Narrative:

Tad radar search and beacon were out of service requiring non-radar routes for all aircraft at or below FL220. There were multiple areas of moderate to heavy precipitation in sector 41 requiring aircraft to deviate. There were multiple aircraft in and out of publication; ALS; mvi; cos; and rca (non-radar). There were departures out the south gate as well. The radar outage required multiple position reports using multiple frequency sites (aircraft cannot hear each other and you depending on which transmitter site you use). Aircraft X was requesting a GPS practice approach into ALS; due to the radar outage; I was unable to provide this service (you are required to be in radar at the IAF for GPS approach). Aircraft X changed plans and requested direct cim rest of flight plan to cvs. Aircraft Y was an apa arrival at FL220 direct brk. Aircraft X was level FL180; requested FL230 and weather deviations. Aircraft Y was radar contact lost at this point; while aircraft X was still in radar. I climbed aircraft X and approved weather deviations knowing I would loose aircraft X for a short period of time until reaching FL230. I had numerous other situations going on at this time. I called radar contact lost on aircraft X. Shortly after; aircraft Y popped up in radar close to the same time as aircraft X. At this time; they were approximately 8 miles apart laterally enclosing and 400 ft apart vertically. I radar identified them; asked aircraft X to expedite and report reaching FL230. He did this before separation was lost. Without the weather deviations; aircraft X would never have been in conflict with aircraft Y. If tad had been in service; while this would have still been a complex session on sector 41; it would have however been without question a very reasonable task. You cannot allow for weather deviations with non-radar situations. However; you cannot force an aircraft through weather. It is completely unacceptable to put controllers and aircraft into these situations on a daily basis with tad being out of service. I know this is not the only unsafe situation that has occurred on that sector. All area 3 controllers know this is unsafe and cannot understand how it can take over 3 months to fix a radar outage. Tad needs to be back in service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDV Controller reports of a radar outage that is causing problems in the sector. Two aircraft are being worked non-radar; then appear on the radar and are on a conflicting course. Controller resolves the issue without a separation loss.

Narrative: TAD radar search and beacon were out of service requiring non-radar routes for all aircraft at or below FL220. There were multiple areas of moderate to heavy precipitation in Sector 41 requiring aircraft to deviate. There were multiple aircraft in and out of PUB; ALS; MVI; COS; and RCA (non-radar). There were departures out the south gate as well. The radar outage required multiple position reports using multiple frequency sites (aircraft cannot hear each other and you depending on which transmitter site you use). Aircraft X was requesting a GPS practice approach into ALS; due to the radar outage; I was unable to provide this service (you are required to be in radar at the IAF for GPS approach). Aircraft X changed plans and requested direct CIM rest of flight plan to CVS. Aircraft Y was an APA arrival at FL220 direct BRK. Aircraft X was level FL180; requested FL230 and weather deviations. Aircraft Y was radar contact lost at this point; while Aircraft X was still in radar. I climbed Aircraft X and approved weather deviations knowing I would loose Aircraft X for a short period of time until reaching FL230. I had numerous other situations going on at this time. I called radar contact lost on Aircraft X. Shortly after; Aircraft Y popped up in radar close to the same time as Aircraft X. At this time; they were approximately 8 miles apart laterally enclosing and 400 FT apart vertically. I radar identified them; asked Aircraft X to expedite and report reaching FL230. He did this before separation was lost. Without the weather deviations; Aircraft X would never have been in conflict with Aircraft Y. If TAD had been in service; while this would have still been a complex session on Sector 41; it would have however been without question a very reasonable task. You cannot allow for weather deviations with non-radar situations. However; you cannot force an aircraft through weather. It is completely unacceptable to put controllers and aircraft into these situations on a daily basis with TAD being out of service. I know this is not the only unsafe situation that has occurred on that sector. All area 3 controllers know this is unsafe and cannot understand how it can take over 3 months to fix a radar outage. TAD needs to be back in service.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.