Narrative:

We were dispatched ase. This aircraft had MEL 35-13; which resulted in being dispatched to aspen with a FL250 restriction. In my opinion; a FL250 restriction is problematic as rain showers develop over this area of the rocky mountains every summer day at the time of our arrival and a FL250 restriction greatly limits our ability to circumvent storms due to the high terrain of the rocky mountains. Nonetheless; the route west of the rockies was clear and we were legal. In addition; the pkn localizer was inoperable and was not projected to be fixed until 30 minutes after our original scheduled arrival time. We complied with a request from dispatch to delay our departure in order to match the time of our arrival to the time of the expected completion of the repair. Upon arrival at the rocky mountain range; storms had expectedly sprung up and due to our altitude restriction; we had to navigate our way around the storms; rather than top them and garner a 'bird's eye' view. As we passed by aspen (west to east) while being vectored to the approach; we saw on radar what appeared to be a strong storm cell sitting just west of the ase localizer at ceyag and another cell sitting atop the missed approach course; just west of the field. We elected to begin the localizer DME 15 approach so that we could get on a southwesterly heading and get a better view of the course and the position of the storms before making a final decision regarding whether to continue or hold. Unfortunately; aspen approach control has no ability to depict weather radar; so they provide virtually no additional weather- related information. ATC's vector and decent clearance to wokuv was way to close and too high; as is often the case. Nonetheless; because the goal was not to complete an approach at this point; but instead to get a good radar picture of the approach corridor; we initiated the DME arc. Once we got to a southwesterly heading on the DME arc; we could see clearly the heavy rain in the valley in which the localizer course resides. In addition; we were still painting a significant cell just west of ceyag and another significant cell right atop the missed approach course at the exact and most critical point where we would be struggling to gain altitude should a missed approach be necessary. Lastly; we asked aspen approach control which direction the cell was heading and were told; 'west.' this was confusing to us as the prevailing winds were from west to east. A few seconds later; aspen approach control advised us that the cells were moving east; meaning they were moving over the airport. Lastly; the downdrafts now triggered a LLWS alert. We had already made our decision to break off the approach but this information certainly confirmed to us that our decision was appropriate. Since we were still outside of the FAF; we advised ATC that we wanted to break off the approach and find a suitable place to hold until the storms had moved east of the approach course and the field. Given all the available information; neither the first officer nor I were not comfortable continuing with the approach at that time. ATC then gave us a heading to the red table VOR and a climb to 17;000 feet. We complied with ATC's instructions but unfortunately; red table VOR was in the middle of another storm cell. As we were advising ATC of the location of that cell and that we would instead need a westerly heading; we received a traffic alert from TCAS. Soon after; we received a revised clearance to stop our climb at 15;000 feet (we were already at 15;300 and climbing at 2;000 FPM). We were then given a heading toward the west and almost immediately after; another heading to the east. These changing clearances came in rapid succession. Due to the closing proximity of traffic to our right side; I cranked the aircraft to the left to create separation. I was surprised that we did not receive an RA. Nonetheless; as I turned the aircraft to the left; I received abank angle warning and responded by lessening the angle of bank. After clear of traffic; ATC reissued the clearance to hold at red table; which I declined. I informed ATC that I wanted a heading of west (270 degrees) to get away from the storm cells and that I would get back to them with an appropriate fix at which we could hold. We were then assigned a heading of 270 degrees which gave us time to determine a save location to hold. Keep in mind that aspen approach control was completely unable to determine a safe location to hold as they had no depiction as to the location of the thunderstorm cells. Ultimately; we informed ATC that we wanted to hold north of ajaxx; away from the weather. This hold would also provide us with a good visual and radar picture of the arrival corridor every few minutes when we were on the inbound course which was a southerly heading. We were issued that clearance and held for two to and one-half turns at 17;000 feet over the ajaxx fix. After the storms cleared the area; we proceeded to fly the localizer DME 15 without further incident. My thoughts on this situation are as follows. First; in my opinion; it is not in the best interest of safety to dispatch an aircraft with a maximum altitude of 25;000 to aspen during this time of year. Every single day of the summer has afternoon thunderstorms and with the 14;000 foot terrain; only altitude can effectively provide storm separation and provide the 'bird's eye' view necessary