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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1183120 |
Time | |
Date | 201406 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Powerplant Fuel Control Unit |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71.0 Flight Crew Total 2335.8 Flight Crew Type 261.2 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
Shortly after takeoff (approximately 1800 feet AGL; 2400 MSL; 145 KIAS) the aircraft's #1 engine malfunctioned resulting in zero torque. The crew declared an emergency; secured the engine per the QRH and returned. After landing; the crew turned off the runway and shut down on taxiway W-5. Airfield emergency crews responded and secured the aircraft for shutdown. Afterwards; ground crew towed the aircraft to the ramp. The torque motor in the #1 engine hydro mechanical unit (hmu) malfunctioned as diagnosed through high power ground engine runs. This failure was not realized by the crew inflight due to the nominal operation of the engine with engine control unit (ecu) selector in top (takeoff power). Once the ecu selector was switched from top to norm (as per the QRH (pilot checklist) during after takeoff checks); the enrichment solenoid was de energized resulting in low fuel flow to the #1 engine. The low fuel flow caused a power reduction and a command to reduce torque to maintain 900 RPM. The torque was reduced to zero resulting in the crew executing the engine failure QRH procedures. Replacing the #1 hmu remedied the problem. This condition is serious and affects operators using this combination of PW120/121 / hmu's everywhere. There were no indications of impending failure prior to moving the ecu selector from top to norm. This situation is dangerous because you have to create the dangerous situation before you know anything is wrong. A safety message should go to all affected operators immediately. Possible workarounds (not verified). If upon selecting ecu selector-norm; if a loss of power is detected; go back to ecu-top and land as soon as possible. Also disabling the affected ecu by selecting ecu-manual may reestablish sufficient fuel flow through mechanical linkages.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DHC8-100 Captain experiences a power loss after takeoff shortly after the ECU is switched from TOP to NORM. The engine is shut down in accordance with QRH procedures and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Narrative: Shortly after takeoff (approximately 1800 feet AGL; 2400 MSL; 145 KIAS) the aircraft's #1 engine malfunctioned resulting in zero torque. The crew declared an emergency; secured the engine per the QRH and returned. After landing; the crew turned off the runway and shut down on taxiway W-5. Airfield emergency crews responded and secured the aircraft for shutdown. Afterwards; ground crew towed the aircraft to the ramp. The torque motor in the #1 Engine Hydro Mechanical Unit (HMU) malfunctioned as diagnosed through high power ground engine runs. This failure was not realized by the crew inflight due to the nominal operation of the engine with Engine Control Unit (ECU) selector in TOP (Takeoff Power). Once the ECU selector was switched from TOP to NORM (as per the QRH (pilot checklist) during after takeoff checks); the Enrichment Solenoid was de energized resulting in low fuel flow to the #1 engine. The low fuel flow caused a power reduction and a command to reduce torque to maintain 900 RPM. The torque was reduced to zero resulting in the crew executing the Engine Failure QRH procedures. Replacing the #1 HMU remedied the problem. This condition is serious and affects operators using this combination of PW120/121 / HMU's everywhere. There were no indications of impending failure prior to moving the ECU selector from TOP to NORM. This situation is dangerous because you have to create the dangerous situation before you know anything is wrong. A safety message should go to all affected operators immediately. Possible workarounds (not verified). If upon selecting ECU selector-NORM; if a loss of power is detected; go back to ECU-TOP and land as soon as possible. Also disabling the affected ECU by selecting ECU-Manual may reestablish sufficient fuel flow through mechanical linkages.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.