Narrative:

WX was ok. Approach control asked us: 'how many miles do you need for your approach'? Pilot not flying (PNF) '5-6 NM'. DME indicated 8 NM. Control cleared us for visual approach and straight in! We were on left hand base leg for runway 20 at 3800' MSL (airport elevation: 44 AGL)! We had +/- 22 KTS. Vref calculated 98 KTS. We were in clean confign. We turned left on final course. It seemed to be a little bit high, but I thought it would be good to make a safe landing, increasing rate of descent, then reducing the speed. PNF selected 45 degree flaps before the required speed (200 KTS) to increase drag, then selected gear down before required speed (180 KTS) trying to reduce speed. PNF selected flaps 30, but at this time we weren't near the threshold up runway 20 -- full flaps at speed 120-130 KTS instead of 98 KTS (vref). I raised the nose to decrease the speed but we overflew the runway past mid point. PNF said: 'put it on the ground'. I put it on the runway at 120 KIAS. Then began the problems. Seeing the runway end coming rapidly, I selected full reverse and heavy braking. I failed to look at 2 beta lights indicating reverse on both sides was available. Left reverse came in first, then the aircraft steered on the left. I counteracted by right hand brake to keep more or less runway heading and slowed the aircraft by heavy braking. We failed (PNF) to contact tower frequency as requested by approach and landed without clearance. Fire brigade was at the parking because smoke was seen from tower. (May be from high speed over runway and touchdown point!) tires skidded and were flat on 3 places on left hand side and on right hand side. Human factors involved: 1) fatigue: bad judgement (PF). Bad perception of altitude and speed (PF and PNF). The decision of the PNF to select flaps and gear without advice contributed to 'try' the landing. I think that was very bad because if I waited for the proper speeds to select settings, I would have realized that I was too high and too fast and decided to go around and perform another landing. My judgement was influenced by these actions (PNF is captain for the company). 2) good WX was also contributing to this situation, seeing clearly the runway. If WX was bad, we do as usual, the right actions at the right place in approach pattern and overconfidence in this situation was also contributing to this occurrence. 3) it was better to perform a 270 degree right to lose altitude and be on final lower than turning direct onto final course. Fatigue is due to: flts sometimes 'off duty' due to lack of pilots and, for me personally, 1 hour drive from home to airport (and back), reducing consequently the rest period, contributing to increase the fatigue (2 hours a day). 4) misjudgment of remaining runway length. So braking action was not necessary.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FOREIGN ATX UNAUTH LNDG. UNSTABILIZED APCH RESULTING IN TIRE DAMAGE.

Narrative: WX WAS OK. APCH CTL ASKED US: 'HOW MANY MILES DO YOU NEED FOR YOUR APCH'? PLT NOT FLYING (PNF) '5-6 NM'. DME INDICATED 8 NM. CTL CLRED US FOR VISUAL APCH AND STRAIGHT IN! WE WERE ON LEFT HAND BASE LEG FOR RWY 20 AT 3800' MSL (ARPT ELEVATION: 44 AGL)! WE HAD +/- 22 KTS. VREF CALCULATED 98 KTS. WE WERE IN CLEAN CONFIGN. WE TURNED LEFT ON FINAL COURSE. IT SEEMED TO BE A LITTLE BIT HIGH, BUT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO MAKE A SAFE LNDG, INCREASING RATE OF DSCNT, THEN REDUCING THE SPEED. PNF SELECTED 45 DEG FLAPS BEFORE THE REQUIRED SPEED (200 KTS) TO INCREASE DRAG, THEN SELECTED GEAR DOWN BEFORE REQUIRED SPEED (180 KTS) TRYING TO REDUCE SPEED. PNF SELECTED FLAPS 30, BUT AT THIS TIME WE WEREN'T NEAR THE THRESHOLD UP RWY 20 -- FULL FLAPS AT SPEED 120-130 KTS INSTEAD OF 98 KTS (VREF). I RAISED THE NOSE TO DECREASE THE SPEED BUT WE OVERFLEW THE RWY PAST MID POINT. PNF SAID: 'PUT IT ON THE GND'. I PUT IT ON THE RWY AT 120 KIAS. THEN BEGAN THE PROBLEMS. SEEING THE RWY END COMING RAPIDLY, I SELECTED FULL REVERSE AND HEAVY BRAKING. I FAILED TO LOOK AT 2 BETA LIGHTS INDICATING REVERSE ON BOTH SIDES WAS AVAILABLE. LEFT REVERSE CAME IN FIRST, THEN THE ACFT STEERED ON THE LEFT. I COUNTERACTED BY RIGHT HAND BRAKE TO KEEP MORE OR LESS RWY HDG AND SLOWED THE ACFT BY HEAVY BRAKING. WE FAILED (PNF) TO CONTACT TWR FREQ AS REQUESTED BY APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC. FIRE BRIGADE WAS AT THE PARKING BECAUSE SMOKE WAS SEEN FROM TWR. (MAY BE FROM HIGH SPEED OVER RWY AND TOUCHDOWN POINT!) TIRES SKIDDED AND WERE FLAT ON 3 PLACES ON LEFT HAND SIDE AND ON RIGHT HAND SIDE. HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) FATIGUE: BAD JUDGEMENT (PF). BAD PERCEPTION OF ALT AND SPEED (PF AND PNF). THE DECISION OF THE PNF TO SELECT FLAPS AND GEAR WITHOUT ADVICE CONTRIBUTED TO 'TRY' THE LNDG. I THINK THAT WAS VERY BAD BECAUSE IF I WAITED FOR THE PROPER SPEEDS TO SELECT SETTINGS, I WOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT I WAS TOO HIGH AND TOO FAST AND DECIDED TO GO AROUND AND PERFORM ANOTHER LNDG. MY JUDGEMENT WAS INFLUENCED BY THESE ACTIONS (PNF IS CAPT FOR THE COMPANY). 2) GOOD WX WAS ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THIS SITUATION, SEEING CLEARLY THE RWY. IF WX WAS BAD, WE DO AS USUAL, THE RIGHT ACTIONS AT THE RIGHT PLACE IN APCH PATTERN AND OVERCONFIDENCE IN THIS SITUATION WAS ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THIS OCCURRENCE. 3) IT WAS BETTER TO PERFORM A 270 DEG RIGHT TO LOSE ALT AND BE ON FINAL LOWER THAN TURNING DIRECT ONTO FINAL COURSE. FATIGUE IS DUE TO: FLTS SOMETIMES 'OFF DUTY' DUE TO LACK OF PLTS AND, FOR ME PERSONALLY, 1 HOUR DRIVE FROM HOME TO ARPT (AND BACK), REDUCING CONSEQUENTLY THE REST PERIOD, CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASE THE FATIGUE (2 HOURS A DAY). 4) MISJUDGMENT OF REMAINING RWY LENGTH. SO BRAKING ACTION WAS NOT NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.