for the pilots to select a safe flight path and make informed decisions. I am surprised at how many times I have been dispatched to aspen with an aircraft what was inappropriate or not legal for the flight. For one example of many; on one occasion; I was dispatched to aspen with an aircraft with one MEL'd FMS/GPS. I telephoned the equipment coordinator the night before to alert him to the fact that we could not legally depart to aspen with that MEL. He acknowledged that fact and changed the aircraft. The next morning; I woke up to conduct that flight and found that we had been changed back to the broken aircraft. It is hard for me to understand how a company of this age and size does not have better safety checks in place so that these types of mistakes do not happen as often as they do. Second; also in my opinion; the lack of weather depiction in aspen approach control leads to unsafe clearances. I am surprised that with today's access to technology; aspen approach is not equipped with simple weather radar depiction. There are pop-up thunderstorms over or near aspen every day in august and due to this year's weather pattern; virtually every day of the summer. When you combine the lack of available weather radar to ground-based air traffic controllers with an aircraft with a 25;000 foot altitude restriction; the safety margin is further compromised. Third; this is not meant as a slight to anyone; but I am told that aspen is a junior assignment for ATC controllers. As a result; I have been the unlucky recipient of poor clearances at least one dozen times in the seven months I have flown to aspen (e.g.; clearances to descend to cross wokuv at 14;000 feet and 190 knots from an altitude where that is clearly impossible; headings that are way too close from which to make an intercept; etc.) it sometimes feels like we are declining so many poor clearances that we might as well be controlling ourselves. Today was one such instance where what sounded like a senior controller stepped in to fix the errant headings we were being issued that were steering us directly into the path of traffic.I have some suggestions. First; I suggest that we revisit whatever system we use to dispatch aircraft to particular cities and see if we can enhance this system to make it more reliable. Secondly; I realize that ATC is not under the control of our airline but it seems to me that as a primary user of the aspen airport and associated approach control that we should be ableto forward these concerns and have them addressed; in the interest of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier dispatched to ASE during an active thunderstorm period broke off the approach while still VMC and while climbing to 17;000 feet to hold took evasive action from a TCAS RA. Aspen is not equipped to assist pilots during summer weather.

Narrative: We were dispatched ASE. This aircraft had MEL 35-13; which resulted in being dispatched to Aspen with a FL250 restriction. In my opinion; a FL250 restriction is problematic as rain showers develop over this area of the Rocky Mountains every summer day at the time of our arrival and a FL250 restriction greatly limits our ability to circumvent storms due to the high terrain of the Rocky Mountains. Nonetheless; the route west of the Rockies was clear and we were legal. In addition; the PKN localizer was inoperable and was not projected to be fixed until 30 minutes after our original scheduled arrival time. We complied with a request from Dispatch to delay our departure in order to match the time of our arrival to the time of the expected completion of the repair. Upon arrival at the Rocky Mountain range; storms had expectedly sprung up and due to our altitude restriction; we had to navigate our way around the storms; rather than top them and garner a 'bird's eye' view. As we passed by Aspen (west to east) while being vectored to the approach; we saw on radar what appeared to be a strong storm cell sitting just west of the ASE localizer at CEYAG and another cell sitting atop the missed approach course; just west of the field. We elected to begin the LOC DME 15 approach so that we could get on a southwesterly heading and get a better view of the course and the position of the storms before making a final decision regarding whether to continue or hold. Unfortunately; Aspen Approach Control has no ability to depict weather radar; so they provide virtually no additional weather- related information. ATC's vector and decent clearance to WOKUV was way to close and too high; as is often the case. Nonetheless; because the goal was not to complete an approach at this point; but instead to get a good radar picture of the approach corridor; we initiated the DME ARC. Once we got to a southwesterly heading on the DME ARC; we could see clearly the heavy rain in the valley in which the localizer course resides. In addition; we were still painting a significant cell just west of CEYAG and another significant cell right atop the missed approach course at the exact and most critical point where we would be struggling to gain altitude should a missed approach be necessary. Lastly; we asked Aspen Approach Control which direction the cell was heading and were told; 'West.' This was confusing to us as the prevailing winds were from west to east. A few seconds later; Aspen Approach Control advised us that the cells were moving east; meaning they were moving over the