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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1195522 |
Time | |
Date | 201408 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B717 (Formerly MD-95) |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flap/Slat Control System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Inspector |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
Experience | Maintenance Inspector 10 Maintenance Technician 15 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Several non-routines I wrote up were signed-off by the inspection manager as 'visually re-inspected.' then he decided that the discrepant component was ok. The components were pulley and slat track bearings on a B717 aircraft. The boeing standard overhaul practices manual (sopm) has procedures to determine the wear of bearings. The procedures require bearing removal to verify the condition of the bearings. The pulley bearings had fretting residue from the deterioration of the needle bearings. The slat track bearings had plating worn down to the base metal causing rust. Engineering provided a repair document which contradicted the written criteria in the boeing sopm. In the past the bearings were replaced because of the sopm criteria. Lack of time is no excuse to overlook safety. Recently a jammed slat caused the aircraft to roll during take-off. The mentioned worn components would cause the same situation when they fail. Our air carrier has not had cable pulley failures because we have been replacing the pulleys when they show signs of bearing wear. [Found] during audit of the check non-routines. This type of maintenance is being used in a desperate attempt to make an unrealistic c-check estimated time of release (etr.) this type of maintenance will cause future delays when the aircraft leaves the check. [Recommend that] inspection manager realizes his lack of B717 experience along with his lack of B717 knowledge and follows boeing procedures. Stop blindly signing-off. Maintenance inspector. Hangar. C-check.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports their Inspection Manager; who is also their Chief Inspector; had been overriding non-routine write-ups made by inspectors during C-Checks for excessive wear on B717 aircraft pulley and slat track bearings; and then signing them off as serviceable bearings.
Narrative: Several Non-Routines I wrote up were signed-off by the Inspection Manager as 'visually re-inspected.' then he decided that the discrepant component was OK. The components were pulley and Slat Track bearings on a B717 aircraft. The Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) has procedures to determine the wear of bearings. The procedures require bearing removal to verify the condition of the bearings. The pulley bearings had fretting residue from the deterioration of the needle bearings. The Slat track bearings had plating worn down to the base metal causing rust. Engineering provided a Repair document which contradicted the written criteria in the Boeing SOPM. In the past the bearings were replaced because of the SOPM criteria. Lack of time is no excuse to overlook safety. Recently a jammed slat caused the aircraft to roll during take-off. The mentioned worn components would cause the same situation when they fail. Our Air Carrier has not had cable pulley failures because we have been replacing the pulleys when they show signs of bearing wear. [Found] during audit of the Check Non-Routines. This type of maintenance is being used in a desperate attempt to make an unrealistic C-Check Estimated Time of Release (ETR.) This type of maintenance will cause future delays when the aircraft leaves the Check. [Recommend that] Inspection Manager realizes his lack of B717 experience along with his lack of B717 knowledge and follows Boeing procedures. Stop blindly signing-off. Maintenance Inspector. Hangar. C-Check.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.