Narrative:

I am a flight instructor. A student pilot and I departed laf on a VFR training flight; where the focus was flying by reference to instruments. Because we had a broken ceiling above us with bases at 3;500 MSL; and because the freezing level was much higher than we'd need to go; I decided to request a pop-up IFR clearance from gus approach to operate within the northeast quadrant of the bvt VOR within 10 DME. At that time I was at 2;500 MSL on the BVT020R at 7 DME. The controller advised us that he was not receiving our transponder signal; so I offered to recycle the transponder. We elected to turn back toward the VOR and climb to 3;000 to assist with radar identification. The controller said the radar was 'unable to pick you up; even on primary radar; for some reason.' when we were on the BVT360R at 2 DME; the controller was able to radar identify us via primary radar only; and issued our IFR clearance as we initially requested. To remain within our IFR clearance limit; we turned back northeast-bound and began a climb to 3;500 MSL to begin our instrument flying work in the clouds. Within 30 seconds of us going northeast-bound; the controller advised us 'radar contact lost.' since we were still in VMC; I decided to cancel IFR; descend back below the bases of the clouds; and complete the training flight under VFR. Late afternoon; a cessna citation had departed laf on an IFR flight. I was monitoring gus approach on our radio at this time. Although this aircraft departed laf; 11 miles southeast of bvt; the same controller had problems radar identifying this aircraft. After the pilot recycled his transponder; he was radar identified; but I believe this issue was related to the radar blind spot and not necessarily the aircraft's transponder. Follow-up with the pilots of that aircraft and the controller would be necessary to verify my concern. I am concerned about the radar coverage problems in this area. While I understand radar is not an end-all-be-all safety solution; it certainly enhances safety. Laf is an intensive student training airport that is home to two large flight schools. As a result; bvt is also highly saturated with VFR aircraft practicing holds and instrument approaches based off of bvt. When I returned to laf a half hour later; laf ATCT advised us that there were between 2-3 aircraft practicing holds at bvt between 2;000 and 3;000. It is routine for the laf ATCT to issue known traffic at bvt; despite the fact that bvt is well outside both the class D surface area and class east shelf area surrounding laf. Although there were between 2-3 aircraft in holds at bvt at altitudes similar to mine; I had no idea this was even the case; despite being in contact with gus approach. I believe gus approach didn't see those aircraft due to the same radar coverage problem that impacted my flight. The immediate vicinity of bvt is also a popular area for IFR traffic to commence approaches to laf. The VOR-a; RNAV runway 10; and ILS runway 10 iaps to laf can all be commenced in this same vicinity. On a day like today; with a ceiling at 3;000 AGL; the ILS runway 10 was indeed in use for inbound IFR aircraft according to the laf ATIS. I am concerned there is going to come a time when an IFR aircraft will be inbound to laf from the northwest and will have an near midair collision or mac with a VFR training aircraft that is invisible to gus approach. Here are my recommendations: 1. The FAA and/or DOD; who operates gus approach; should study the impact of the vast wind turbine farms that have been erected north of laf; specifically on the accuracy and dependability of the gus approach primary and secondary surveillance radar. I fear that those farms have greatly compromised already previously-poor radar coverage in the laf area. (Gus approach took over approach control responsibilities for this area from ZAU a few years ago to provide our area with better radar coverage. I believe those wind turbine farms have compromised that plan.) 2. The FAA should consideradding a primary surveillance radar and/or secondary surveillance radar system at the laf airport. This would greatly enhance safety and situational awareness; especially in the vicinity of bvt. The antenna could be routed into the gus TRACON for use as an additional radar site at that facility; whose radar system (stars) supports input from multiple sites. Alternatively the antennas could be used to re-establish an approach control function within the laf ATCT. 3. In addition to primary and secondary surveillance radar; the FAA should consider re-establishing the laf approach control; and upgrading the laf class D airspace to class C airspace. This would create a separation standard for all aircraft operating outside of the laf surface area; specifically in the vicinity of the bvt VOR. 4. If the above recommendations are deemed infeasible; the FAA should create a safer procedure for VFR operations in the vicinity of bvt. Either: a. The FAA should expand the laf class D airspace so that it includes the bvt VOR; officially making laf ATCT the controlling agency for that area; or delegating that portion of the class D to gus approach. VFR aircraft would therefore be required to be in contact with a controller prior to operating in the vicinity of the VOR. Currently; no communication is required at all; although many pilots do choose to communicate with laf ATCT anyway. Regardless; the laf ATCT providing traffic information for aircraft in the vicinity of bvt is not an official function of that tower; although their efforts are certainly greatly appreciated. B. The FAA should establish an air-to-air frequency for pilots to self-report their positions while conducting operations in the vicinity of bvt; eliminating the unofficial responsibility for laf ATCT to issue traffic information in that vicinity. C. Establish better communication of known traffic in the vicinity of bvt between the laf ATCT and gus approach. Laf ATCT is often aware of VFR aircraft operating in the vicinity of bvt; while those same aircraft are invisible to gus approach; who works the IFR aircraft inbound before transferring communication to the laf ATCT.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An instructor pilot reported GUS was unable to provide radar coverage within ten miles of the BVT VOR possibly because of ground interference. The pilot feels because of the training traffic density; a LAF airspace upgrade may be needed to provide the needed safety margin.

