Narrative:

We pushed off of the gate and had briefed a quick taxi expecting runway 18L for the lills 6 departure. All checklists and flows were completed. As we were holding short of taxiway C; ground told us to expect departure following a 757 which was two planes away for sequence. Shortly after the 'expect for sequence'; we were asked to monitor tower frequency. Captain decided to depart without using flex since we were following a 757. I completely agreed with this decision. As we were both trying to get rid of the flex numbers and get new numbers for departure; tower changed our sequence to the airplane in front of the 757 which was right in front of us at taxiway C and rolling onto runway 18L. Tower also told us to expect to 'keep rolling'. As we rushed to get numbers; taxi checks twice (flap setting changed) and before T/O checks done; we were cleared for T/O. We did complete all flows and checklists prior to T/O. After T/O; the captain noticed the FMS/flight director leading him to turn into runway 18C departures. The captain did not turn into runway 18C departures. I tried to input hisor into the FMS but the FMS would not accept it and shortly hisor was behind us. After we realized that we were having issues. We reported the FMS issues to departure control and requested vectors which gave us enough time to correct or pick/up the lills 6 departure. The captains operational knowledge of clt prevented us from getting into a potentially bad situation. Departure was helpful with vectors. The rest of the flight was uneventful.I can't pin point an exact 'why' for the event. The environment was 'rushed' from taxi out to take off. Both of us on the flight deck briefed and verified runway 18L 'inside and out'. I have experienced information 'falling out' of the FMS before. I'm thankful the captain (flying pilot) was situationally aware enough to realize what was going on and fly the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 First Officer reports a rushed departure from Runway 18L at CLT with a clearance for the LILLS 6 RNAV. Once airborne; the flight director indicates a right turn; which the Captain ignores; and it is quickly determined that the FMC is set for a Runway 18C departure.

Narrative: We pushed off of the gate and had briefed a quick taxi expecting Runway 18L for the LILLS 6 departure. All checklists and flows were completed. As we were holding short of Taxiway C; ground told us to expect departure following a 757 which was two planes away for sequence. Shortly after the 'expect for sequence'; we were asked to monitor tower frequency. Captain decided to depart without using flex since we were following a 757. I completely agreed with this decision. As we were both trying to get rid of the flex numbers and get new numbers for departure; tower changed our sequence to the airplane in front of the 757 which was right in front of us at Taxiway C and rolling onto Runway 18L. Tower also told us to expect to 'keep rolling'. As we rushed to get numbers; taxi checks twice (flap setting changed) and before T/O checks done; we were cleared for T/O. We did complete all flows and checklists prior to T/O. After T/O; the captain noticed the FMS/flight director leading him to turn into Runway 18C departures. The captain did not turn into Runway 18C departures. I tried to input HISOR into the FMS but the FMS would not accept it and shortly HISOR was behind us. After we realized that we were having issues. We reported the FMS issues to departure control and requested vectors which gave us enough time to correct or pick/up the LILLS 6 departure. The captains operational knowledge of CLT prevented us from getting into a potentially bad situation. Departure was helpful with vectors. The rest of the flight was uneventful.I can't pin point an exact 'why' for the event. The environment was 'rushed' from taxi out to take off. Both of us on the flight deck briefed and verified Runway 18L 'inside and out'. I have experienced information 'falling out' of the FMS before. I'm thankful the captain (flying pilot) was situationally aware enough to realize what was going on and fly the airplane.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.