Narrative:

I was the flm on duty and was about to give a team briefing when I was informed that there was a near miss reported earlier in the day in our mei MOA 1 between a flight of 3 aircraft X's and an unknown VFR aircraft. After investigating the incident with my manager and another OM we determined the incident occurred. An unknown VFR aircraft was flying around the sector in our MOA and 'was not' talking to the controller. The controller had tagged the VFR up as VFR 1 or VFR 2 and had previously advised the flight of VFR activity in the MOA I was told after the fact. From what I observed later on falcon; the aircraft X flight and the VFR got very close and I don't know if traffic was called or not. Qc later determined the VFR flight's call sign as aircraft Y and that he was out doing some radar mapping in the area. The controller told me a day later that the pilot did indeed call him after the incident to request flight following. At that time of the incident I was the flm on duty in area 4 and had 5 r-side sectors opened up out of 7 and the incident occurred on the combined sector R66/65. The controller at the position at the time was one of my strongest controllers and in my opinion was never busy during the session that I witnessed. I 'did not' get a heads up from the controller that anything occurred in order to investigate the situation immediately. After listening to the tapes and reviewing the falcon he was coordinating with gwo tower and controllers reference another flight and that seemed to be the only complication he was encountering. The volume of traffic on the combined sector in my opinion did not warrant a d-side or being split-off when I was managing the area. I recall I had 4CPC's and 1 d-side on break a red sector R43; and lunch was going on. Everything was normal up until I was informed later in the day of the occurrence.I believe in the cpc was one of my strongest controllers and that he was in no way challenged by the traffic situation. I think that knowledge may have led me to not split the sector. That does not relieve me of my responsibility of providing the safest environment for everyone involved and in the future split the sector once the military begins flying to give us the opportunity to provide better and more timely traffic advisories.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZME FLM reports of a NMAC with a flight of aircraft and a VFR aircraft; but doesn't find out about it until later in the day.

Narrative: I was the FLM on duty and was about to give a team briefing when I was informed that there was a near miss reported earlier in the day in our MEI MOA 1 between a flight of 3 Aircraft X's and an unknown VFR aircraft. After investigating the incident with my manager and another OM we determined the incident occurred. An unknown VFR aircraft was flying around the sector in our MOA and 'was not' talking to the controller. The controller had tagged the VFR up as VFR 1 or VFR 2 and had previously advised the flight of VFR activity in the MOA I was told after the fact. From what I observed later on FALCON; the Aircraft X flight and the VFR got very close and I don't know if traffic was called or not. QC later determined the VFR flight's call sign as Aircraft Y and that he was out doing some radar mapping in the area. The controller told me a day later that the pilot did indeed call him after the incident to request flight following. At that time of the incident I was the FLM on duty in Area 4 and had 5 R-side sectors opened up out of 7 and the incident occurred on the combined sector R66/65. The controller at the position at the time was one of my strongest controllers and in my opinion was never busy during the session that I witnessed. I 'did not' get a heads up from the controller that anything occurred in order to investigate the situation immediately. After listening to the tapes and reviewing the FALCON he was coordinating with GWO TWR and controllers reference another flight and that seemed to be the only complication he was encountering. The volume of traffic on the combined sector in my opinion did not warrant a D-side or being split-off when I was managing the area. I recall I had 4CPC's and 1 D-side on break a red sector R43; and lunch was going on. Everything was normal up until I was informed later in the day of the occurrence.I believe in the CPC was one of my strongest controllers and that he was in no way challenged by the traffic situation. I think that knowledge may have led me to not split the sector. That does not relieve me of my responsibility of providing the safest environment for everyone involved and in the future split the sector once the military begins flying to give us the opportunity to provide better and more timely traffic advisories.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.