Narrative:

Maintenance informed the crew that they fueled the aircraft the night before with full inboard tanks and 200 liters per outboard tank for a total of 3;187 pounds of fuel. Sic set up his side of the cockpit; turned all interior lights checking double checking fuel on board; and checked lights outside. Sic performed pre-flight and walk around; weighing passenger cargo with the scale; and securing a total of 339 pounds in passenger cargo with net and straps with fire blanket and smoke detectors. All preflight checks were good. Sic loaded passengers and briefed the passengers while PIC was doing performance checks in the cockpit. The crew started engines took off with PIC at the controls for the first hour. The takeoff and climb was uneventful up to an altitude of FL100. In cruise to ZZZZ; the crew noticed the left fuel gauge was intermittently working; going from 0 to 100%; periodically matching the right gauge within 300 pounds. The crew continued to ZZZZ; and at about 35 minutes from ZZZZ; the crew called operations; who said he had not gotten a hold of the controller in ZZZZ; and that he would call the crew back. He called the PIC back about 28 minutes from ZZZZ; telling the PIC the following: weather in ZZZZ is 1/4 mile visibility; 100-200 overcast; and that the crew should try to fly over the airport and make an attempt to land in ZZZZ; because of the high profile mission. About 27 minutes from ZZZZ; while the sic was flying; the PIC worked a time fuel distance problem and determined there would be between 300 and 500 pounds of fuel left on board after flying to ZZZZ and back to ZZZZ1 for landing. The crew determined that ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 was the closest alternate airport for landing. Crew discussed landing at ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 if unable to get into ZZZZ due to weather in order to wait out the weather in ZZZZ or ZZZZ3 and refuel. The crew continued to ZZZZ. The crew established two-way communication with ZZZZ safety (controller). The crew approached and descended into ZZZZ down to 1;500 feet AGL; maintaining VFR; flew over the airport once; and turned left to return direct to ZZZZ1. Over the top of ZZZZ; the fuel trips were showing 1;274 pounds. The crew continued on a direct track to ZZZZ1; with ZZZZ2 20 miles off the right wing (visible on a clear day). ZZZZ2's weather was the same as ZZZZ a low-lying; solid overcast layer; and there was enough fuel to return to ZZZZ1; so the crew continued the return trip at FL095 (9;500 feet MSL). Later in the flight; crew had to descend to FL075 to avoid weather and to stay VFR. The PIC established two-way communications with ZZZZ1 control and that we were 80 nautical miles out from ZZZZ1. The crew observed; about thirty minutes from ZZZZ1; the right fuel low light came on. The PIC turned on all fuel boost pumps and opened cross feed. The crew stayed at FL075 VFR; tracking direct to ZZZZ1. The crew pressed the nearest button on the GPS to double check that ZZZZ1 was the nearest suitable airport for landing. The GPS confirmed ZZZZ1 was the nearest airfield. The crew continued at FL075; and the left low-level light came on. As the closest airport to land was ZZZZ1; the crew continued to ZZZZ1 and saw the fuel pressure gauge intermittently flickering and decreasing. The PIC informed the sic that the number 1 engine would start to fail. The sic asked the PIC if he would like the flight controls. As the PIC responded that he had the flight controls; the sic confirmed that the PIC had the flight controls. The number 1 engine failed about 24 nautical miles from the ZZZZ1 airport. The crew ran emergency procedures by feathering the number 1 engine. After the number 1 engine failed; the fuel pressure gauge for the number 2 engine was intermittently flickering. The sic declared emergency to ZZZZ1 control. The PIC announced he has a road in sight suitable for landing. Approximately 5 to 10 seconds later; the number 2 engine fails. The PIC announces the number 2 engine has failed. The crew ran emergency procedures; feathering number 2 engine on crosswind; flying over the road; and the crew runs landing checklist. Turning on to a left downwind; the crew observed light traffic on the road suitable for landing with no obstacles in sight. The crew observed the road had a slight upward slope. The sic informed passengers to buckle up and brace. PIC turned left base and the crew ran before landing checklist; and the PIC calls for approach flaps. The sic put in approach flaps. The PIC turned final over the road; the crew ran the landing checklist and with landing assured; the PIC called for full flaps. The sic put in full flaps. After touchdown; the sic assisted the PIC with braking action. The sic announced to the PIC at 60 knots that he had the tops so the PIC could steer with the tiller; coming to a stop shortly after. After the aircraft came to a stop; the crew ran shutdown parking checklist and asked the passengers if they were hurt in any way. There were no injuries to the passengers or crew members. The crew asked the passengers to disembark the aircraft. The crew did a walk around and noticed there was a stabilizing telephone cable wrapped around the vertical and horizontal stabilizer. The sic determined that the stabilizing telephone cable was approximately 450 feet from where the aircraft came to a stop. The crew noticed the only damage to the aircraft was a small crinkle on the left hand side of the horizontal stabilizer (approximately 4 inches wide). During the post flight; the crew recorded the fuel trips at 1;281 on the left and 1;401 on the right for a total of 2;682. Corrective actions must include: maintenance not fueling the aircraft but crew fueling their own aircraft; PIC signing fuel receipt and sic initialing receipt to ensure proper grade and quantity; and if aircraft is fueled the night before; pilots must measure fuel with a fuel stick in tanks to ensure fuel was not stolen the night before. Company should hire a security guard to guard the aircraft overnight to ensure fuel will not be stolen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew learns during a weather diversion that they may have departed with less fuel than they thought; when first the right then the left fuel low lights come on. A successful emergency landing is accomplished on a highway with both engines feathered.

