Narrative:

The flight started in a routine way. We operated to zspd with the first officer as pilot flying (PF). I was pilot monitoring(pm). Our jump seater was a line check airman who conducted a line check on us the previous day; a pilot not flying (PNF). He rode in the crew rest area. The flight had 69;400# of fuel. The flight was planned for 2:40 & a burn of 33;700#. The alternate airport was rksi; 1:40 & 19;100# away. During our flight; we were unsuccessful in obtaining the zspd ATIS. We found the zspd sita weather report the same as forecast; VFR. Entering the shanghai ATC area we prepared for the STAR & ILS 35L. About 80 NM from zspd; the situation turned less benign. The controller put our flight & 3 other flights into holds. The latest ATIS had ceilings at 60 m and visibility at 700 m. Approach was to zspd CAT ii ILS 17L. No expect further clearance (efc) times. While in the hold I calculated & the flight management system (FMS) confirmed that if we left immediately & flew direct; we would land at rksi with 12;200# of calculated fuel. Emergency fuel for this aircraft is 9;000#. We faced: 1. Unforecast IFR weather. 2. Metric altimetry 3. An approach controller speaking english as a second language. 4. An unknown delay in conducting the instrument approach procedure to the single operating runway. 5. No known route & actual fuel burn to our alternate airport. In china; there are no direct clearances. 6. We saw at least one other aircraft in a holding pattern while on the final approach. These holding patterns were not regularly assigned points but may have been assigned on an ad hoc basis (just as our holding pattern was). Traffic separation was a concern. I summoned the PNF forward & requested that he contact the dispatcher to find a closer alternate airport. This would lower our fuel burn requirements & give us more time in our destination area. I know there is a domestic airport in the shanghai area. I returned to my pm duties & built & briefed the CAT ii ILS 17L approach procedures. I only heard snippets of the conversation with the dispatcher. He seemed to be caught completely unaware of our deteriorating weather conditions. He complained about a computer program he needed being down. There were long pauses in the conversation between the PNF & the dispatcher. I realized that we were on our own. We were vectored onto the localizer & were the third aircraft for the approach. We were on a 30 NM final approach course when I realized that landing at zspd was our safest course of action. I assumed the PF & the first officer became the pm. At 25 NM on approach our dispatcher sent an ACARS message that had a closer alternate airport (rkpc?) but its runway was closed until after we would run out of fuel. At 20 NM I briefed the pm & PNF that in the event of a missed approach we would: go around. Declare an emergency. Conduct a CAT III autoland approach to the CAT ii runway at zspd. We did not have the fuel needed to safely arrive at our filed alternate. There were no objections. Fortunately; we were successful on our first landing attempt. After block in & shutdown checklist procedures; we conducted an extensive debrief discussing what each of us perceived and what other options may have been open to us. Adding more fuel when operating in china. There are no nearby alternate airports in our china operations. A proactive dispatcher. This dispatcher is atypical of the cooperation and participation I have found with dispatch.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 Captain reports discovering enroute that ZSPD weather; which was forecast to be VFR; was now IFR with low ceiling and visibility. With questionable diversion airports available the Captain elects to wait out the assigned holding and lands safely.

Narrative: The flight started in a routine way. We operated to ZSPD with the First Officer as Pilot Flying (PF). I was Pilot Monitoring(PM). Our jump seater was a Line Check Airman who conducted a Line Check on us the previous day; a Pilot Not Flying (PNF). He rode in the crew rest area. The flight had 69;400# of fuel. The flight was planned for 2:40 & a burn of 33;700#. The Alternate Airport was RKSI; 1:40 & 19;100# away. During our flight; we were unsuccessful in obtaining the ZSPD ATIS. We found the ZSPD SITA Weather Report the same as forecast; VFR. Entering the Shanghai ATC Area we prepared for the STAR & ILS 35L. About 80 NM from ZSPD; the situation turned less benign. The controller put our flight & 3 other flights into holds. The latest ATIS had ceilings at 60 m and visibility at 700 m. Approach was to ZSPD CAT II ILS 17L. No Expect Further Clearance (EFC) times. While in the hold I calculated & the Flight Management System (FMS) confirmed that if we left immediately & flew direct; we would land at RKSI with 12;200# of calculated fuel. Emergency Fuel for this aircraft is 9;000#. We faced: 1. Unforecast IFR weather. 2. Metric altimetry 3. An Approach Controller speaking English as a second language. 4. An unknown delay in conducting the instrument approach procedure to the single operating runway. 5. No known route & actual fuel burn to our alternate airport. In China; there are no direct clearances. 6. We saw at least one other aircraft in a holding pattern while on the final approach. These holding patterns were not regularly assigned points but may have been assigned on an ad hoc basis (just as our holding pattern was). Traffic separation was a concern. I summoned the PNF forward & requested that he contact the Dispatcher to find a closer Alternate Airport. This would lower our fuel burn requirements & give us more time in our destination area. I know there is a domestic airport in the Shanghai area. I returned to my PM duties & built & briefed the CAT II ILS 17L Approach procedures. I only heard snippets of the conversation with the Dispatcher. He seemed to be caught completely unaware of our deteriorating weather conditions. He complained about a computer program he needed being down. There were long pauses in the conversation between the PNF & the Dispatcher. I realized that we were on our own. We were vectored onto the localizer & were the third aircraft for the approach. We were on a 30 NM final approach course when I realized that landing at ZSPD was our safest course of action. I assumed the PF & the First Officer became the PM. At 25 NM on approach our Dispatcher sent an ACARS message that had a closer Alternate Airport (RKPC?) but its runway was closed until after we would run out of fuel. At 20 NM I briefed the PM & PNF that in the event of a missed approach we would: Go Around. Declare an Emergency. Conduct a CAT III AutoLand approach to the CAT II runway at ZSPD. We did not have the fuel needed to safely arrive at our filed alternate. There were no objections. Fortunately; we were successful on our first landing attempt. After Block In & Shutdown Checklist procedures; we conducted an extensive Debrief discussing what each of us perceived and what other options may have been open to us. Adding more fuel when operating in China. There are no nearby Alternate Airports in our China operations. A proactive Dispatcher. This Dispatcher is atypical of the cooperation and participation I have found with Dispatch.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.