Narrative:

Flight from livermore (lvk) to oakland (oak) VFR, VMC. How problem arose: 1) call up by pilot not customary for facility. 2) pilot unfamiliar with area (stated to control). 3) clouds. 4) pilot not IFR rated (requested by control as so stated). 5) dg precessed. 6) pilot unable to quickly locate position from unfamiliar ground references. 7) control very tense and terse. 8) lack of vectoring by control. 9) lack of free flow first officer communication between control and pilot. Human factors: to my mind, presented here is a situation in which neither party, for reasons of experience or others, was able to act quickly and decisively to clear the airspace for the safety of others and to alleviate stress on those operating the system. This occurrence caused me to realize how much is to be learned in order to understand what control does and how it is done. Seeing an airport (hwd) between fast moving yet separate clouds, I turned early, discovered physical differences between hwd and oak and was not cleared to land in this airspace. At this time I was told to change to hwd and was assigned a heading. During the turn and with eyes inside, I lost sight of the airport, not due to clouds, but because I was looking in the wrong place. The charge to be filed, as I understand it is VFR pilot in IMC on the basis of what was said by the pilot. The conditions were never below VFR minimums and a SVFR was not requested, however one heading could not be held and that should have been made clear that continuation would put plane below VFR minimums. Actions thought to reduce possibility of a recurrence. I do not know how to work toward correcting items 7,8,9, but feel them crucial. I have recently returned from 2 full days flying with CFI's (3) learning their methods of call up for this facility doing tough and goes at oak and hwd and talking with pilots. There was little agreement except that when busy call up should include identification saying I have request, then wait. I am rereading publications related to procedure and phraseology working toward completion of my IFR, and am also continuing with the series of safety flight proficiency and emergency maneuvering training, which is useful in control of the plane in any axis except in that of human factors. Unfortunately, from my perspective there was a minimum of useful information. Perhaps the stakes are too high, perhaps all control has to go on is 'does the pilot sound professional' and one can not be professional, by definition, without the IFR rating.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT MISTOOK HWD ARPT FOR OAK ARPT DUE TO SCATTERED CLOUDS. ASSISTED WITH VECTORS TO OAK.

Narrative: FLT FROM LIVERMORE (LVK) TO OAKLAND (OAK) VFR, VMC. HOW PROBLEM AROSE: 1) CALL UP BY PLT NOT CUSTOMARY FOR FAC. 2) PLT UNFAMILIAR WITH AREA (STATED TO CONTROL). 3) CLOUDS. 4) PLT NOT IFR RATED (REQUESTED BY CTL AS SO STATED). 5) DG PRECESSED. 6) PLT UNABLE TO QUICKLY LOCATE POSITION FROM UNFAMILIAR GND REFERENCES. 7) CTL VERY TENSE AND TERSE. 8) LACK OF VECTORING BY CTL. 9) LACK OF FREE FLOW FO COM BETWEEN CTL AND PLT. HUMAN FACTORS: TO MY MIND, PRESENTED HERE IS A SITUATION IN WHICH NEITHER PARTY, FOR REASONS OF EXPERIENCE OR OTHERS, WAS ABLE TO ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY TO CLEAR THE AIRSPACE FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AND TO ALLEVIATE STRESS ON THOSE OPERATING THE SYSTEM. THIS OCCURRENCE CAUSED ME TO REALIZE HOW MUCH IS TO BE LEARNED IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND WHAT CONTROL DOES AND HOW IT IS DONE. SEEING AN ARPT (HWD) BETWEEN FAST MOVING YET SEPARATE CLOUDS, I TURNED EARLY, DISCOVERED PHYSICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HWD AND OAK AND WAS NOT CLRED TO LAND IN THIS AIRSPACE. AT THIS TIME I WAS TOLD TO CHANGE TO HWD AND WAS ASSIGNED A HDG. DURING THE TURN AND WITH EYES INSIDE, I LOST SIGHT OF THE ARPT, NOT DUE TO CLOUDS, BUT BECAUSE I WAS LOOKING IN THE WRONG PLACE. THE CHARGE TO BE FILED, AS I UNDERSTAND IT IS VFR PLT IN IMC ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WAS SAID BY THE PLT. THE CONDITIONS WERE NEVER BELOW VFR MINIMUMS AND A SVFR WAS NOT REQUESTED, HOWEVER ONE HEADING COULD NOT BE HELD AND THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT CONTINUATION WOULD PUT PLANE BELOW VFR MINIMUMS. ACTIONS THOUGHT TO REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF A RECURRENCE. I DO NOT KNOW HOW TO WORK TOWARD CORRECTING ITEMS 7,8,9, BUT FEEL THEM CRUCIAL. I HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED FROM 2 FULL DAYS FLYING WITH CFI'S (3) LEARNING THEIR METHODS OF CALL UP FOR THIS FAC DOING TOUGH AND GOES AT OAK AND HWD AND TALKING WITH PLTS. THERE WAS LITTLE AGREEMENT EXCEPT THAT WHEN BUSY CALL UP SHOULD INCLUDE ID SAYING I HAVE REQUEST, THEN WAIT. I AM REREADING PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO PROC AND PHRASEOLOGY WORKING TOWARD COMPLETION OF MY IFR, AND AM ALSO CONTINUING WITH THE SERIES OF SAFETY FLT PROFICIENCY AND EMER MANEUVERING TRAINING, WHICH IS USEFUL IN CONTROL OF THE PLANE IN ANY AXIS EXCEPT IN THAT OF HUMAN FACTORS. UNFORTUNATELY, FROM MY PERSPECTIVE THERE WAS A MINIMUM OF USEFUL INFO. PERHAPS THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH, PERHAPS ALL CONTROL HAS TO GO ON IS 'DOES THE PLT SOUND PROFESSIONAL' AND ONE CAN NOT BE PROFESSIONAL, BY DEFINITION, WITHOUT THE IFR RATING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.