Narrative:

We were ready to push out of the gate when the lead ramp agent started signaling my first officer. He could not understand the signaling and I could not see him from my seat so I told my first officer to direct him to use a headset. He got in his tug cart and put a headset on. His headset did not work both ways. He could hear us; but we could not hear him. We managed to decipher that he did not like how one of the tires looked. I asked my first officer if all the tires looked good to him when he did the post flight walk around; to which he said they did indeed look good. I told the ramp agent that my first officer looked at the tires and they all were in good shape. I then asked him if he thought something had just happened to one of the tires. He clearly signaled something like 'ok; let's go!' I asked him if he was sure. He again replied 'yeah; let's go!?' and gave me hand signals for 'brake release' to commence the push. I commented to my first officer that if they were willing to push us; the tire must have been in good shape. Common sense dictates that if I have three ramp agents and the three of them think there is something wrong with any part of the airplane; they will not push it off the gate until they are comfortable doing so. At least that was my reasoning. I was wrong. After the push; we taxied to [runway] 24R for departure. Everything felt good to me and my first officer during taxi and takeoff. In fact; by the time we reached the runway we had totally forgotten about the episode at the gate. At some point during the climb; center contacted us with a message from the control tower. Tower said that right around our time of departure; an airplane (they did not know which) had lost part of a tire on takeoff. They were contacting all airplanes that departed at around our departure time. We went back and forth with several controllers trying to determine how much rubber they found of the runway. Eventually; they got back to us and said they found between thirty and forty pieces of rubber ranging between one inch and three feet in length. I figured if we were the ones who lost all that rubber it must have made some noise in the cabin. I contacted both flight attendants and asked them if everything had felt all right during the takeoff. They responded that it did not. They told me loud noises and strong vibrations came from under the airplane. At this point we were ready to assume one of our tires blew on takeoff. By this time we were all the way over half way. All indications were good in the flight deck; so I decided to continue to our filed destination. As we got closer to the airport we sent a message to dispatch; we declared an emergency; and requested to land on 27R. I expected a normal landing; except for a longer than normal landing roll. I talked to the flight attendants and also decided not to mention anything to the passengers until after landing; unless we happened to have a flap malfunction or any 'unsafe landing gear indications' during the approach. The landing was uneventful; but after the aircraft settled on the runway; it became evident we had indeed lost part of a tire on takeoff. This was also confirmed by another flight crew; and by airport personnel. We had no problems exiting the runway. In fact; once the airplane slowed down to taxi speed; it felt completely normal. Ground control told us there was a tug team on the way; along with mechanics; to look at the airplane and tow it to the gate. We stopped on taxiway left; I talked to the passengers; and got towed to the gate. The biggest threat here was a breakdown in communication between the ramp agents and the captain. A working headset could have helped the ramp agent communicate effectively that the tire was not in a safe condition. I really did not get any sense in urgency in their attempt to communicate we had a problem. When he decided to push; I assumed all ramp agents believed the tire was safe. I questioned him once; he decidedto push; and gave me an indication that all was well. It would have helped if he had said: 'you really need to look at this tire'; or something like that. Instead; in my mind; everything went more like: ramp agent: 'hmmmm that tire could look better captain' myself: 'my first officer looked at them a few minutes ago and they looked ok; did anything just happen to a tire?' ramp agent: 'ok; never mind; looks good to me captain; let's go!' that did not tell me: hey; we need to stop what we are doing and have a look. Next time a ramp agent questions something; it does not matter how little or what it is; I am going to open the door; get out; and check it out myself. If I had done that; I would not be writing this right now. I made a decision with not the best information; under a less than ideal communication situation. I should have made sure communication was adequate and information was accurate before I made the decision to continue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ground crew had no headset before a CRJ-900 engine start; but indicated something wrong with a tire. Unable to confirm an anomaly after the First Officer's normal preflight; the flight crew assumed no anomaly; but were notified after takeoff a tire had failed. An emergency was declared at the arrival station followed by an uneventful landing.

