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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1224941 |
Time | |
Date | 201412 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Angle of Attack Vane |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Preflight and taxi were normal. Planned as the co-pilots leg; so the first officer (first officer) is pilot flying (PF) and captain (ca) is the pilot monitoring (pm). Takeoff performance data called for a 22K standard power with 5 flaps. Because of likely tail winds; we re-planned for a maximum power. We were cleared to take off after appropriate separation behind a 757. Between 80 knots and V1 'IAS disagree' came on in both pfds. A quick cross check showed the first officer and stby IAS agreed and the ca IAS was lagging by 10-20 knots. A scan of the overhead panel by pm confirmed the pitot heat was on. We continued the takeoff. During rotation the stick shaker came on. PF continued a gentle rotation and flew the aircraft off the ground; with the stick shaker still active. We continued the takeoff profile through clean up. Tower switched us to TRACON as we continued the climb. Pm notified TRACON that we had an airspeed indication problem. TRACON cleared us to stop the climb at 6;000 and gave left vectors to circle over ZZZ1. PF hand flew the airplane while the pm ran the QRH checklist for 'IAS disagree.' we both noted the following indications: IAS disagree; altitude disagree; the ca aoa analog needle above the red stick shaker indicator with an aoa digital readout of 9.2; and the feel diff press light on the overhead panel. QRH directed the pm to the 'airspeed unreliable' checklist. While we were working through the QRH; all IAS; altitude; and aoa indications began to come back to normal. The stick shaker finally stopped shaking. The feel diff press light went out. As the flight conditions came back to normal; we reviewed our fob; consulted the FMS and flight plan; and decided to continue to destination. At cruise we reviewed the airspeed unreliable QRH information and had pitch and power setting charts available for the remainder of the flight. The descent; approach and landing were normal. Ca made log book entries and sent fmr codes identifying the IAS disagree and altitude disagree discrepancies. Maintenance met us at the arrival gate. When the first officer did a walk around he discovered what seemed to be some tape residue stuck to the ca aoa vane. Maintenance technicians identified and removed some scotch tape from the ca aoa.more assertiveness on the part of our mechanics when following procedural maintenance actions. Be sure to follow each and every step no matter how insignificant or obvious that step may seem. Also more thorough preflight inspections on my part; being sure not to overlook anything 'minor' which could lead to a potentially catastrophic situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: On takeoff a B737-800 IAS DISAGREE and stall warning alerted. The pilot monitoring ran the IAS and altitude checklist and the warnings abated. The flight continued to destination airport where the post flight inspection revealed tape over the Captain's AOA vane.
Narrative: Preflight and taxi were normal. Planned as the co-pilots leg; so the First Officer (FO) is pilot flying (PF) and Captain (CA) is the pilot monitoring (PM). Takeoff Performance data called for a 22K STD PWR with 5 flaps. Because of likely tail winds; we re-planned for a MAX PWR. We were cleared to take off after appropriate separation behind a 757. Between 80 knots and V1 'IAS DISAGREE' came on in both PFDs. A quick cross check showed the FO and STBY IAS agreed and the CA IAS was lagging by 10-20 knots. A scan of the overhead panel by PM confirmed the pitot heat was on. We continued the Takeoff. During rotation the STICK SHAKER came on. PF continued a gentle rotation and flew the aircraft off the ground; with the STICK SHAKER still active. We continued the takeoff profile through clean up. Tower switched us to TRACON as we continued the climb. PM notified TRACON that we had an airspeed indication problem. TRACON cleared us to stop the climb at 6;000 and gave left vectors to circle over ZZZ1. PF hand flew the airplane while the PM ran the QRH checklist for 'IAS DISAGREE.' We both noted the following indications: IAS DISAGREE; ALT DISAGREE; the CA AOA Analog Needle above the red Stick Shaker Indicator with an AOA digital readout of 9.2; and the FEEL DIFF PRESS light on the overhead panel. QRH directed the PM to the 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist. While we were working through the QRH; all IAS; ALT; and AOA indications began to come back to normal. The STICK SHAKER finally stopped shaking. The FEEL DIFF PRESS light went out. As the flight conditions came back to normal; we reviewed our FOB; consulted the FMS and flight plan; and decided to continue to destination. At cruise we reviewed the Airspeed Unreliable QRH information and had pitch and power setting charts available for the remainder of the flight. The descent; approach and landing were normal. CA made log book entries and sent FMR codes identifying the IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE discrepancies. Maintenance met us at the arrival gate. When the FO did a walk around he discovered what seemed to be some tape residue stuck to the CA AOA vane. Maintenance Technicians identified and removed some scotch tape from the CA AOA.More assertiveness on the part of our mechanics when following procedural maintenance actions. Be sure to follow each and every step no matter how insignificant or obvious that step may seem. Also more thorough preflight inspections on my part; being sure not to overlook anything 'minor' which could lead to a potentially catastrophic situation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.