Narrative:

After a normal landing; and an exceptionally smooth touchdown; we experienced an apparent normal brake system failure. I; as pilot not flying; responded to the pilot flying's announcement that he had no brakes; attempted brake application; and immediately selected emergency brakes. An attempt to counter a weathervane while slowing into the existing crosswind with nosewheel steering was not successful and aircraft control deteriorated. The plane came to rest just off the windward side of the runway approximately 1;000 ft short of the departure end. An evacuation was initiated and egress made through the main cabin door. In hindsight; and after the evacuation of the sole passenger; there was the discovery of a possible inadvertent omission of two checklist items: activation of the ground air brakes; and thrust reversers arming. The standard operating procedure (SOP); was to orally confirm the positioning of the two items; ground air brakes and thrust reversers; for landing after the selection of flaps 12 degrees. The callout may have been missed because; when prompted by the pilot flying to select flaps 12; I hesitated because the airspeed was excessive. And; after achieving the proper speed; the aircraft momentarily exceeded the maximum configuration speed due to the turbulent conditions and caused an aural alarm. Additionally; I experienced some distraction during final approach due to task fixation resulting from a deferred maintenance item (34-30). The inoperative FMS on my side required me to reach across the center pedestal; and due to the turbulent conditions; necessitated multiple; redundant keystrokes. Recognizing the distraction; I abandoned my attempts and recited the before landing checklist. At the time of landing; it was my belief all systems were normal and checklists complete. Complicating matters; I did recognize during initial approach that I did not formally accomplish the entire approach checklist. Upon this realization; I did independently confirm all item were complete. I believe this failure was due to distraction stemming from an acute family situation I encountered earlier in the day. Though I sincerely thought my ability to perform was not compromised; I became aware of my deficiency and announced it to my other crew member while in descent. I firmly believe additional emphasis in simulator training should be placed on failures experienced during landing. Scenarios including unanticipated brake system failures; steering failures; and aerodynamic brake failures; though distressing; would go to greatly increase every pilot's ability to deal with time critical decision making.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A G200 Captain; the pilot not flying; was distracted by family events and operating a single FMS during approach so he forgot to arm the speedbrakes and thrust reverses which prevented brake activation. A runway excursion without injuries resulted from loss of control.

Narrative: After a normal landing; and an exceptionally smooth touchdown; we experienced an apparent normal brake system failure. I; as pilot not flying; responded to the pilot flying's announcement that he had no brakes; attempted brake application; and immediately selected emergency brakes. An attempt to counter a weathervane while slowing into the existing crosswind with nosewheel steering was not successful and aircraft control deteriorated. The plane came to rest just off the windward side of the runway approximately 1;000 FT short of the departure end. An evacuation was initiated and egress made through the main cabin door. In hindsight; and after the evacuation of the sole passenger; there was the discovery of a possible inadvertent omission of two checklist items: activation of the ground air brakes; and thrust reversers arming. The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP); was to orally confirm the positioning of the two items; ground air brakes and thrust reversers; for landing after the selection of flaps 12 degrees. The callout may have been missed because; when prompted by the pilot flying to select flaps 12; I hesitated because the airspeed was excessive. And; after achieving the proper speed; the aircraft momentarily exceeded the maximum configuration speed due to the turbulent conditions and caused an aural alarm. Additionally; I experienced some distraction during final approach due to task fixation resulting from a deferred maintenance item (34-30). The inoperative FMS on my side required me to reach across the center pedestal; and due to the turbulent conditions; necessitated multiple; redundant keystrokes. Recognizing the distraction; I abandoned my attempts and recited the Before Landing Checklist. At the time of landing; it was my belief all systems were normal and checklists complete. Complicating matters; I did recognize during initial approach that I did not formally accomplish the entire Approach Checklist. Upon this realization; I did independently confirm all item were complete. I believe this failure was due to distraction stemming from an acute family situation I encountered earlier in the day. Though I sincerely thought my ability to perform was not compromised; I became aware of my deficiency and announced it to my other crew member while in descent. I firmly believe additional emphasis in simulator training should be placed on failures experienced during landing. Scenarios including unanticipated brake system failures; steering failures; and aerodynamic brake failures; though distressing; would go to greatly increase every pilot's ability to deal with time critical decision making.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.