Narrative: We were ready to push out of the gate when the lead ramp agent started signaling my First Officer. He could not understand the signaling and I could not see him from my seat so I told my First Officer to direct him to use a headset. He got in his tug cart and put a headset on. His headset did not work both ways. He could hear us; but we could not hear him. We managed to decipher that he did not like how one of the tires looked. I asked my First Officer if all the tires looked good to him when he did the post flight walk around; to which he said they did indeed look good. I told the Ramp Agent that my First Officer looked at the tires and they all were in good shape. I then asked him if he thought something had just happened to one of the tires. He clearly signaled something like 'OK; let's go!' I asked him if he was sure. He again replied 'Yeah; let's go!?' and gave me hand signals for 'Brake Release' to commence the push. I commented to my First Officer that if they were willing to push us; the tire must have been in good shape. Common sense dictates that if I have three Ramp Agents and the three of them think there is something wrong with any part of the airplane; they will not push it off the gate until they are comfortable doing so. At least that was my reasoning. I was wrong. After the push; we taxied to [Runway] 24R for departure. Everything felt good to me and my First Officer during taxi and takeoff. In fact; by the time we reached the runway we had totally forgotten about the episode at the gate. At some point during the climb; Center contacted us with a message from the Control Tower. Tower said that right around our time of departure; an airplane (they did not know which) had lost part of a tire on takeoff. They were contacting all airplanes that departed at around our departure time. We went back and forth with several controllers trying to determine how much rubber they found of the runway. Eventually; they got back to us and said they found between thirty and forty pieces of rubber ranging between one inch and three feet in length. I figured if we were the ones who lost all that rubber it must have made some noise in the cabin. I contacted both flight attendants and asked them if everything had felt all right during the takeoff. They responded that it did not. They told me loud noises and strong vibrations came from under the airplane. At this point we were ready to assume one of our tires blew on takeoff. By this time we were all the way over half way. All indications were good in the flight deck; so I decided to continue to our filed destination. As we got closer to the airport we sent a message to Dispatch; we declared an emergency; and requested to land on 27R. I expected a normal landing; except for a longer than normal landing roll. I talked to the flight attendants and also decided not to mention anything to the passengers until after landing; unless we happened to have a flap malfunction or any 'unsafe landing gear indications' during the approach. The landing was uneventful; but after the aircraft settled on the runway; it became evident we had indeed lost part of a tire on takeoff. This was also confirmed by another flight crew; and by airport personnel. We had no problems exiting the runway. In fact; once the airplane slowed down to taxi speed; it felt completely normal. Ground Control told us there was a tug team on the way; along with mechanics; to look at the airplane and tow it to the gate. We stopped on Taxiway L; I talked to the passengers; and got towed to the gate. The biggest threat here was a breakdown in communication between the ramp agents and the Captain. A working headset could have helped the Ramp Agent communicate effectively that the tire was not in a safe condition. I really did not get any sense in urgency in their attempt to communicate we had a problem. When he decided to push; I assumed all ramp agents believed the tire was safe. I questioned him once; he decidedto push; and gave me an indication that all was well. It would have helped if he had said: 'You really need to look at this tire'; or something like that. Instead; in my mind; everything went more like: Ramp Agent: 'HMMMM that tire could look better Captain' Myself: 'my First Officer looked at them a few minutes ago and they looked OK; did anything just happen to a tire?' Ramp Agent: 'OK; never mind; looks good to me Captain; let's go!' That did not tell me: Hey; we need to stop what we are doing and have a look. Next time a Ramp Agent questions something; it does not matter how little or what it is; I am going to open the door; get out; and check it out myself. If I had done that; I would not be writing this right now. I made a decision with not the best information; under a less than ideal communication situation. I should have made sure communication was adequate and information was accurate before I made the decision to continue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.