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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1185694 |
Time | |
Date | 201407 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Generator Drive |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor |
Narrative:
During cruise; had apparent number 2 generator failure; saw source off light followed by drive light. While running the checklists; we noticed an odor like burning rubber or plastic; and the flight attendants reported the same throughout the cabin. We donned the masks/goggles and continued checklists to include smoke/fumes on the aircraft. We declared the emergency and diverted to a nearby airport. The fumes/odor remained but did not increase; and no smoke was seen at any time. Decent and landing were normal; and after fire crews checked us out externally; we taxied to the gate.I don't believe we made any significant errors in handling this event; but the major issue was with the O2 mask/goggles (single combined unit in this aircraft) and communications and coordination. I don't believe the fumes warranted goggles; but it was not an option in this case. Glare and reduced visibility with the goggles hindered us a bit in checklist switchology. And of course communication inside and outside the cockpit was cumbersome and slow. I would have liked to make a reassuring PA informing the passengers of our situation; but I felt maxed out; so I had the flight attendant do it. As far as the divert; I accepted clearance to a point on the arrival which had to be programmed; but I should have requested vectors. Post-flight; we were replaced with pilots; a good choice even though we felt we could continue. Then we agreed to deadhead. A better choice would have been to go to the hotel and deadhead the next day. This would have avoided a number of hassles and a very long; late duty day; and given us better crew rest. A couple of suggestions: continue to have us practice with the masks in training; that limited exposure was helpful. [One should] request vectors to simplify the situation. After a stressful event like this; hang it up and go to the hotel.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-700 Number 2 Generator alerted SOURCE OFF; then DRIVE followed by a burning rubber or plastic odor. Smoke masks with integrated goggles were donned; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport. All communications were difficult.
Narrative: During cruise; had apparent Number 2 Generator failure; saw SOURCE OFF light followed by DRIVE light. While running the checklists; we noticed an odor like burning rubber or plastic; and the flight attendants reported the same throughout the cabin. We donned the masks/goggles and continued checklists to include smoke/fumes on the aircraft. We declared the emergency and diverted to a nearby airport. The fumes/odor remained but did not increase; and no smoke was seen at any time. Decent and landing were normal; and after fire crews checked us out externally; we taxied to the gate.I don't believe we made any significant errors in handling this event; but the major issue was with the O2 mask/goggles (single combined unit in this aircraft) and communications and coordination. I don't believe the fumes warranted goggles; but it was not an option in this case. Glare and reduced visibility with the goggles hindered us a bit in checklist switchology. And of course communication inside and outside the cockpit was cumbersome and slow. I would have liked to make a reassuring PA informing the passengers of our situation; but I felt maxed out; so I had the flight attendant do it. As far as the divert; I accepted clearance to a point on the arrival which had to be programmed; but I should have requested vectors. Post-flight; we were replaced with pilots; a good choice even though we felt we could continue. Then we agreed to deadhead. A better choice would have been to go to the hotel and deadhead the next day. This would have avoided a number of hassles and a very long; late duty day; and given us better crew rest. A couple of suggestions: Continue to have us practice with the masks in training; that limited exposure was helpful. [One should] request vectors to simplify the situation. After a stressful event like this; hang it up and go to the hotel.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.