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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1192113 |
Time | |
Date | 201407 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | DC-10 30 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Exhaust Pipe |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Our dayshift was called out to a dc-10 aircraft at the gate; july 2014; to cut the tack welds on the studs in the turbine rear frame (trf) struts on the number 3 engine. Dayshift cut the tack welds and assisted the line mechanics with removal of the studs. Line maintenance then replaced the studs; during shift change at our shop. After shift change; late afternoon; we were called back to the aircraft to tack weld the studs in the strut per the repair. All of this was accomplished per the general electric (G.east. Engine manual 72-58-01; repair 006; figure 902; stud installation subtask 72-58-01-310). After which I returned to update the repair in the logbook; and then called quality control (qc) to verify they knew about; and were going to do; a fluorescent dye penetrant inspection (fpi) on the welds as the repair called for. At this time; qc brought to my attention that we could not use the repair [procedure] from the engine manual without an engineering authorization (ea) from engineering; because we were not in a shop environment; but was on the flight line. At which time I went to engineering to ask about an ea. Engineering told me first to use the reference out of the aircraft maintenance manual (amm) that was given. I responded with; we could not use the amm reference because it does not reference tack welding the studs in the strut. At which time I requested an ea and an engineering request (er) had [already] been turned in from line maintenance requesting an ea (via an er) to use the engine manual reference. Engineering said they would cut an ea and would attach it to the er as soon as they could. After midnight; we received the ea from engineering. At that time; I pulled up the aircraft on our maintenance computer; to check the status. It stated that line [maintenance] had put [the engine] back together with the aircraft and was getting ready to call the aircraft up [to release for service]. I then called qc to see if they had done the fpi; which they had not. So I called maintenance control to make them aware that the plane was back together and the fpi had not been completed. Maintenance control told me at that time; line maintenance had done the fpi inspection; it had checked good and the job was complete. I told maintenance control at that time; that the logbook had not been updated for the fpi and that I had an ea for the job; also; what did they want me to do with it? I was told by maintenance control; that the ea was a blanket ea and I didn't need to do anything with it. At this time it was at the end of the shift; I went home. I came in the next day and discussed the previous night's on-goings with qc.[concerns were] that everyone not being on the same page; as far as what manuals can be used for what job. The general maintenance manual (gmm) states what the approved manuals are that can be used; but it does not break them down to specifics as far as when certain manuals can and cannot be used. I.e.. Engine manual in a shop environment /or; not in a shop environment. There needs to be something put in print explaining to everyone when certain manuals can; and cannot; be used. Because it depends on what you read; how you interpret what it says; and who says what it is at this point. Just like the debate on when you can; and when you cannot use the component maintenance manual (cmm).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An Aircraft Machinist describes his involvement with an on-wing tack welding of new studs installed at the aft flange of a G.E. CF-6 Engine Turbine Rear Frame (TRF) Assembly for a DC-10 aircraft. Aircraft was released without a required Fluorescent Dye Penetrant Inspection (FPI) being accomplished on the new tack welds and signed-off in the logbook.
Narrative: Our Dayshift was called out to a DC-10 aircraft at the gate; July 2014; to cut the tack welds on the studs in the Turbine Rear Frame (TRF) struts on the Number 3 Engine. Dayshift cut the tack welds and assisted the line mechanics with removal of the studs. Line Maintenance then replaced the studs; during shift change at our shop. After shift change; late afternoon; we were called back to the aircraft to tack weld the studs in the strut per the repair. All of this was accomplished per the General Electric (G.E. Engine Manual 72-58-01; Repair 006; Figure 902; Stud Installation Subtask 72-58-01-310). After which I returned to update the repair in the logbook; and then called Quality Control (QC) to verify they knew about; and were going to do; a Fluorescent Dye Penetrant Inspection (FPI) on the welds as the repair called for. At this time; QC brought to my attention that we could not use the repair [procedure] from the Engine Manual without an Engineering Authorization (EA) from Engineering; because we were not in a shop environment; but was on the flight line. At which time I went to Engineering to ask about an EA. Engineering told me first to use the reference out of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) that was given. I responded with; we could not use the AMM reference because it does not reference tack welding the studs in the strut. At which time I requested an EA and an Engineering Request (ER) had [already] been turned in from Line Maintenance requesting an EA (via an ER) to use the Engine Manual reference. Engineering said they would cut an EA and would attach it to the ER as soon as they could. After midnight; we received the EA from Engineering. At that time; I pulled up the aircraft on our maintenance computer; to check the status. It stated that Line [Maintenance] had put [the engine] back together with the aircraft and was getting ready to call the aircraft up [to release for service]. I then called QC to see if they had done the FPI; which they had not. So I called Maintenance Control to make them aware that the plane was back together and the FPI had not been completed. Maintenance Control told me at that time; Line Maintenance had done the FPI Inspection; it had checked good and the job was complete. I told Maintenance Control at that time; that the logbook had not been updated for the FPI and that I had an EA for the job; also; what did they want me to do with it? I was told by Maintenance Control; that the EA was a blanket EA and I didn't need to do anything with it. At this time it was at the end of the shift; I went home. I came in the next day and discussed the previous night's on-goings with QC.[Concerns were] that everyone not being on the same page; as far as what manuals can be used for what job. The General Maintenance Manual (GMM) states what the approved manuals are that can be used; but it does not break them down to specifics as far as when certain manuals can and cannot be used. I.E.. Engine Manual in a shop environment /or; not in a shop environment. There needs to be something put in print explaining to everyone when certain manuals can; and cannot; be used. Because it depends on what you read; how you interpret what it says; and who says what it is at this point. Just like the debate on when you can; and when you cannot use the Component Maintenance Manual (CMM).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.