Narrative:

Last leg of four day trip. Scheduled arrival ord xa:00 pm. Actual arrival ord xa:58 pm plus 25 minute debrief.our last leg of the four day trip from the west to ord; was rerouted by ATC over waterloo iowa; across lake michigan to michigan; and back across lake michigan to O'hare. We were busy with dispatch coordinating alternates and diversion airports.as approach turned on onto final 4 miles from the final approach fix; they instructed us to slow to 180 knots as we were doing 210 knots and were four miles in trail of the proceeding jet. We had 5000 pounds of fuel and the nearest suitable airport was mke. An area of thunderstorms was approaching ord from the northwest. I told the first officer; who was flying; to slow and to get the gear down. He did not respond; so I said again; 'let's get the gear;' as I put the gear handle down. He immediately pulled his hands from the controls and said; 'you got it.' I took over two miles from the FAF and flew the approach and landing. The aircraft behind us went around for windshear. We were the last aircraft to land for quite some time.we landed ord one hour late; due to ATC routing for trws in chicago area. We had a lengthy taxi delay due to ground congestion at ord. We remained in the cockpit after block-in; discussing transfer of control; appropriate use of alternates; diversion airports; and fuel required for these. The first officer said he did not want to be micro managed and would not keep flying if the captain directed the energy management. The first officer also stated that he had a background from the commuters; and believed that all fuel planning numbers; including alternate fuel; are for planning only. He believed that once enroute; the pilots can use the fuel as they see fit. We discussed whether it as necessary to coordinate with dispatch; to track suitable diversion airports; and to conduct the flight so as to be able to go-around at the destination and have enough fuel to reach an alternate. The first officer stated that the commuters didn't operate as conservatively as I had operated. After leaving the jet at xb:20 am; I proceeded from the concourse to the train station; where I waited about 25 minutes for the next train. I took the train to the city; arriving home at about xd:00 am. I discovered a phone message from the crew desk and returned the call. (The [cell] phone did not have reception in the blue line station; and was not accessible during the blue line ride.)at xd:00 am; the crew desk informed me that I had been reassigned; my 4 day had been reassigned into a 5 day trip; and that I had a minimum rest and was expected to report at xk:45 am to fly a turn. This seemed completely unsafe; but not out of the realm of [previous] demands placed by the company on pilots post-merger. I told the crew desk that I would need 8 hours of sleep and a train ride back to ord; thus; I could be back at ord at xn:00. The crew desk said he would re-crew the trip and give me a fatigue call.after the ATC routings; fuel and alternate work; and the first officer dropping out of the loop on a 6 mile final; I was not ready to sleep. And I needed sleep. I did not consider it to be a safe or prudent move to accept the crew desk reassignment of my four day trip into a five day trip and return from home to the airport on five hours sleep. I informed the crew desk of my rest needs and the time I could return and the crew desk made the decision to give me a fatigue call.there is a plethora of ideas here for managers and the FAA to chew on for a while. These facts are bad on so many levels. Good luck.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain refused a reassignment at the end of his four day trip due to fatigue. Contributing factors included a greatly extended and delayed inbound flight; a post midnight arrival; and unprofessional behavior on the part of his First Officer on short final.

Narrative: Last leg of four day trip. Scheduled arrival ORD XA:00 PM. Actual arrival ORD XA:58 PM plus 25 minute debrief.Our last leg of the four day trip from the west to ORD; was rerouted by ATC over Waterloo Iowa; across Lake Michigan to Michigan; and back across Lake Michigan to O'Hare. We were busy with Dispatch coordinating alternates and diversion airports.As Approach turned on onto final 4 miles from the final approach fix; they instructed us to slow to 180 knots as we were doing 210 knots and were four miles in trail of the proceeding jet. We had 5000 pounds of fuel and the nearest suitable airport was MKE. An area of thunderstorms was approaching ORD from the NW. I told the First Officer; who was flying; to slow and to get the gear down. He did not respond; so I said again; 'Let's get the gear;' as I put the gear handle down. He immediately pulled his hands from the controls and said; 'You got it.' I took over two miles from the FAF and flew the approach and landing. The aircraft behind us went around for windshear. We were the last aircraft to land for quite some time.We landed ORD one hour late; due to ATC routing for TRWS in Chicago area. We had a lengthy taxi delay due to ground congestion at ORD. We remained in the cockpit after block-in; discussing transfer of control; appropriate use of alternates; diversion airports; and fuel required for these. The First Officer said he did not want to be micro managed and would not keep flying if the Captain directed the energy management. The First Officer also stated that he had a background from the commuters; and believed that all fuel planning numbers; including alternate fuel; are for planning only. He believed that once enroute; the pilots can use the fuel as they see fit. We discussed whether it as necessary to coordinate with Dispatch; to track suitable diversion airports; and to conduct the flight so as to be able to go-around at the destination and have enough fuel to reach an alternate. The First Officer stated that the commuters didn't operate as conservatively as I had operated. After leaving the jet at XB:20 AM; I proceeded from the Concourse to the train station; where I waited about 25 minutes for the next train. I took the train to the city; arriving home at about XD:00 AM. I discovered a phone message from the crew desk and returned the call. (The [cell] phone did not have reception in the Blue Line Station; and was not accessible during the Blue Line ride.)At XD:00 am; the crew desk informed me that I had been reassigned; my 4 day had been reassigned into a 5 day trip; and that I had a minimum rest and was expected to report at XK:45 am to fly a turn. This seemed completely unsafe; but not out of the realm of [previous] demands placed by the company on pilots post-merger. I told the crew desk that I would need 8 hours of sleep and a train ride back to ORD; thus; I could be back at ORD at XN:00. The crew desk said he would re-crew the trip and give me a fatigue call.After the ATC routings; fuel and alternate work; and the First Officer dropping out of the loop on a 6 mile final; I was not ready to sleep. And I needed sleep. I did not consider it to be a safe or prudent move to accept the crew desk reassignment of my four day trip into a five day trip and return from home to the airport on five hours sleep. I informed the crew desk of my rest needs and the time I could return and the crew desk made the decision to give me a fatigue call.There is a plethora of ideas here for Managers and the FAA to chew on for a while. These facts are bad on so many levels. Good luck.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.