Narrative:

Preparing for engine start and taxi-out after quick turn. Running the pre-start check; I call out the release fuel and then realize that we do not have that fuel on board the AC. I then talk with the first officer and look at the dispatch release again. I see that there is over 1000 lbs. Of contingency and holding fuel. I decide to call dispatch and see if we can remove that fuel from the release and that would allow us to depart. The first officer calls operations and asks that the fuel vendor come back out to the AC; because we were under fueled. Talking with dispatch we agree that the flight can depart without the fuel and we do an amended release. The WX is VFR. As I am finishing the phone call; I see that the fuel vendor has started fueling the AC. I ask the ramp to stop him. Fuel was loaded on the AC and I did not have the main cabin door open. This was my mistake as I did not talk with operations and let them know that I was working with dispatch to go without the extra fuel. Better communication on my part would have corrected this issue. The second situation on this flight was; after taxing away from the gate; I heard the call of a small piper cherokee taxiing. I thought that I heard he was taxiing for departure. I was just about to leave the terminal ramp on taxiway G; and I looked to the right and saw the cherokee advancing toward me on taxiway D. I stopped the AC on taxiway G prior to reaching taxiway D. As I set the parking brake to talk with the first officer about what the cherokee might be doing; I notice that he is really accelerating on taxiway D. The cherokee lifts off of taxiway D about 20-25 feet before the intersections of taxiways D and G; with the wind coming out of the south; he is blown toward my AC; I believe that he came within 25 feet of the AC both horizontally and vertically. I asked the cherokee pilot if he knew that he was taking off on the taxiway; and I did not understand his response. After I sat at the intersection for a few minutes and watched the cherokee fly away; the first officer and I looked at each other and then cleared the area around us and continued on our flight. The root cause of the first part of the incident was not reading correctly the dispatch flight release. The fuel on board was sufficient with the flight plan and the winds to have adequate reserve fuel onboard at landing; but it was not above the initial minto fuel; with the original release. Uncontrolled field is the root cause of the second incident; general aviation pilots as well as commercial airline pilots can and do make mistakes about taxiways; runways; and where they are on the field. I usually have the rule of only typing in the fuel onboard the AC to put in the FMS. Even this rule did not save me from making this mistake; as even with the fuel I did have onboard the AC; the FMS showed me landing with more the my required reserve. I need to double check the release fuel from the dispatch release and then check the fuel onboard the AC to ensure that I have the required fuel onboard the AC. I also need to communicate more with my first officer and with operation personnel at the station to make sure that we are all on the same page when trying to solve the issues that we are facing as a team. Maintaining vigilance at an uncontrolled field is very important. My first officer conducted a very good brief that discussed the threat of the uncontrolled field. We did maintain our vigilance; but the AC was still very close to another AC that had decided to use a taxiway for his takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reports inadvertently fueling with the main cabin door closed. After engine start; a PA28 is heard on the CTAF to be taxiing for takeoff. Upon reaching the parallel taxiway the PA28 is seen to be accelerating down the taxiway; and lifts off very close to the CRJ.

Narrative: Preparing for engine start and Taxi-out after quick turn. Running the pre-start check; I call out the release fuel and then realize that we do not have that fuel on board the AC. I then talk with the first officer and look at the dispatch release again. I see that there is over 1000 lbs. of contingency and holding fuel. I decide to call dispatch and see if we can remove that fuel from the release and that would allow us to depart. The FO calls operations and asks that the fuel vendor come back out to the AC; because we were under fueled. Talking with dispatch we agree that the flight can depart without the fuel and we do an amended release. The WX is VFR. As I am finishing the phone call; I see that the fuel vendor has started fueling the AC. I ask the ramp to stop him. Fuel was loaded on the AC and I did not have the Main Cabin Door open. This was my mistake as I did not talk with operations and let them know that I was working with dispatch to go without the extra fuel. Better communication on my part would have corrected this issue. The second situation on this flight was; after taxing away from the gate; I heard the call of a small piper Cherokee taxiing. I thought that I heard he was taxiing for departure. I was just about to leave the terminal ramp on taxiway G; and I looked to the right and saw the Cherokee advancing toward me on taxiway D. I stopped the AC on taxiway G prior to reaching taxiway D. As I set the Parking Brake to talk with the FO about what the Cherokee might be doing; I notice that he is really accelerating on taxiway D. The Cherokee lifts off of taxiway D about 20-25 feet before the intersections of taxiways D and G; with the wind coming out of the south; he is blown toward my AC; I believe that he came within 25 feet of the AC both horizontally and vertically. I asked the Cherokee pilot if he knew that he was taking off on the taxiway; and I did not understand his response. After I sat at the intersection for a few minutes and watched the Cherokee fly away; the FO and I looked at each other and then cleared the area around us and continued on our flight. The root cause of the first part of the incident was not reading correctly the Dispatch Flight Release. The fuel on board was sufficient with the flight plan and the winds to have adequate reserve fuel onboard at landing; but it was not above the initial MINTO fuel; with the original release. Uncontrolled field is the root cause of the second incident; General Aviation pilots as well as Commercial Airline Pilots can and do make mistakes about taxiways; runways; and where they are on the field. I usually have the rule of only typing in the fuel onboard the AC to put in the FMS. Even this rule did not save me from making this mistake; as even with the fuel I did have onboard the AC; the FMS showed me landing with more the my required reserve. I need to double check the Release Fuel from the Dispatch Release and then check the Fuel Onboard the AC to ensure that I have the required fuel onboard the AC. I also need to communicate more with my FO and with Operation personnel at the station to make sure that we are all on the same page when trying to solve the issues that we are facing as a team. Maintaining vigilance at an uncontrolled field is very important. My FO conducted a very good brief that discussed the threat of the Uncontrolled field. We did maintain our vigilance; but the AC was still very close to another AC that had decided to use a taxiway for his takeoff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.