Narrative: I am a flight instructor. A student pilot and I departed LAF on a VFR training flight; where the focus was flying by reference to instruments. Because we had a broken ceiling above us with bases at 3;500 MSL; and because the freezing level was much higher than we'd need to go; I decided to request a pop-up IFR clearance from GUS Approach to operate within the northeast quadrant of the BVT VOR within 10 DME. At that time I was at 2;500 MSL on the BVT020R at 7 DME. The controller advised us that he was not receiving our transponder signal; so I offered to recycle the transponder. We elected to turn back toward the VOR and climb to 3;000 to assist with radar identification. The controller said the radar was 'unable to pick you up; even on primary radar; for some reason.' When we were on the BVT360R at 2 DME; the controller was able to radar identify us via primary radar only; and issued our IFR clearance as we initially requested. To remain within our IFR clearance limit; we turned back northeast-bound and began a climb to 3;500 MSL to begin our instrument flying work in the clouds. Within 30 seconds of us going northeast-bound; the controller advised us 'Radar contact lost.' Since we were still in VMC; I decided to cancel IFR; descend back below the bases of the clouds; and complete the training flight under VFR. Late afternoon; a Cessna Citation had departed LAF on an IFR flight. I was monitoring GUS Approach on our radio at this time. Although this aircraft departed LAF; 11 miles southeast of BVT; the same controller had problems radar identifying this aircraft. After the pilot recycled his transponder; he was radar identified; but I believe this issue was related to the radar blind spot and not necessarily the aircraft's transponder. Follow-up with the pilots of that aircraft and the controller would be necessary to verify my concern. I am concerned about the radar coverage problems in this area. While I understand radar is not an end-all-be-all safety solution; it certainly enhances safety. LAF is an intensive student training airport that is home to two large flight schools. As a result; BVT is also highly saturated with VFR aircraft practicing holds and instrument approaches based off of BVT. When I returned to LAF a half hour later; LAF ATCT advised us that there were between 2-3 aircraft practicing holds at BVT between 2;000 and 3;000. It is routine for the LAF ATCT to issue known traffic at BVT; despite the fact that BVT is well outside both the Class D surface area and Class E shelf area surrounding LAF. Although there were between 2-3 aircraft in holds at BVT at altitudes similar to mine; I had no idea this was even the case; despite being in contact with GUS Approach. I believe GUS Approach didn't see those aircraft due to the same radar coverage problem that impacted my flight. The immediate vicinity of BVT is also a popular area for IFR traffic to commence approaches to LAF. The VOR-A; RNAV RWY 10; and ILS RWY 10 IAPs to LAF can all be commenced in this same vicinity. On a day like today; with a ceiling at 3;000 AGL; the ILS RWY 10 was indeed in use for inbound IFR aircraft according to the LAF ATIS. I am concerned there is going to come a time when an IFR aircraft will be inbound to LAF from the northwest and will have an NMAC or MAC with a VFR training aircraft that is invisible to GUS Approach. Here are my recommendations: 1. The FAA and/or DOD; who operates GUS Approach; should study the impact of the vast wind turbine farms that have been erected north of LAF; specifically on the accuracy and dependability of the GUS Approach primary and secondary surveillance radar. I fear that those farms have greatly compromised already previously-poor radar coverage in the LAF area. (GUS Approach took over approach control responsibilities for this area from ZAU a few years ago to provide our area with better radar coverage. I believe those wind turbine farms have compromised that plan.) 2. The FAA should consideradding a primary surveillance radar and/or secondary surveillance radar system at the LAF Airport. This would greatly enhance safety and situational awareness; especially in the vicinity of BVT. The antenna could be routed into the GUS TRACON for use as an additional radar site at that facility; whose radar system (STARS) supports input from multiple sites. Alternatively the antennas could be used to re-establish an approach control function within the LAF ATCT. 3. In addition to primary and secondary surveillance radar; the FAA should consider re-establishing the LAF Approach Control; and upgrading the LAF Class D airspace to Class C airspace. This would create a separation standard for all aircraft operating outside of the LAF surface area; specifically in the vicinity of the BVT VOR. 4. If the above recommendations are deemed infeasible; the FAA should create a safer procedure for VFR operations in the vicinity of BVT. Either: A. The FAA should expand the LAF Class D airspace so that it includes the BVT VOR; officially making LAF ATCT the controlling agency for that area; OR delegating that portion of the Class D to GUS Approach. VFR aircraft would therefore be required to be in contact with a controller prior to operating in the vicinity of the VOR. Currently; no communication is required at all; although many pilots do choose to communicate with LAF ATCT anyway. Regardless; the LAF ATCT providing traffic information for aircraft in the vicinity of BVT is not an official function of that tower; although their efforts are certainly greatly appreciated. B. The FAA should establish an air-to-air frequency for pilots to self-report their positions while conducting operations in the vicinity of BVT; eliminating the unofficial responsibility for LAF ATCT to issue traffic information in that vicinity. C. Establish better communication of known traffic in the vicinity of BVT between the LAF ATCT and GUS Approach. LAF ATCT is often aware of VFR aircraft operating in the vicinity of BVT; while those same aircraft are invisible to GUS Approach; who works the IFR aircraft inbound before transferring communication to the LAF ATCT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.