Narrative:

The captain was flying. After a flaps 20 takeoff; he called for flaps 8. I selected flaps 8 and shortly thereafter received the flap fail EICAS message. We ran the QRH checklist and determined the need to land at the nearest suitable airport. Dispatch and maintenance control were advised of the situation and were coordinated with regarding the diversion. Between us we selected the nearest suitable airport to which we continued to and landed in accordance with the QRH flap fail procedures. Passengers were deplaned at a normal interval after parking. A different plane was swapped for the diversion aircraft and the flight was re-dispatched to destination.the flap fail occurred when the flaps are normally retracted which is typically a high workload time of the flight. Although not as severe a failure as an engine failure or in-flight fire; the flap failure certainly is non-routine and added to the workload. This threat was overcome and through good training and proper communication between crewmembers and with dispatch and maintenance the aircraft made a safe landing without an undesired aircraft state or any known errors. There was a previous write-up in the maintenance log for a flap fail that had been cleared by replacing the sdu. Apparently; this did not solve the problem as the diversion flight was only a few cycles later.what we train for actually happens. Good training made this event as routine as possible. The practice of reading previous discrepancies is very good as neither of us were completely surprised by the flaps failing. We weren't expecting it; but somewhere in the back of our minds; we were mentally prepared for it. I can't help but wonder if an opportunity to prevent this (second flap fail in less than five cycles) was somehow missed. Will this airframe have another flap fail in the next five cycles?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport following receipt of a FLAPS FAIL EICAS message. They landed safely; transferred their passengers to another aircraft; and continued their flight to destination.

Narrative: The Captain was flying. After a flaps 20 takeoff; he called for flaps 8. I selected flaps 8 and shortly thereafter received the FLAP FAIL EICAS message. We ran the QRH checklist and determined the need to land at the nearest suitable airport. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were advised of the situation and were coordinated with regarding the diversion. Between us we selected the nearest suitable airport to which we continued to and landed IAW the QRH FLAP FAIL procedures. Passengers were deplaned at a normal interval after parking. A different plane was swapped for the diversion aircraft and the flight was re-dispatched to destination.The FLAP FAIL occurred when the flaps are normally retracted which is typically a high workload time of the flight. Although not as severe a failure as an engine failure or in-flight fire; the flap failure certainly is non-routine and added to the workload. This threat was overcome and through good training and proper communication between crewmembers and with Dispatch and Maintenance the aircraft made a safe landing without an undesired aircraft state or any known errors. There was a previous write-up in the maintenance log for a FLAP FAIL that had been cleared by replacing the SDU. Apparently; this did not solve the problem as the diversion flight was only a few cycles later.What we train for actually happens. Good training made this event as routine as possible. The practice of reading previous discrepancies is very good as neither of us were completely surprised by the flaps failing. We weren't expecting it; but somewhere in the back of our minds; we were mentally prepared for it. I can't help but wonder if an opportunity to prevent this (second FLAP FAIL in less than five cycles) was somehow missed. Will this airframe have another FLAP FAIL in the next five cycles?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.