Narrative:

On aug/wed/89, when en route between the wabash VOR and the 'mt' NDB, I was forced to deviate south of course, into a military practice area, for the safety of my aircraft and passenger. The deviation was dictated by an area of 'circuit breaker' activity which laid on and to the north of my course. The deviation was kept to an absolute minimum, minimizing my incursion into the military airspace, while keeping the flight safe. Montreal center cleared me to a block altitude of 16,000 to 20,000, and that I could deviate at 16,000. I decided to maintain 20,000 for the moment in hopes that I could clear the 'circuit breaker's' without deviating. A descent to 16,000 at that time, would have increased my fuel flow, subjected me to moderate ice at 16,000. This, together with the relative remoteness of the area, the lack of alternate airports, and my legal, but tight fuel reserves, and the inconsistent WX reports, influenced my decision not to descend at that time. About 20 minutes later, montreal center called and changed my clearance to maintain 16,000' by 175 miles southwest of the wabash VOR. When I received the clearance, I calculated that my position was beyond the 175 mile limit. When I tried to get an explanation of the clearance, center said that I was breaking up, and they could not read me. Based on several requests by center for earlier position reports, and an inaccurate clearance, I had to assume that I was not in radar contact, and that a descent to 16,000' beyond a clearance limit would not be safe. As an added point, the tops of the overcast in the area were at 19,000, so the descent would have been in IFR conditions. I believe that my actions were the safest possible response to the situation, and that if I had responded differently, the situation could have escalated into an emergency. I believe the main problem was the lack of communications in the area. Also the lack of navaids, the leg we were flying was 350 mi in length, and at the time of the deviation, I had no reference to navaids, I was on a heading.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE ENROUTE BETWEEN WABUSH VOR AND CHIBOUGAMAU NDB, A CORPORATE ACFT ENCOUNTERS TSTM ACTIVITY, FAILS TO CONFORM TO ALT ASSIGNMENTS, AND DEVIATES FROM TRACK, ENTERING THE BAGOTVILLE MILITARY FLYING AREA.

Narrative: ON AUG/WED/89, WHEN ENRTE BETWEEN THE WABASH VOR AND THE 'MT' NDB, I WAS FORCED TO DEVIATE SOUTH OF COURSE, INTO A MIL PRACTICE AREA, FOR THE SAFETY OF MY ACFT AND PAX. THE DEVIATION WAS DICTATED BY AN AREA OF 'CB' ACTIVITY WHICH LAID ON AND TO THE NORTH OF MY COURSE. THE DEVIATION WAS KEPT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, MINIMIZING MY INCURSION INTO THE MIL AIRSPACE, WHILE KEEPING THE FLT SAFE. MONTREAL CENTER CLRED ME TO A BLOCK ALT OF 16,000 TO 20,000, AND THAT I COULD DEVIATE AT 16,000. I DECIDED TO MAINTAIN 20,000 FOR THE MOMENT IN HOPES THAT I COULD CLEAR THE 'CB'S' WITHOUT DEVIATING. A DESCENT TO 16,000 AT THAT TIME, WOULD HAVE INCREASED MY FUEL FLOW, SUBJECTED ME TO MODERATE ICE AT 16,000. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE RELATIVE REMOTENESS OF THE AREA, THE LACK OF ALTERNATE ARPTS, AND MY LEGAL, BUT TIGHT FUEL RESERVES, AND THE INCONSISTENT WX REPORTS, INFLUENCED MY DECISION NOT TO DESCEND AT THAT TIME. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER, MONTREAL CENTER CALLED AND CHANGED MY CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 16,000' BY 175 MILES SW OF THE WABASH VOR. WHEN I RECEIVED THE CLRNC, I CALCULATED THAT MY POSITION WAS BEYOND THE 175 MILE LIMIT. WHEN I TRIED TO GET AN EXPLANATION OF THE CLRNC, CENTER SAID THAT I WAS BREAKING UP, AND THEY COULD NOT READ ME. BASED ON SEVERAL REQUESTS BY CENTER FOR EARLIER POSITION REPORTS, AND AN INACCURATE CLRNC, I HAD TO ASSUME THAT I WAS NOT IN RADAR CONTACT, AND THAT A DESCENT TO 16,000' BEYOND A CLRNC LIMIT WOULD NOT BE SAFE. AS AN ADDED POINT, THE TOPS OF THE OVERCAST IN THE AREA WERE AT 19,000, SO THE DESCENT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN IFR CONDITIONS. I BELIEVE THAT MY ACTIONS WERE THE SAFEST POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION, AND THAT IF I HAD RESPONDED DIFFERENTLY, THE SITUATION COULD HAVE ESCALATED INTO AN EMER. I BELIEVE THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE LACK OF COMS IN THE AREA. ALSO THE LACK OF NAVAIDS, THE LEG WE WERE FLYING WAS 350 MI IN LENGTH, AND AT THE TIME OF THE DEVIATION, I HAD NO REFERENCE TO NAVAIDS, I WAS ON A HDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.