Narrative:

The aircraft was flown by the first officer (first officer); and the captain assumed the role of the pilot not flying (PNF). Approximately 100 miles from our destination; the captain (PNF) obtained the ATIS and it was discovered that the prevailing visibility was reported at 1/2 statute miles; and the RVR was down to 1000 RVR as I recall. There was also a NOTAM that the 'sequence flashers' at our destination were out for runway xx. The ALS was noted as not being able to achieve full bright intensity. The RVR with the lights was RVR 24 or 1/2. Without the ALS it was RVR 50 or 1sm. The first officer; made a statement at that point saying that the 'RVR was below mins' in both situations and that we should consider thinking about diverting. The first officer asked the captain if he would like him to slow down to 200 KIAS or so to save some fuel and to give us more time to prepare for an approach if the weather had gone above minimums. En-route; the captain began contacting dispatch; initially to see if they had updated weather information; and to prepare them for a possible divert. The forecast as I recall remained the same. The captain brought up the possibility of a divert to the center controller as well as the approach controller. With approach; several weather requests were asked for by the captain; and all reports remained below published mins. The status of the ALS system was also inquired on. We were told that the ALS; was working but could not obtain 'full intensity status'. Some discussion began to consider if that meant the ALS could legally be defined as 'in service' without full intensity and with the sequence flasher out of service.the captain decided to let the passengers and the flight attendant know that there was a possibility of diverting relative to our listed alternate on the release. The captain was later told by dispatch that they would prefer that if we did divert that we head to the preferred airport. New divert numbers were read to the captain. By this point we began a descent into our destination. It was decided that based on the fuel that we would ask for vectors to essentially orbit over the field while waiting for; and in the hope that the visibility on the field would increase enough to be legal to shoot an approach. The first officer made several statements to the effect that 'approach mins are based on RVR and not prevailing visibility and that unless the RVR increases above 24; we should divert'. At this point the captain was not sure; and or brought up the thought pattern that 'prevailing visibility' might be legal to shoot the approach; and that they were still reporting 1/2 SM from both the approach controller and later the tower. Several times during the orbit over the field; the captain asked approach what the visibility was on the field. It was reported as '1/2sm with a touchdown RVR of 800' several more times the first officer mentioned that he thought RVR was controlling and that we should consider diverting at that point. Following a downwind turn on the radar pattern; the captain called approach and said that he wanted to 'try to shoot the approach'. Once again; the first officer stated that he felt that we should divert due to the mins and not shoot the approach. The reply became; 'well; let's shoot the approach.....I don't expect we will see the runway but at the very least management will not accuse me of not making an effort to get into [the destination]' (this quote is paraphrase and that was the jest of what was said) my thoughts were 'this is not smart' but I did not feel I could forcefully divert the aircraft on my own accord. I felt we would never see the runway and prepared myself for the possible 'missed approach' at that point. Once again the captain asked for the weather and was given a 1200 RVR number with 1/2 SM visibility. Following the final approach fix on the glide slope; about 500 feet above minimums the captain asked the tower for the visibility. He was told that the RVR was around 800 at the approach end. The rollout was maybe 1000 RVR. The tower stated that the visibility was such that he 'could not see or barely could see the bravo taxiway' from the tower. As the PF I stated once again that 'we should go missed now and divert prior to continuing lower on the approach with the mountainous terrain near the field'. He stated that we should just continue to minimums and go missed. That is what we did at that point and upon reaching the minimums with no runway in sight I executed the published missed approach procedure. We then were given a clearance to proceed direct to [the divert] airport. En-route; the captain made an announcement to the passengers saying 'we had attempted the approach; but the fog was too thick; and that we were diverting to [our alternate]'. He explained that [the carrier] would take care of the passengers when we arrived in [at the alternate]. The captain stated that he was sure 'that he was going to be called into the office of the chief pilot for the fact we had not made it to [the original destination]; and the aftermath of the divert; but felt he had done everything in his power to make an effort to make it into [the destination] that evening'. Outside