Narrative: Maintenance informed the crew that they fueled the aircraft the night before with full inboard tanks and 200 liters per outboard tank for a total of 3;187 LBS of fuel. SIC set up his side of the cockpit; turned all interior lights checking double checking fuel on board; and checked lights outside. SIC performed pre-flight and walk around; weighing passenger cargo with the scale; and securing a total of 339 LBS in passenger cargo with net and straps with fire blanket and smoke detectors. All preflight checks were good. SIC loaded passengers and briefed the passengers while PIC was doing performance checks in the cockpit. The crew started engines took off with PIC at the controls for the first hour. The takeoff and climb was uneventful up to an altitude of FL100. In cruise to ZZZZ; the crew noticed the left fuel gauge was intermittently working; going from 0 to 100%; periodically matching the right gauge within 300 LBS. The crew continued to ZZZZ; and at about 35 minutes from ZZZZ; the crew called Operations; who said he had not gotten a hold of the Controller in ZZZZ; and that he would call the crew back. He called the PIC back about 28 minutes from ZZZZ; telling the PIC the following: Weather in ZZZZ is 1/4 mile visibility; 100-200 overcast; and that the crew should try to fly over the airport and make an attempt to land in ZZZZ; because of the high profile mission. About 27 minutes from ZZZZ; while the SIC was flying; the PIC worked a time fuel distance problem and determined there would be between 300 and 500 LBS of fuel left on board after flying to ZZZZ and back to ZZZZ1 for landing. The crew determined that ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 was the closest alternate airport for landing. Crew discussed landing at ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 if unable to get into ZZZZ due to weather in order to wait out the weather in ZZZZ or ZZZZ3 and refuel. The crew continued to ZZZZ. The crew established two-way communication with ZZZZ Safety (Controller). The crew approached and descended into ZZZZ down to 1;500 feet AGL; maintaining VFR; flew over the airport once; and turned left to return direct to ZZZZ1. Over the top of ZZZZ; the fuel trips were showing 1;274 LBS. The crew continued on a direct track to ZZZZ1; with ZZZZ2 20 miles off the right wing (visible on a clear day). ZZZZ2's weather was the same as ZZZZ a low-lying; solid overcast layer; and there was enough fuel to return to ZZZZ1; so the crew continued the return trip at FL095 (9;500 feet MSL). Later in the flight; crew had to descend to FL075 to avoid weather and to stay VFR. The PIC established two-way communications with ZZZZ1 Control and that we were 80 nautical miles out from ZZZZ1. The crew observed; about thirty minutes from ZZZZ1; the right fuel low light came on. The PIC turned on all fuel boost pumps and opened cross feed. The crew stayed at FL075 VFR; tracking direct to ZZZZ1. The crew pressed the nearest button on the GPS to double check that ZZZZ1 was the nearest suitable airport for landing. The GPS confirmed ZZZZ1 was the nearest airfield. The crew continued at FL075; and the left low-level light came on. As the closest airport to land was ZZZZ1; the crew continued to ZZZZ1 and saw the fuel pressure gauge intermittently flickering and decreasing. The PIC informed the SIC that the number 1 engine would start to fail. The SIC asked the PIC if he would like the flight controls. As the PIC responded that he had the flight controls; the SIC confirmed that the PIC had the flight controls. The number 1 engine failed about 24 nautical miles from the ZZZZ1 airport. The crew ran emergency procedures by feathering the number 1 engine. After the number 1 engine failed; the fuel pressure gauge for the number 2 engine was intermittently flickering. The SIC declared emergency to ZZZZ1 Control. The PIC announced he has a road in sight suitable for landing. Approximately 5 to 10 seconds later; the number 2 engine fails. The PIC announces the number 2 engine has failed. The crew ran emergency procedures; feathering number 2 engine on crosswind; flying over the road; and the crew runs landing checklist. Turning on to a left downwind; the crew observed light traffic on the road suitable for landing with no obstacles in sight. The crew observed the road had a slight upward slope. The SIC informed passengers to buckle up and brace. PIC turned left base and the crew ran before landing checklist; and the PIC calls for approach flaps. The SIC put in approach flaps. The PIC turned final over the road; the crew ran the landing checklist and with landing assured; the PIC called for full flaps. The SIC put in full flaps. After touchdown; the SIC assisted the PIC with braking action. The SIC announced to the PIC at 60 knots that he had the TOPS so the PIC could steer with the tiller; coming to a stop shortly after. After the aircraft came to a stop; the crew ran shutdown parking checklist and asked the passengers if they were hurt in any way. There were no injuries to the passengers or crew members. The crew asked the passengers to disembark the aircraft. The crew did a walk around and noticed there was a stabilizing telephone cable wrapped around the vertical and horizontal stabilizer. The SIC determined that the stabilizing telephone cable was approximately 450 feet from where the aircraft came to a stop. The crew noticed the only damage to the aircraft was a small crinkle on the left hand side of the horizontal stabilizer (approximately 4 inches wide). During the post flight; the crew recorded the fuel trips at 1;281 on the left and 1;401 on the right for a total of 2;682. Corrective actions must include: Maintenance not fueling the aircraft but crew fueling their own aircraft; PIC signing fuel receipt and SIC initialing receipt to ensure proper grade and quantity; and if aircraft is fueled the night before; pilots must measure fuel with a fuel stick in tanks to ensure fuel was not stolen the night before. Company should hire a security guard to guard the aircraft overnight to ensure fuel will not be stolen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.