Narrative:

I arrived to work at xa 40, 7/89, for an XB00 shift change. After parking the car, I heard one of our hospital helicopters turning on the hospital helipad. I ran to the pad so I could relieve the night pilot and take the flight. The pilot at the controls was at the time looking over maps of the area while the aircraft turned at ground idle. We exchanged places with the aircraft still turning. When I got into the helicopter cockpit, the aircraft was not ready for flight. The throttles were not out of ground idle and I had to dial in a few radio frequencys applicable for the mission. We were responding to a multiple car accident with serious injuries incurred. I do remember pushing the throttles forward. I also remember glancing at my instrument gauges before lift off. Everything looked good. (Nr was approximately 98%.) I made the appropriate calls and began the takeoff process. I first came to a hover, turned on the spot and then began my transition to forward flight and climb. As we moved forward, my warning lights and horns for low RPM came on. My rotor turns began to drop and the aircraft slowly began to settle. We were past the west end of the pad, over a very steep hill which extended down to a commuter hour freeway. My #1 concern was to reach the nearest spot to land, which was back at the helipad. I turned and was able to settle back on the pad and appeared to land west/O incident. I looked at the gauges and around the cockpit. Everything was normal again, except I noticed that my engine throttles were not full forward (approximately 1/2 or 1/4' short).I assumed this was the problem. I pushed the throttles forward completely, lifted off again and flew the flight to the accident scene as if everything was normal. Upon landing and shutting down at the scene, I discovered that approximately 2-3' of each tail rotor blade (2) was chopped off. I gave the remaining rotors a detailed inspection, checked the drive train from the engines to the rotors and found everything in place. The patient was brought to the aircraft, dying, and placed inside. I made the decision that I could make the 5 min flight back to the hospital safely. The flight went back west/O incident. Problem areas: the quick EMS helicopter responses, the numerous interruptions of the EMS helicopter pilot during start-up and the pilot allowing this to happen. Plus, the added pressure of a dying person causing the pilot to make emotional decisions instead of safe ones. Most likely the throttles not being pushed full forward would not have occurred under normal start-up operations, and a pilot would not fly a damaged aircraft unless under excessive pressure to do so--not by anyone, but self-imposed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMI HELICOPTER TRIED TO TKOF WITHOUT FULL THROTTLE AND DAMAGED TAIL ROTOR RETURNING TO HELIPAD. PLT DISCOVERED THROTTLE PROBLEM, BUT DID NOT DETECT ROTOR DAMAGE UNTIL REACHING DESTINATION, THE ACCIDENT SIGHT.

Narrative: I ARRIVED TO WORK AT XA 40, 7/89, FOR AN XB00 SHIFT CHANGE. AFTER PARKING THE CAR, I HEARD ONE OF OUR HOSPITAL HELIS TURNING ON THE HOSPITAL HELIPAD. I RAN TO THE PAD SO I COULD RELIEVE THE NIGHT PLT AND TAKE THE FLT. THE PLT AT THE CONTROLS WAS AT THE TIME LOOKING OVER MAPS OF THE AREA WHILE THE ACFT TURNED AT GND IDLE. WE EXCHANGED PLACES WITH THE ACFT STILL TURNING. WHEN I GOT INTO THE HELI COCKPIT, THE ACFT WAS NOT READY FOR FLT. THE THROTTLES WERE NOT OUT OF GND IDLE AND I HAD TO DIAL IN A FEW RADIO FREQS APPLICABLE FOR THE MISSION. WE WERE RESPONDING TO A MULTIPLE CAR ACCIDENT WITH SERIOUS INJURIES INCURRED. I DO REMEMBER PUSHING THE THROTTLES FORWARD. I ALSO REMEMBER GLANCING AT MY INSTRUMENT GAUGES BEFORE LIFT OFF. EVERYTHING LOOKED GOOD. (NR WAS APPROX 98%.) I MADE THE APPROPRIATE CALLS AND BEGAN THE TKOF PROCESS. I FIRST CAME TO A HOVER, TURNED ON THE SPOT AND THEN BEGAN MY TRANSITION TO FORWARD FLT AND CLB. AS WE MOVED FORWARD, MY WARNING LIGHTS AND HORNS FOR LOW RPM CAME ON. MY ROTOR TURNS BEGAN TO DROP AND THE ACFT SLOWLY BEGAN TO SETTLE. WE WERE PAST THE W END OF THE PAD, OVER A VERY STEEP HILL WHICH EXTENDED DOWN TO A COMMUTER HR FREEWAY. MY #1 CONCERN WAS TO REACH THE NEAREST SPOT TO LAND, WHICH WAS BACK AT THE HELIPAD. I TURNED AND WAS ABLE TO SETTLE BACK ON THE PAD AND APPEARED TO LAND W/O INCIDENT. I LOOKED AT THE GAUGES AND AROUND THE COCKPIT. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL AGAIN, EXCEPT I NOTICED THAT MY ENG THROTTLES WERE NOT FULL FORWARD (APPROX 1/2 OR 1/4' SHORT).I ASSUMED THIS WAS THE PROB. I PUSHED THE THROTTLES FORWARD COMPLETELY, LIFTED OFF AGAIN AND FLEW THE FLT TO THE ACCIDENT SCENE AS IF EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL. UPON LNDG AND SHUTTING DOWN AT THE SCENE, I DISCOVERED THAT APPROX 2-3' OF EACH TAIL ROTOR BLADE (2) WAS CHOPPED OFF. I GAVE THE REMAINING ROTORS A DETAILED INSPECTION, CHKED THE DRIVE TRAIN FROM THE ENGS TO THE ROTORS AND FOUND EVERYTHING IN PLACE. THE PATIENT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ACFT, DYING, AND PLACED INSIDE. I MADE THE DECISION THAT I COULD MAKE THE 5 MIN FLT BACK TO THE HOSPITAL SAFELY. THE FLT WENT BACK W/O INCIDENT. PROB AREAS: THE QUICK EMS HELI RESPONSES, THE NUMEROUS INTERRUPTIONS OF THE EMS HELI PLT DURING START-UP AND THE PLT ALLOWING THIS TO HAPPEN. PLUS, THE ADDED PRESSURE OF A DYING PERSON CAUSING THE PLT TO MAKE EMOTIONAL DECISIONS INSTEAD OF SAFE ONES. MOST LIKELY THE THROTTLES NOT BEING PUSHED FULL FORWARD WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED UNDER NORMAL START-UP OPS, AND A PLT WOULD NOT FLY A DAMAGED ACFT UNLESS UNDER EXCESSIVE PRESSURE TO DO SO--NOT BY ANYONE, BUT SELF-IMPOSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.