Narrative:

Prior to takeoff; everything was normal. Once on the runway and cleared for takeoff; the controls were passed to me; I advanced the thrust levers and said 'set thrust.' around 60 KTS; the aircraft distinctly jerked to the left; taking a significant amount of right rudder input to try to correct. At this time; my attention was entirely on trying to keep the aircraft on the centerline. At almost the exact same time; we got a triple chime and I saw the master warning and master caution lights flashing. The captain took the controls and aborted the takeoff; at which time I was trying to split my attention between the runway (due to a possible steering malfunction) and the EICAS.I saw at least three messages on the EICAS (1 warning and 2 cautions); but I only read the first which was an sps 2 inoperative; and before I could even advise tower of the abort; they were giving us instructions on where to clear. I responded to tower; made he required passenger PA; and when I looked back down at the EICAS; all the messages were gone. I never had the chance to read the caution messages; but I assume one was a steer inop. After clearing the runway; we did the required checklists. After discussing the occurrence and with two seemingly unrelated malfunctions; we opted to contact maintenance and ops; and then returned to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the captain spoke with the mechanics while I did the walk around. I didn't see any anomalies. We then walked to the gate next door; boarded the passengers; and departed. I never had a clear idea of exactly what happened; but under the circumstances; I felt the best thing for me to do initially (during the transfer of controls back to the captain and immediately after) was stay focused outside in case we were having a steering malfunction. For me; the main threat during the abort was trying to figure out how to split my attention between the EICAS and the position of the aircraft on the runway. Knowing exactly what is presented on the EICAS is important; but I felt that since we had a possible steering malfunction; my attention outside while we were above a taxi speed was more important so that I could help monitor the aircraft's position and call out any deviations from the centerline if they occurred again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-145 EICAS alerted during takeoff as the aircraft jerked left at about 60 KTS; so the Captain rejected and the flight returned to the gate for a replacement aircraft. The First Officer noted EICAS SPS 2; a Master Warning and Caution; but all messages self-cleared.

Narrative: Prior to takeoff; everything was normal. Once on the runway and cleared for takeoff; the controls were passed to me; I advanced the thrust levers and said 'set thrust.' Around 60 KTS; the aircraft distinctly jerked to the left; taking a significant amount of right rudder input to try to correct. At this time; my attention was entirely on trying to keep the aircraft on the centerline. At almost the exact same time; we got a triple chime and I saw the Master Warning and Master Caution lights flashing. The Captain took the controls and aborted the takeoff; at which time I was trying to split my attention between the runway (due to a possible steering malfunction) and the EICAS.I saw at least three messages on the EICAS (1 warning and 2 cautions); but I only read the first which was an SPS 2 INOP; and before I could even advise Tower of the abort; they were giving us instructions on where to clear. I responded to Tower; made he required passenger PA; and when I looked back down at the EICAS; all the messages were gone. I never had the chance to read the caution messages; but I assume one was a steer inop. After clearing the runway; we did the required checklists. After discussing the occurrence and with two seemingly unrelated malfunctions; we opted to contact Maintenance and Ops; and then returned to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the Captain spoke with the mechanics while I did the walk around. I didn't see any anomalies. We then walked to the gate next door; boarded the passengers; and departed. I never had a clear idea of exactly what happened; but under the circumstances; I felt the best thing for me to do initially (during the transfer of controls back to the Captain and immediately after) was stay focused outside in case we were having a steering malfunction. For me; the main threat during the abort was trying to figure out how to split my attention between the EICAS and the position of the aircraft on the runway. Knowing exactly what is presented on the EICAS is important; but I felt that since we had a possible steering malfunction; my attention outside while we were above a taxi speed was more important so that I could help monitor the aircraft's position and call out any deviations from the centerline if they occurred again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.