Narrative:

Prior to pushback from the gate and subsequent engine start; the weather was overcast with good visibility. After pushback; rain began to fall and a new ATIS was forthcoming. We obtained the new ATIS prior to taxi and discussed the -fzra indicated with the new weather broadcast. The aircraft had been deiced prior to crew arrival with type 1 deice fluid and the deice form was included with the dispatch release. We made a visual check of the aircraft on taxi out and noted no ice present. Ground control contacted us while taxiing and said that an aircraft in the deice pad (another carrier) was concerned that he had ice on his aircraft and that he noted we were not going to deice. We checked our wings and informed ground control that we had been deiced at the gate and that our aircraft was free of contamination. We proceeded to receive our takeoff clearance and departed without incident. During the cruise climb portion of the flight; the captain confessed that he was having reservations about the decision we had made to takeoff without anti-ice. We pulled the winter ops laminated cards and reviewed them and discussed the information contained on them. We agreed that we did in fact error in our judgment. We should have taxied to the deice pad and been deiced and anti-iced with type 1 followed by type iv fluid. Although I was uncomfortable with our initial decision and had reservations of my own at the time; I failed to convey that to the captain and I believed that we made a safe decision. The first indication of -fzra on the ATIS should have sent us to the pad for deice. The indication from another aircraft of ice should have sent us to the deice pad. We should have reviewed the laminated cards initially and that would have left us with no doubt given the circumstances. This was my first real-word company winter ops situation and we should have taken more time to study what we were dealing with. I will better prepare by reviewing fom again and the laminated cockpit reference cards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew reports departing with light freezing rain falling; without being anti-iced with type IV fluid. A study of the de ice sheet indicates they should have deiced with type I and anti-iced with type IV.

Narrative: Prior to pushback from the gate and subsequent engine start; the weather was overcast with good visibility. After pushback; rain began to fall and a new ATIS was forthcoming. We obtained the new ATIS prior to taxi and discussed the -FZRA indicated with the new weather broadcast. The aircraft had been deiced prior to Crew arrival with Type 1 deice fluid and the deice form was included with the Dispatch Release. We made a visual check of the aircraft on taxi out and noted no ice present. Ground Control contacted us while taxiing and said that an aircraft in the deice pad (another carrier) was concerned that he had ice on his aircraft and that he noted we were not going to deice. We checked our wings and informed Ground Control that we had been deiced at the gate and that our aircraft was free of contamination. We proceeded to receive our takeoff clearance and departed without incident. During the cruise climb portion of the flight; the Captain confessed that he was having reservations about the decision we had made to takeoff without anti-ice. We pulled the winter ops laminated cards and reviewed them and discussed the information contained on them. We agreed that we did in fact error in our judgment. We should have taxied to the deice pad and been deiced and anti-iced with Type 1 followed by Type IV fluid. Although I was uncomfortable with our initial decision and had reservations of my own at the time; I failed to convey that to the Captain and I believed that we made a safe decision. The first indication of -FZRA on the ATIS should have sent us to the pad for deice. The indication from another aircraft of ice should have sent us to the deice pad. We should have reviewed the laminated cards initially and that would have left us with no doubt given the circumstances. This was my first real-word Company winter ops situation and we should have taken more time to study what we were dealing with. I will better prepare by reviewing FOM again and the laminated cockpit reference cards.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.