of the fact that both pilots were exhausted at that point due to the fact our duty day was now around 15 hours; not much was said on the flight back. For my part as the first officer; I feel that I made my concerns about the approach and the desire to divert on multiple occasions during the late cruise/approach phase of the flight. I even suggested we go missed early and was still told to fly to mins. I only wish that I had been more assertive. I should have asked the captain to pull out the gom/aom to verify what minimums applied while I was flying the aircraft. I should have acted more aggressively in my opinion that RVR was the correct minimums to use and that the RVR was being reported lower than mins and thus; shooting the approach was not legal. Short of a heated argument in the cockpit with this particular captain and or commandeering the aircraft; I did not feel that there was much I could do other than to express my concerns and desire to divert. While I have a friendly relationship with this captain; he and I had arguments on a previous trip a month ago regarding how he ran his cockpit where I expressed a concern to him about how he makes decisions and runs the crew; and with his communication skills with his crew. Specifically; the captain has always been extremely concerned with making mistakes. He is constantly concerned about ensuring taxi clearances are read back correctly as an example. He is a captain that will have the PNF or first officer ask to clarify clearances multiple times; even when the PNF /first officer reads back the clearance correctly the first time. He is ultra concerned about paperwork errors and maintenance concerns. Based on knowing him; I feel that he feels pressure to perform based on past problems as a captain. It is speculation; but maybe he felt psychological pressure to make the flight happen based on past failures as a captain. The only truly poor decision that was made was to shoot the approach to [the destination]. When that decision was made; I was absolutely dumfounded that he wanted to shoot the approach based on past experience with this particular captain being a stickler for what was written in the book. Because of past experience; I should have known that the only way to break a bad decision chain with this particular captain was to be extremely assertive. I feel I failed in that duty. Only ensuring all pilots know and follow all the rules in the book can prevent this sort of situation from occurring again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC-8-200 First Officer reported his Captain refused to divert without first attempting an approach at an airport with the weather below minimums because he feared Company accusations.

Narrative: The aircraft was flown by the First Officer (FO); and the Captain assumed the role of the pilot not flying (PNF). Approximately 100 miles from our destination; the Captain (PNF) obtained the ATIS and it was discovered that the prevailing visibility was reported at 1/2 statute miles; and the RVR was down to 1000 RVR as I recall. There was also a NOTAM that the 'Sequence Flashers' at our destination were out for Runway XX. The ALS was noted as not being able to achieve full bright intensity. The RVR with the lights was RVR 24 or 1/2. Without the ALS it was RVR 50 or 1sm. The First Officer; made a statement at that point saying that the 'RVR was below mins' in both situations and that we should consider thinking about diverting. The FO asked the Captain if he would like him to slow down to 200 KIAS or so to save some fuel and to give us more time to prepare for an approach if the weather had gone above minimums. En-route; the Captain began contacting Dispatch; initially to see if they had updated weather information; and to prepare them for a possible divert. The forecast as I recall remained the same. The Captain brought up the possibility of a divert to the Center Controller as well as the approach controller. With approach; several weather requests were asked for by the Captain; and all reports remained below published mins. The status of the ALS system was also inquired on. We were told that the ALS; was working but could not obtain 'full intensity status'. some discussion began to consider if that meant the ALS could legally be defined as 'In service' without full intensity and with the Sequence Flasher out of service.The Captain decided to let the passengers and the Flight Attendant know that there was a possibility of diverting relative to our listed alternate on the release. The Captain was later told by Dispatch that they would prefer that if we did divert that we head to the preferred airport. New divert numbers were read to the Captain. By this point we began a descent into our destination. It was decided that based on the fuel that we would ask for vectors to essentially orbit over the field while waiting for; and in the hope that the visibility on the field would increase enough to be legal to shoot an approach. The First Officer made several statements to the effect that 'Approach mins are based on RVR and not prevailing visibility and that unless the RVR increases above 24; we should divert'. At this point the Captain was not sure; and