ZLC controller reports of an altitude change that he is not able to modify on the radar screen becau...

Narrative:

Aircraft X was level at FL350 and was flashing to ZLA 32 the sector the aircraft was going to be entering; ZLA32 called me and gave the control instruction; 'aircraft X descend and maintain FL330.' my response of 'roger; wilco; show it.' I then gave the control instruction to the aircraft. The problem comes then with the fact that the aircraft was entering ZLA33's airspace with the descent clearance and ZLA32 had the hand-off; they had to show the new altitude because of the problem with the fact that ZLA does not share the idea of taking hand-offs back and entering new information rather they feel the needs to ok information into all sorts of data blocks. The aircraft was never handed off to ZLA33 and I shipped the aircraft to the sector that it would be entering.ZLA should conform with the rest of the centers in the FAA and understand that their idea of ok functions are not needed to keep safety. These so-called controllers in ZLA are horribly inefficient and obviously unsafe because they have all these extra procedures in place because of having so many deals; both with airspace and aircraft. There should also be directive in the .65 about who is responsible for progressing hand offs in cases like these. I am under the idea that because the ZLA controller issued the control instruction they are responsible for the progression of the hand off as well as all coordination.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZLC Controller reports of an altitude change that he is not able to modify on the radar screen because another ATC Center has control of the aircraft.

Narrative: Aircraft X was level at FL350 and was flashing to ZLA 32 the sector the aircraft was going to be entering; ZLA32 called me and gave the control instruction; 'Aircraft X descend and maintain FL330.' My response of 'Roger; Wilco; show it.' I then gave the control instruction to the aircraft. The problem comes then with the fact that the aircraft was entering ZLA33's airspace with the descent clearance and ZLA32 had the hand-off; they had to show the new altitude because of the problem with the fact that ZLA does not share the idea of taking hand-offs back and entering new information rather they feel the needs to OK information into all sorts of data blocks. The aircraft was never handed off to ZLA33 and I shipped the aircraft to the sector that it would be entering.ZLA should conform with the rest of the centers in the FAA and understand that their idea of ok functions are not needed to keep safety. These so-called controllers in ZLA are horribly inefficient and obviously unsafe because they have all these extra procedures in place because of having so many deals; both with airspace and aircraft. There should also be directive in the .65 about who is responsible for progressing hand offs in cases like these. I am under the idea that because the ZLA controller issued the control instruction they are responsible for the progression of the hand off as well as all coordination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1195919
Time
Date	201408
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	ZLC.ARTCC
State Reference	UT
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Cruise
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Enroute
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Experience	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2
Events
Anomaly	Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZLC controller reports of an altitude change that he is not able to modify on the radar screen because another ATC center has control of the aircraft.