Narrative:

After starting up at the gate we checked the AWOS and decided 18 was favorable for the departure due to the winds. The first officer made a radio call that we were taxiing out to 18 and would be holding short at taxiway bravo. Taxiway alpha to the approach end of 18 was closed due to construction. Holding short of runway 18; I performed the takeoff checklist; and briefed the departure. As we were preparing to taxi onto the runway; an rv-12 called that they were entering the pattern on the left crosswind of 18. We observed the traffic on the departure end of 18; and determined we had a reasonable amount of time to taxi back onto 18; and depart. The first officer made a second radio call as we entered the runway; stating we would be back taxiing on 18 for departure. We maintained a visual with the rv-12; who was now turning downwind. After the rv-12 made their downwind radio call; the first officer again stated we were back taxiing on the runway to depart 18. As we were arriving in position on 18 to turn around for departure; I observed the aircraft begin a descent at midfield downwind; then beginning a very close in turn to base. The first officer again stated over unicom we were on the runway; with no response. The taxiway at the approach end of 18 was closed; and we were unable to exit the runway. I elected not to turn the aircraft around for fear of losing sight of the aircraft. I instead began taxiing as much as possible onto the closed taxiway; but was unable to clear the runway completely. The aircraft then turned to a short final; and made a radio call that they were landing 18. The first officer stated a third time over unicom we were on the runway. There was no acknowledgment of this by the rv-12. At this point I took over the radios and repeated '[rv-12] traffic we are on runway 18; the runway is occupied!' I had managed to partially clear the runway; but several barricades were keeping us from fully exiting and we were still within the runway safety area. The aircraft looked high on the approach; however the pilot was visible and his view of our aircraft did not appear to be obscured. The rv-12 passed partially overhead our aircraft; touched down beyond the aim point markings; and exited at the end of the runway. I attempted to contact the aircraft on the unicom; stating they had just landed on the runway while it was occupied. They made a final call that they were clearing 18 with no other acknowledgment of our presence. The FBO radioed us over unicom after the incident; who had overheard the transmissions from both aircraft. This indicated to us that our radio was operative and [was either] not being received or disregarded by the landing aircraft. In hindsight it was apparent that we should not have entered the runway as the landing aircraft had the right of way. However; we had a reasonable expectation that we would be able to taxi into position and depart without any interference with the other aircraft. This coupled with the radio calls being broadcast by the other aircraft initially led us to believe they were aware of our presence and intentions on the runway. By the time it was apparent the aircraft was going to land; and seemingly unaware of our presence; it was too late to turn around and exit at taxiway bravo; and the closure of taxiway alpha left us without an exit. Factors that could have mitigated or prevented this incident would have been to ensure the aircraft was receiving and understanding our transmissions before entering the runway. We also could have erred further on the side of caution when factoring in the taxiway closure at the end; having prevented us from a safe exit in the case of a traffic conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C-402 back taxiing to takeoff at a non-Towered airport suffered a ground based conflict with a landing homebuilt the pilot of which; although making position/intentions transmissions; failed to respond to repeated entreaties from the C-402 which was unable to exit the runway due the approach end entry being closed; thus necessitating the back taxi operation.

Narrative: After starting up at the gate we checked the AWOS and decided 18 was favorable for the departure due to the winds. The First Officer made a radio call that we were taxiing out to 18 and would be holding short at Taxiway Bravo. Taxiway Alpha to the approach end of 18 was closed due to construction. Holding short of Runway 18; I performed the Takeoff Checklist; and briefed the departure. As we were preparing to taxi onto the runway; an RV-12 called that they were entering the pattern on the left crosswind of 18. We observed the traffic on the departure end of 18; and determined we had a reasonable amount of time to taxi back onto 18; and depart. The First Officer made a second radio call as we entered the runway; stating we would be back taxiing on 18 for departure. We maintained a visual with the RV-12; who was now turning downwind. After the RV-12 made their downwind radio call; the First Officer again stated we were back taxiing on the runway to depart 18. As we were arriving in position on 18 to turn around for departure; I observed the aircraft begin a descent at midfield downwind; then beginning a very close in turn to base. The First Officer again stated over UNICOM we were on the runway; with no response. The taxiway at the approach end of 18 was closed; and we were unable to exit the runway. I elected not to turn the aircraft around for fear of losing sight of the aircraft. I instead began taxiing as much as possible onto the closed taxiway; but was unable to clear the runway completely. The aircraft then turned to a short final; and made a radio call that they were landing 18. The First Officer stated a third time over UNICOM we were on the runway. There was no acknowledgment of this by the RV-12. At this point I took over the radios and repeated '[RV-12] traffic we are on Runway 18; the runway is occupied!' I had managed to partially clear the runway; but several barricades were keeping us from fully exiting and we were still within the runway safety area. The aircraft looked high on the approach; however the pilot was visible and his view of our aircraft did not appear to be obscured. The RV-12 passed partially overhead our aircraft; touched down beyond the aim point markings; and exited at the end of the runway. I attempted to contact the aircraft on the UNICOM; stating they had just landed on the runway while it was occupied. They made a final call that they were clearing 18 with no other acknowledgment of our presence. The FBO radioed us over UNICOM after the incident; who had overheard the transmissions from both aircraft. This indicated to us that our radio was operative and [was either] not being received or disregarded by the landing aircraft. In hindsight it was apparent that we should not have entered the runway as the landing aircraft had the right of way. However; we had a reasonable expectation that we would be able to taxi into position and depart without any interference with the other aircraft. This coupled with the radio calls being broadcast by the other aircraft initially led us to believe they were aware of our presence and intentions on the runway. By the time it was apparent the aircraft was going to land; and seemingly unaware of our presence; it was too late to turn around and exit at Taxiway Bravo; and the closure of Taxiway Alpha left us without an exit. Factors that could have mitigated or prevented this incident would have been to ensure the aircraft was receiving and understanding our transmissions before entering the runway. We also could have erred further on the side of caution when factoring in the taxiway closure at the end; having prevented us from a safe exit in the case of a traffic conflict.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.