or brought up the thought pattern that 'prevailing visibility' might be legal to shoot the approach; and that they were still reporting 1/2 SM from both the approach controller and later the tower. Several times during the orbit over the field; the Captain asked Approach what the visibility was on the field. It was reported as '1/2sm with a touchdown RVR of 800' Several more times the First Officer mentioned that he thought RVR was controlling and that we should consider diverting at that point. Following a downwind turn on the RADAR pattern; the Captain called approach and said that he wanted to 'Try to shoot the Approach'. Once again; the First Officer stated that he felt that we should divert due to the mins and not shoot the approach. The reply became; 'Well; let's shoot the approach.....I don't expect we will see the runway but at the very least management will not accuse me of not making an effort to get into [the destination]' (This quote is paraphrase and that was the jest of what was said) My thoughts were 'This is not smart' but I did not feel I could forcefully divert the aircraft on my own accord. I felt we would never see the runway and prepared myself for the possible 'Missed Approach' at that point. Once again the Captain asked for the weather and was given a 1200 RVR number with 1/2 SM visibility. Following the Final approach fix on the Glide slope; about 500 feet above minimums the Captain asked the tower for the visibility. He was told that the RVR was around 800 at the approach end. The Rollout was maybe 1000 RVR. The Tower stated that the visibility was such that he 'Could not see or barely could see the Bravo taxiway' from the tower. As the PF I stated once again that 'We should go missed now and divert prior to continuing lower on the approach with the mountainous terrain near the field'. He stated that we should just continue to minimums and go missed. That is what we did at that point and upon reaching the minimums with no runway in sight I executed the published missed approach procedure. We then were given a clearance to proceed direct to [the divert] airport. En-route; the Captain made an announcement to the passengers saying 'We had attempted the approach; but the fog was too thick; and that we were diverting to [our alternate]'. He explained that [the carrier] would take care of the passengers when we arrived in [at the alternate]. The Captain stated that he was sure 'That he was going to be called into the office of the Chief Pilot for the fact we had not made it to [the original destination]; and the aftermath of the divert; but felt he had done everything in his power to make an effort to make it into [the destination] that evening'. Outside of the fact that both pilots were exhausted at that point due to the fact our duty day was now around 15 hours; not much was said on the flight back. For my part as the FO; I feel that I made my concerns about the approach and the desire to divert on multiple occasions during the late cruise/approach phase of the flight. I even suggested we go missed early and was still told to fly to mins. I only wish that I had been more assertive. I should have asked the Captain to pull out the GOM/AOM to verify what minimums applied while I was flying the aircraft. I should have acted more aggressively in my opinion that RVR was the correct minimums to use and that the RVR was being reported lower than mins and thus; shooting the approach was not legal. Short of a heated argument in the cockpit with this particular Captain and or commandeering the aircraft; I did not feel that there was much I could do other than to express my concerns and desire to divert. While I have a friendly relationship with this Captain; he and I had arguments on a previous trip a month ago regarding how he ran his cockpit where I expressed a concern to him about how he makes decisions and runs the crew; and with his communication skills with his crew. Specifically; the Captain has always been extremely concerned with making mistakes. He is constantly concerned about ensuring taxi clearances are read back correctly as an example. He is a Captain that will have the PNF or FO ask to clarify clearances multiple times; even when the PNF /FO reads back the clearance correctly the first time. He is ultra concerned about paperwork errors and maintenance concerns. Based on knowing him; I feel that he feels pressure to perform based on past problems as a Captain. It is speculation; but maybe he felt psychological pressure to make the flight happen based on past failures as a Captain. The only truly poor decision that was made was to shoot the approach to [the destination]. When that decision was made; I was absolutely dumfounded that he wanted to shoot the approach based on past experience with this particular Captain being a stickler for what was written in the book. Because of past experience; I should have known that the only way to break a bad decision chain with this particular Captain was to be extremely assertive. I feel I failed in that duty. Only ensuring all pilots know and follow all the rules in the book can prevent this sort of situation from occurring again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.