Narrative:

On arrival to changi airport after listening to ATIS; we anticipated the ILS to runway 20C since runway 20R was closed. During our initial descent; singapore arrival told us that runway 20R had opened and gave us vectors to intercept the localizer. With heading selected; I activated the secondary flight plan that had runway 20R loaded. Since we were over 20 miles out; the pilot flying directed me to hard tune the localizer. Approximately 15 miles from touchdown; approach directed us to change to runway 20C as there was debris on runway 20R. As we began an immediate left hand turn; I asked the PF if I could activate the secondary flight plan. He replied 'yes;' and I activated the secondary flight plan while communicating with ATC and verbalizing to the PF the new minimums and missed approach numbers for runway 20C. During this time I failed to hard tune the localizer to runway 20C; incorrectly assuming it would auto tune upon activating the secondary flight plan. The PF subsequently realized that the new localizer was not tuned; directing me to hard tune it. This delay led to overshooting final followed by a right turn to come back to intercept the now-correct localizer. The remaining approach and landing was uneventful. Incorrect prioritization; lack of specific communication; and failure to verify an FMS input all led to this event. When the runway was switched back to 20C; my first priority as pm should have been to hard-tune the new localizer first; then activate the secondary flight plan; and finally; once established on final; re-brief the minimums and missed approach numbers. Also; verifying the localizer identifier on the nav display would have led to quicker recognition of the need to hard tune the new localizer; preventing an overshoot. Though a very challenging event; better communication between the pm and PF would have aided the situation. When the possibility exists to have a runway change in close; it is imperative to pre-brief the requisite steps and priorities required; especially in the case where auto tuning of the localizer will not occur after being previously hard-tuned. Also; this would be a good training scenario.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew experiences two runway changes during approach to WSSS. After the second change the ILS frequency is not tuned in a timely manner resulting in an overshoot. A normal landing ensues.

Narrative: On arrival to Changi Airport after listening to ATIS; we anticipated the ILS to Runway 20C since Runway 20R was closed. During our initial descent; Singapore Arrival told us that Runway 20R had opened and gave us vectors to intercept the localizer. With heading selected; I activated the secondary flight plan that had Runway 20R loaded. Since we were over 20 miles out; the pilot flying directed me to hard tune the localizer. Approximately 15 miles from touchdown; Approach directed us to change to Runway 20C as there was debris on Runway 20R. As we began an immediate left hand turn; I asked the PF if I could activate the secondary flight plan. He replied 'yes;' and I activated the secondary flight plan while communicating with ATC and verbalizing to the PF the new minimums and missed approach numbers for Runway 20C. During this time I failed to hard tune the LOC to Runway 20C; incorrectly assuming it would auto tune upon activating the secondary flight plan. The PF subsequently realized that the new localizer was not tuned; directing me to hard tune it. This delay led to overshooting final followed by a right turn to come back to intercept the now-correct localizer. The remaining approach and landing was uneventful. Incorrect prioritization; lack of specific communication; and failure to verify an FMS input all led to this event. When the runway was switched back to 20C; my first priority as PM should have been to hard-tune the new localizer first; then activate the secondary flight plan; and finally; once established on final; re-brief the minimums and missed approach numbers. Also; verifying the localizer identifier on the Nav display would have led to quicker recognition of the need to hard tune the new localizer; preventing an overshoot. Though a very challenging event; better communication between the PM and PF would have aided the situation. When the possibility exists to have a runway change in close; it is imperative to pre-brief the requisite steps and priorities required; especially in the case where auto tuning of the localizer will not occur after being previously hard-tuned. Also; this would be a good training scenario.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.