airport. Lastly; the downdrafts now triggered a LLWS alert. We had already made our decision to break off the approach but this information certainly confirmed to us that our decision was appropriate. Since we were still outside of the FAF; we advised ATC that we wanted to break off the approach and find a suitable place to hold until the storms had moved east of the approach course and the field. Given all the available information; neither the First Officer nor I were not comfortable continuing with the approach at that time. ATC then gave us a heading to the Red Table VOR and a climb to 17;000 feet. We complied with ATC's instructions but unfortunately; Red Table VOR was in the middle of another storm cell. As we were advising ATC of the location of that cell and that we would instead need a westerly heading; we received a traffic alert from TCAS. Soon after; we received a revised clearance to stop our climb at 15;000 feet (we were already at 15;300 and climbing at 2;000 FPM). We were then given a heading toward the west and almost immediately after; another heading to the east. These changing clearances came in rapid succession. Due to the closing proximity of traffic to our right side; I cranked the aircraft to the left to create separation. I was surprised that we did not receive an RA. Nonetheless; as I turned the aircraft to the left; I received abank angle warning and responded by lessening the angle of bank. After clear of traffic; ATC reissued the clearance to hold at Red Table; which I declined. I informed ATC that I wanted a heading of West (270 degrees) to get away from the storm cells and that I would get back to them with an appropriate fix at which we could hold. We were then assigned a heading of 270 degrees which gave us time to determine a save location to hold. Keep in mind that Aspen Approach Control was completely unable to determine a safe location to hold as they had no depiction as to the location of the thunderstorm cells. Ultimately; we informed ATC that we wanted to hold North of AJAXX; away from the weather. This hold would also provide us with a good visual and radar picture of the arrival corridor every few minutes when we were on the inbound course which was a southerly heading. We were issued that clearance and held for two to and one-half turns at 17;000 feet over the AJAXX fix. After the storms cleared the area; we proceeded to fly the LOC DME 15 without further incident. My thoughts on this situation are as follows. First; in my opinion; it is not in the best interest of safety to dispatch an aircraft with a maximum altitude of 25;000 to Aspen during this time of year. Every single day of the summer has afternoon thunderstorms and with the 14;000 foot terrain; only altitude can effectively provide storm separation and provide the 'bird's eye' view necessary for the pilots to select a safe flight path and make informed decisions. I am surprised at how many times I have been dispatched to Aspen with an aircraft what was inappropriate or not legal for the flight. For one example of many; on one occasion; I was dispatched to Aspen with an aircraft with one MEL'd FMS/GPS. I telephoned the Equipment Coordinator the night before to alert him to the fact that we could not legally depart to Aspen with that MEL. He acknowledged that fact and changed the aircraft. The next morning; I woke up to conduct that flight and found that we had been changed back to the broken aircraft. It is hard for me to understand how a company of this age and size does not have better safety checks in place so that these types of mistakes do not happen as often as they do. Second; also in my opinion; the lack of weather depiction in Aspen Approach Control leads to unsafe clearances. I am surprised that with today's access to technology; Aspen Approach is not equipped with simple weather radar depiction. There are pop-up thunderstorms over or near Aspen every day in August and due to this year's weather pattern; virtually every day of the summer. When you combine the lack of available weather radar to ground-based air traffic controllers with an aircraft with a 25;000 foot altitude restriction; the safety margin is further compromised. Third; this is not meant as a slight to anyone; but I am told that Aspen is a junior assignment for ATC controllers. As a result; I have been the unlucky recipient of poor clearances at least one dozen times in the seven months I have flown to Aspen (e.g.; Clearances to descend to cross WOKUV at 14;000 feet and 190 knots from an altitude where that is clearly impossible; headings that are way too close from which to make an intercept; etc.) It sometimes feels like we are declining so many poor clearances that we might as well be controlling ourselves. Today was one such instance where what sounded like a Senior Controller stepped in to fix the errant headings we were being issued that were steering us directly into the path of traffic.I have some suggestions. First; I suggest that we revisit whatever system we use to dispatch aircraft to particular cities and see if we can enhance this system to make it more reliable. Secondly; I realize that ATC is not under the control of our airline but it seems to me that as a primary user of the Aspen Airport and associated Approach Control that we should be ableto forward these concerns and have them addressed; in the interest of safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.