual arrival into the FMC distracted me from monitoring the Captain; left us rushed and behind in being on speed and altitude at BOLDR. Whether our clearance removed the responsibility of making the restriction of 250 KTS/10;000 FT at BOLDR or not; we were clearly task saturated by the last minute runway and visual approach assignment. SFO is a place that issues the runway and arrival procedure very late. The arrivals are complicated by not being a direct overlay with the existing procedures in the FMC approaches. Coinciding fixes with existing fixes or creating a selectable approach procedure would reduce these complications and distractions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.